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Abstract
In India, the crisis of migration tied to the entry, presence and assimilation of the so-called
‘irregular’, ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ is now an undisputed reality, seemingly
affecting all geographical areas located within the national territories in multiple adverse
ways. A decidedly strident xenophobic rhetoric attaches the presence of such migrants in
an indiscriminate fashion to unending anxieties and urgent problems, whilst constantly
drawing attention to the inefficacies of immigration enforcement and deficiencies of
(interior and exterior) borders controls. This dissertation addresses key moments in the
making and deepening of this national crisis and its management by state authorities over
the course of two and half decades. Through the critical assessment of some prominent
governance strategies which unfolded during specific times and at particular
geographical locations and scales, the study highlights the formation and intensification
of this crisis and associated, corrective measures adopted by successive governments to
fix it. Some of these important tactics discussed in this dissertation include: migrant
detention and deportation, especially at privileged interior locations like New Delhi and
its marginal, ‘Bangladeshi-prone’ spaces; adjustments to immigration and citizenship
rules; dissolution of migrant assimilation through elimination of various fundamental
rights, including birthright citizenship and access to dwindling state subsidies; building
up of edifices with the aim of segregating unwanted non-citizens and heightened
surveillance; along with the intensification of border controls through rising enforcement.
The securitization and criminalization of such flows, it is shown, are its notable features
and by implementing such schemes, these xenophobic tendencies are being amplified in
particular ways. The pivotal function performed by the Hindu right-wing political forces
and their anti-Muslim, xenophobic politics of Hindutva or Hindu majoritarianism in these
processes is analysed. The study discusses the shadowy, threatening figures of the
‘irregular Bangladeshi migrants’, increasingly merging with residents and entrants of a
particular religious faith, along with the intensifying precariousness of vulnerable
residents targeted by such immigration and border controls.
Keywords: immigration and border controls; migrant detention and deportation;
crimmigration regime; biometric identity systems and surveillance; irregular
migration and migrants; xenophobia; Hindu right; citizenship, religion and classbased identities; India and Bangladesh.
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Write,
Write Down,
I am a Miya. 1
My serial number in the NRC 2 is 200543.
I have two children.
Another is coming,
Next summer.
Will you hate him,
As you hate me? – Hafiz Ahmed (Andre and Kumar 2016).
You murdered me in Nellie,3
Because I am Miya,
You murdered me in Khagrabari,
Because I am Miya,
You abused me by calling me Bangladeshi,
Because I am Miya – Aman Wadud (Das 2016).
Jodi khushi thaktey chao,
Jodi Assam thaktey chao,
Proman-potro joma diya,
NRC banao,
Jodi proman-patro na thakile,
Bangladesh-e-jao
[If you want to remain happy,
if you want to remain in Assam,
then deposit your identity documents
and get your NRC made,
And if you don’t have these documents,
Go back to Bangladesh] 4 (Mukherjee 2018).

1

Miya (also written as mian or miyah) denotes a gentleman in the Urdu language. An amalgamation of Arabic-Farsi
(Persian) and Hindustani languages with a Perso-Arabic script, Urdu has been associated with the Muslim
populations of undivided India, including Pakistan and to a lesser extent Bangladesh. This term has been
appropriated in India for pejorative, popular usage to derogatorily describe Muslims citizens and migrants. In parts
of north-east India, unwanted migrants and residents are labelled as miya and miya log. Sectarian or communal
violence targeting Muslims has been referred to lately as miya mari (killing of Muslims) (Shaban 2018). The first two
pieces are samples of Miya poetry composed in protest against the rising tide of religious intolerance in Assam and
other parts of India.
2
NRC is the acronym for the National Register of Citizens, the official list and record of the legitimate citizens of
India. This register is in the final stages of completion for the province of Assam. For other parts of India, it is
believed that preparatory work is being carried out through the National Population Register.
3
Nellie and Khagrabari are conspicuous sites of large-scale anti-migrant, anti-Muslim violence in Assam.
4
These are the lyrics of a new folk song in Assam about the NRC and ‘irregular Bangladeshis’. It uses a combination
of Bengali and Assamese words.

5

Acknowledgements
Writing is a largely solitary pursuit. However, the broader act of research cannot be
conducted or completed without the help and support of many persons associated with
academia as well as those outside of it. This is especially the case when one’s chosen
project deals with a highly politicized, sensitive topic involving subaltern individuals
whose precarious existence at the social margins arouses tremendous fear and anxiety at
the research setting. Such difficult research cannot be successfully executed without the
help and support of those who appreciate its purpose and value. I have accumulated
many such debts for this work for which I need to belatedly express my deep appreciation
to numerous individuals. I am certain that I am forgetting to name all of them. But I
remain forever indebted to them for their involvement in my research. My work would
have been far less comprehensive and certainly not as richly textured without the
generous, willing assistance of these persons. In big ways and small, they have added
great value to this dissertation and other writings emerging out of it. Many of them were
unconnected with academia and the university milieu. They had little to benefit, if at all,
from my research and work.
Such generous, often unexpected help enabled me to locate unidentified opportunities
for interviews and fieldwork and also provided access to previously unknown sources of
primary materials. The political cartoon on the cover of this dissertation accompanied a
small set of clippings of articles on the ‘Bangladeshi migrants’ from unidentified Hindilanguage newspapers given to me by a social worker engaged in New Delhi’s poorest
neighbourhoods. The head librarian at a prominent institution suggested that the
documentation unit and library at the Parliament of India would be useful for my
research endeavour. He then proceeded to facilitate the introduction required for entry
into those facilities, even though I was a complete stranger to him. Despite the wideranging body of materials available there, those particular archives are meant primarily
for the benefit of the members of the Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha, the two houses of the
Indian Parliament. Access to it is generally restricted for the general public. Similarly, it
was the inadvertent discovery of entire sets of local newspapers for that period at another
research library in New Delhi which provided the fertile body of materials for my
detailed account of ‘Operation Pushback’. Their staff was kind enough to allow me go
through these stacked, unsorted piles of newspapers to search for relevant articles. I
remember with affection and amusement being encouraged by the employees at the
Parliament’s documentation unit to sample the subsidized, generous lunch served at the
MP’s cafeteria/restaurant. I was offered two free cups of tea on the days I spent at one of
the research libraries. Some of their staff would often urge me to stop my work and
savour the drink before it got cold.
On several occasions, it was small, seemingly insignificant suggestions and good advice
that yielded new, unexpected results and led to other avenues for research. Without the
support of these persons, I would not have been able to locate my participants and
accumulate the vast body of primary research materials from which I have partly drawn
6

for this study. Others questioned my ideas and helped me to improve my grasp of the
social and political dynamics in India. I am sure I have ended up missing some names.
But I am immensely grateful to all of those whose names I recall and others I may have
inadvertently left out: A. Rajan, Amina, Asad Ali, Tarun Bose, Jawahar Singh, Mushiar,
Mujibur Rahman, Sanjay Chauhan, Susheela ji, Sheila Makhijani, Bishakha De Sarkar,
Syeda Hameed, Naresh Gupta, Shikha Trivedy, R. Venkatraman, S. Ranjan, Saroj Kapoor,
Shabnam Ramaswamy, Lal Babu Hussain, S. Das, A. Baviskar, Reena Kukreja, Paritosh
Kumar, Partho Datta, Jayant Lele and Bob Stock.
My acknowledgements will be incomplete without conveying my appreciation to my
many migrant and non-migrant participants at several of the marginal neighborhoods of
New Delhi. For their safety, I have chosen not to identify the exact locations where
research was conducted though many of these are/were prominent settlements known
to those familiar with this city. My sincere thanks go to them for trusting my intentions
and sharing their experiences with me. Unfortunately, it is their compelling words and
accounts recounting the tribulations and humiliations of detention, deportation and
exploitation as a result of the escalating xenophobia and anti-Muslim strains which have
lent special depth to my work.
The staff at several research libraries in New Delhi, including the Indian Social Institute,
Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, Nehru Memorial Library and the
Parliament House were very helpful. I was also lucky enough to access the research and
documentation units of several newspaper groups in New Delhi and accumulate
additional materials there. Teesta Setalvad kindly brought a large body of newspaper
articles, many dealing with the detention and deportation of the ‘irregular Bangladeshis’
in Mumbai city, from Sabrang’s Documentation Unit to New Delhi for me.
I have been very fortunate to have a thesis committee whose extraordinary research on
migration and mobilities has long been a source of inspiration for me. I have been able to
easily draw several ideas and concepts from their published works to shape my own
narrative. I would like to thank Professors Margaret Walton-Roberts, Jenna Hennebry,
and Alison Mountz for being part of my committee. Their observations and comments at
different points have helped me to carefully think through my arguments and sharpen
my observations.
Special thanks are owing to Professor Crush for giving me so many opportunities
through the Southern African Migration Program (SAMP). The several co-authored
reports with Jonathan on xenophobia in South Africa gave me the ample chances to refine
my understanding of this complex phenomenon. I cannot thank him enough for this and
the many other ways in which he has shown faith in my work and abilities for so many
years.
Other persons have played a vital role in other ways. I will always remember with
affection Dr. Bernard Zylberberg who was my allergist for an extended period. He and
his wife Miriam saw me on a regular basis at the height of my illness. He went far beyond
his responsibility as my doctor by not only providing treatment but, on occasion, giving
emotional support. He provided much-needed understanding and compassion during a
very difficult period when many among my friends and acquaintances did not

7

comprehend the difficult nature of my illness. I will always remember his and Miriam’s
constant kindness towards me.
My family has played an important role throughout this process. They were an unfailing
source of strength during a stretch dominated by serious illness which forced me to take
a prolonged hiatus from academic work and focus my energies on addressing my health
concern. My parents, Chameli and A. Ramachandran, have been a source of inspiration
throughout my life and their understanding has extended especially towards my
research. They have always encouraged me and my brother Rahul to forge our own
paths, even if it means pursuing difficult and less straightforward options. Even when
family friends and acquaintances were characterizing my research topic as being ‘dirty’
and ‘dangerous’, they remained reassuring, downplaying their own anxieties about its
‘difficult’ and ‘controversial’ character. New Delhi has never been a safe city for women.
I remember my father frantically pacing the main street outside the neighborhood where
they live when I arrived very late one evening after completing my interviews. Thanks
also go to Rahul, Kerrin and delightful Sachi for the much-needed breaks from work in
Huntsville and elsewhere.
My thanks are also due to Nalini and Vikram Dogra for being part of our family. For
many years now, they have allowed their place outside Rochester to become a second
home to us. They have unfailingly provided generous hospitality whenever we visited
them and also cared for my parents as their own, especially during times when I
remained preoccupied with my research and was unable to do so.
Alistair has read all of my text, carefully proofreading all of it. He has also nudged me
from time to time to maintain a life outside academia, to take pleasure in the mundane
routines of daily life and not let work consume all my time. I cannot thank him enough
for always being there. I am really blessed to have a wonderful family that nurtures me,
understands my interests, recognizes my efforts and always keeps me grounded.
This study is dedicated to my research participants and my parents. This work would not
have materialized without their constant blessings and involvement.

8

Table of Contents
Copyright
Abstract
Acknowledgements
List of Tables
List of figures and illustrations

3
4
6
11
12

1.0 Introduction
1.1 Research Questions
1.2 Contribution to Literature
1.3 Literature Review of Thematic Areas of Study
1.3.1 Mobilities
1.3.2 Borders, Immigration Controls and Spatiality
1.3.3 ‘Irregular’ Migration and ‘Irregularity
1.3.4 Xenophobia and Anti-Migrant Biases
1.4 Organization of Chapters

13
22
23
25
25
28
33
36
39

2.0 Contextual Framings and Research Approach
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Research Methods and Materials
2.3 Staging the Indian Setting
2.3.1 Burden of Histories
2.3.2 Bordering Practices and Controls
2.3.3 Identity and Belonging: Local, National and Transnational Dimensions
2.3.4 Rise of the Hindu Right and Anti-Muslim Xenophobia
2.3.5 Migrants, Muslims and Urban Marginality

45
46
61
61
64
66
69
77

3.0 ‘There are many Bangladeshis in New Delhi’: Methodological Routines and Fieldwork Anxieties
3.1 Introduction
91
3.2 ‘They will not speak with you!’: Politics of Location
95
3.3 ‘Interviews as Interrogation’
98
3.4 Rights/Rites of Entry and Key Informants
104
3.5 Circuitous Routes and Sequences of Credibility
108
3.6 ‘A famous Bangladeshi actress named Sujata’: Interviews, Interruptions, and Intervals 110
3.7 ‘Masks of Silence’: Observer Observed, Participants Watched
113
3.8 Conclusion
118
4.0 ‘Operation Pushback’: Sangh Parivar, State, Slums and Surreptitious Bangladeshis
in New Delhi
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Indifference, Impotence, Intolerance
4.3 The ‘Action Plan’: Detection, Identification, Deportation
4.4 ‘Operation Pushback’: Aggrandisement and Aggression

122
124
131
138

9

4.5 ‘Operation Push-in’: Repudiation and Retaliation
4.6 Bravado and Contraction
4.7 Conclusion

143
147
150

5.0 Capricious Citizenship: Identity, Identification and Banglo-Indians
5.1 Introduction
5.2 ‘Irregular’ Migrants and Citizenship Slippages
5.3 Transmigrants and Politics of (In)Security
5.3.1 Enclosure and Separation
5.3.2 Surveillance and Expulsion
5.3.3 National Identification Systems and Social Sorting
5.4 Conclusion

151
153
157
160
161
163
170

6.0 Detention-Deportation Dispensation: Crimmigration Control and ‘Irregular Bangladeshis’
in India
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Crimmigration and Immcarceration
6.3 Contours of Crimmigration Control in India
6.3.1 Regulatory Frameworks
6.3.2 Decolonization, Nation-State Formation and Informal Mobilities
6.3.3 ‘Infiltration’ and the Hindu Right
6.4 Crimmigration Effect
6.5 Conclusion

172
174
179
179
184
187
188
196

7.0 Conclusion

200

References

237

Appendix A: Primary Materials and Interviews

286

Appendix B: Copyright releases

290

10

List of Tables
Table 6.1 Pre-trial Detainees and Convicted Migrants in India, 1998-2012

188

Table 6.2 Foreigners’ Arrests and Deportation by Citizenship, 2006-2008

189

Table 6.3 Deportations to Bangladesh, 2005-2011

190

Table 6.4 Migrant Pre-Trial Detainees and Convicted Non-Citizens in Indian Prisons, 2015

190

11

List of Figures and Illustrations
Figure 4.1 Rao’s Liberalisation and ‘Non-Indian residents’

124

Figure 4.2 Saffronisation of Congress Party and India

127

Figure 4.3 ‘Bangladeshi-prone areas’ in New Delhi

130

Figure 4.4 Chief Ministers’ meeting, September 1992

136

12

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
My income tax return form has been sent back to me because in response to the question "number of your
dependents", I replied: “65% of the population who don't pay taxes, 50 million illegal immigrants, 900,000
criminals in over 85 prisons, and above all, 769 idiots in Parliament.”
They said this was not an acceptable answer. I am still wondering. Who the hell did I miss out?
If you cross the North Korean border illegally,
You get twelve years’ hard labor in an isolated prison,
If you cross the Iranian border illegally,
You get detained indefinitely,
If you cross the Afghan border illegally,
You get shot,
If you cross the Saudi Arabian border illegally,
You get jailed for life,
If you cross the Chinese border illegally,
You get kidnapped and may never be heard from again,
If you cross the Venezuelan border illegally,
You get branded as a spy and your fate is sealed,
If you cross the Cuban border illegally,
You get thrown into a political prison to rot,
If you cross the British border illegally,
You get arrested, prosecuted, sent to prison and be deported after serving your sentence,
Now if you cross the Indian border illegally, you will get:
A Ration Card,5
Passport (more than one, if you please),
Driver’s License,
Voter Identity Card,
Haj subsidy, 6
Job reservations,
Free education,
Free health care,
And of course, voting rights to elect politicians…

Circulated widely via email and social media, these anonymous statements clearly
convey the idea that ‘irregular migration’ is out of control in India. They suggest that its

5

State-issued document to access subsidized food rations and other essential commodities through
the national Public Distribution System (PDS). This document also usually provides proof of
identification and domicile status for residents by listing individual members of each household.
6
Haj subsidy refers to small government grants for religious pilgrimage to Mecca. In 2012, the
Supreme Court ruled that this subsidy would be phased out over a period of ten years and funds
directed instead to social development projects for the benefit of Muslim communities.
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crisis-like dimensions have been augmented by negligible state enforcement to contain
the flows and the liberal distribution of rights and privileges generally reserved for
citizens, to such migrants. These popular claims were expressed a short while back
during the sentencing hearing of two ‘irregular’ Bangladeshi immigrants for their
involvement in a criminal case at a Sessions Court in New Delhi. The presiding judge
warned that the “Bangladeshi influx” was a “matter of serious national concern”
requiring “urgent governmental attention…and concerted action before it becomes too
late” (Free Press Journal, 2012). In a markedly similar position, Judge Kamini Lau lamented
that even as these undesirable immigrants were entering Indian territories with impunity,
state responses remained weak and ineffectual:
It is unfortunate that while genuine citizens of this country continue to suffer in
abject poverty, it is petty vote-bank politics that prevents firm, resolute, intense
government action against these three crore [30 million] (official figures)
Bangladeshi nationals illegally staying in India, enjoying all benefits which
otherwise are the entitlements of citizens (Delhi District Court 2012, 17).
More recently, she repeated this argument in a separate judgment relating to the
conviction of another migrant:
Bangladeshi influx is one of the major challenges faced by our country in recent
times and is a matter of national concern. This serious issue requires urgent
political debate, governmental attention and concerted action (Indian Express
2014).
Judge Lau and the unnamed writers are not alone in sharing intemperate opinions that
are now widely accepted in India. “Bangladeshi influx” is a rankling issue and a vexed
challenge in this country. Indeed, it is a matter of “serious national concern”, as Judge
Lau put it. Print and online Indian news sources abound with articles and reports
indiscriminately connecting the presence of the ‘irregular Bangladeshi migrants’ to an
overwhelming variety of urgent social, economic and political problems (Joseph and
Narendran 2013). These migrant flows into, and their continued presence within, Indian
14

geographies have been tied to terrorism, violent and petty crimes, protracted insurgent
movements, unemployment, environmental degradation, depletion of economic and
social resources, cultural survival of indigenous/tribal communities, and damage to
cultural/historical heritage sites, to list just a few. Consider any urgent social, economic
and political problem confronting India and its citizens and there is a very strong
likelihood that the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ or the ‘Bangladeshi infiltrators’ as they
are also commonly characterized, have been blamed for their occurrence and escalation.
To cite a recent example, following the rape of a female photojournalist in Mumbai city
in August of 2013, a local anti-immigrant political party, the Shiv Sena, held the ‘illegal
Bangladeshi immigrants’ responsible (Bhowmik 2013). The perpetrators were later
confirmed to be citizens born and raised in this metropolis.

Highly negative, largely unrestrained public and popular discourses on migrants have
also slanted the perceptions of political and state-based actors. Since 2002 at least, the
annual reports of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the section/department of the central
government responsible for immigration-related matters, have identified ‘illegal
migration’ from Bangladesh as the principal problem (MHA 2002-2018). The threats
attached to such undesirable mobilities have been repeatedly accentuated in these
publicly-available official documents. This pattern can be witnessed, similarly, in formal
written declarations submitted at various times responding to queries by members of
Parliament/MPs. In a recent statement, the Government of India notified the Rajya
Sabha, the Upper House of the Indian Parliament, that “illegal immigration of
Bangladeshi nationals into India has remained an issue of concern” (Rajya Sabha 2018a).
In another example, the Upper House was informed last year that “some Bangladeshi
migrants may be prone to Islamic fundamentalism and become easy prey for militancy,
15

communal conflicts, [and] anti-India elements like Pak ISI [Pakistan’s Intelligence Service
Agency]” (Rajya Sabha 2017b). This official release went on to note that “illegal
Bangladeshi immigrants are found to be involved in cases relating to theft/burglary,
smuggling, human trafficking and drugs trafficking.” The language used by Judge Lau
and the Indian state to characterize these migrations and migrants, and their implications
for India and Indians, is strikingly similar. It places recurrent emphasis on the gravity of
the problem and the unending dangers accompanying it.

Staggering estimates, completely detached from reliable statistics, have regularly
circulated in popular, public discourses to draw constant attention to the gravity of this
problem. For instance, the unidentified author(s) in the epigraph above fixes this tally at
a massive fifty million ‘illegal’ migrants. Judge Lau confidently asserted that the official
figure for such migrants was three crores or thirty million. The latest disclosure by the
Hindu right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party/BJP-led government to the Rajya Sabha (2016),
however, cites somewhat lower numbers by claiming that there are around 20 million
illegal Bangladeshi migrants staying in India. Just how these various figures, effortlessly
brandished by various public and private actors, are arrived at has never been explained.
More reliable statistics, however, indicate that there were 5,635,489 million migrants in
India in 1990 whose origin can be traced to Bangladesh, falling to 3,289,037 by the middle
of 2010 and constituting a miniscule share (0.24%) of the Indian population (UNDESA
2013). In mid-2015, this figure had fallen further to 3,171,022 migrants (UNDESA 2015).
Even when official figures are utilized for these calculations, they form a meagre 1.5% of
India’s residents, suggesting that their presence and impact has been greatly exaggerated.
India’s global standing as a major receiving country had similarly fallen from 3rd position
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in 1990 hosting 7.5 million migrants to 12th rank by 2017 and the downward trajectory of
5.2 million international migrants (UNDESA 2018).

Claims that these illegitimate and unwanted migrants play a dominant role in criminal
activities becomes questionable when official data collected by the National Crime
Records Bureau/NCRB attached to the Ministry of Home Affairs is examined. For
example, 6,148 foreigners or non-citizens were held in Indian prisons at the end of 2015,
constituting a meagre share (1.47%) of the total incarcerated population (416,244 persons)
(NCRB 2016). Non-citizens from various countries represented a mere 1.75% (2,353
persons) of all convicted persons and 1.34% (3,795 persons) of pre-trial detainees in the
correctional system for that year. While Bangladeshis represented the largest group of
incarcerated immigrants/non-citizens (1,493 pre-trial detainees and 2,579 convicted
persons), over two-thirds were detained for immigration-related breaches, rather than
serious criminal activities. And most of these were migrants who had crossed over into
India informally. They were being held as pre-trial detainees or convicted prisoners for
being present within Indian territories without passports and valid visas and to a lesser
extent, for holding expired passports/visas.

It is evident that state rhetoric on the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ now closely
resembles, or to be more precise echoes and reinforces, popular discourses. In the case of
the latter though, and in a divergent manner, these highly biased images have been
presented repeatedly to give weight to and magnify this crisis of ‘illegal Bangladeshi
immigration’ and, equally importantly, the related inadequacies of state controls. The
national crisis tied to these migrants, and related failures of state-based actors to
effectively manage it, loom perennially in this setting. As a direct consequence, the
17

difficult burden of effective and intensified immigration controls through large-scale
migrant expulsions and ever-expanding deterrent measures weighs heavily on the Indian
state. Through its legal counsel, the Government of India admitted in a hearing before
the Supreme Court in 2012 that “curbing illegal migration into the country is a priority
since it has serious security, economic and societal ramifications” and instructions were
being issued periodically to all state-level authorities to undertake “concerted efforts to
identify, detect and deport’ ‘Bangladeshi nationals staying in India unauthorizedly (sic)”
(Venkatesan 2012).

Annual reports released by the Ministry of Home Affairs (2014, 42), on whom the
responsibility for immigration and border enforcement rests, have repeatedly restated
that “the checking of…illegal migration from Bangladesh into India [has] been [a] major
challenge” and also a constant and important priority. “Detention and deportation of
illegal immigrants is a continuous process”, the latest statement by the Press Information
Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs has pointedly stated (PIB 2018). That migrant
detention and deportation has been deployed to manage these flows has been affirmed
again and again to MPs of both houses of the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha and Rajya
Sabha) over the last few years. Besides these two related strategies, other enforcement
mechanisms deployed to “curb and control the illegal cross border movement and illegal
infiltration from Bangladesh” have been accentuated (Rajya Sabha 2018a). Prominent
among these is strengthened controls at the border zones, which have been visibly
highlighted, especially in more recent years.

As is obvious from the preceding discussion, ‘irregular’ migration is largely synonymous
with undesirable, often informal, migrant flows across the seemingly unregulated
18

borders from neighbouring Bangladesh. Moreover, the interwoven ties between
‘irregular’ migrants, criminality, and national security have been plainly, if
problematically, constructed. The term ‘national security’ is being used with deliberation
here, albeit in its broadest sense to refer to the safety and well-being of Indians and the
unceasing risks and challenges such migrants represent. Popular, legal and state
pronouncements all convey the uniform message that beyond the porous borders, poor
immigration/border controls and weak deterrent measures, the generous granting of
rights and privileges generally reserved for citizens to these illegitimate migrants, and
their assimilation within the national fold, constitute significant aspects of anxiety and
unease.

The pointed allusion in the epigraphs above to job reservations and haj subsidy specifies
the faith-based identity of the unwanted migrants in question. Haj subsidy was an
established program of dispensing small state grants for religious pilgrimage to Mecca,
discontinued recently by the Hindu right-wing ruling regime. After major cutbacks to its
funding, the ruling BJP-led government eliminated this program at the start of this year
(Dwivedi 2018). Such pilgrimage grants continue to be available to other religious groups
(Chakravarty 2017). Judge Lau’s reference to the petty vote-bank politics also connects
directly with residents and citizens of a specific religious faith. This well-known
expression signifies, albeit in an entirely derogatory manner, the perceived appeasement
through special concessions or extraordinary measures of certain sections of the citizenry,
mostly marginal groups, by liberal political parties in order to consolidate their power
and hegemony.
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Affirmative action and positive discrimination policies have been extended in India to
various precarious social groups, including lower castes, tribal/indigenous groups and
religious minorities as a way of redressing structural disadvantages inherited from the
past. Carried out by the Congress party which ruled India for many decades (and to a
lesser extent smaller regional parties with an explicitly welfare-oriented agenda), such
measures created for the Muslim minority, in particular, have received repeated criticism
as unfair, preferential conduct, especially since the late 1980s. In popular discussions,
such policies are believed to be divisive, reinforcing differences between groups by
bestowing special, favourable treatment on some at the expense of others. Drawing on
the dominant religious identity of neighbouring Bangladesh, weaknesses in border
controls, weak immigration enforcement measures, and the acceptance of cross-border
migrants until the 1990s, have all been viewed as veiled efforts by this political party to
placate their electoral constituency, the Muslim residents of India. Here too, in the
construction of the category of the illegitimate migrant, we see the seamless merging of
two distinctive categories of residents and entrants — unwanted migrants from
neighbouring countries who are believed to have willfully flouted the country’s
immigration regulations and the increasingly undesirable Muslim residents of India.

Another less noticeable (and certainly far removed from prevalent popular
understanding about the so-called ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ or the ‘Bangladeshi
infiltrators’) is the gradual though systematic transformation of the governance of these
migrations. To be sure, the edifice of a new system for the draconian control of
undesirable migrants was assembled over the previous decade in India. Efforts to
sharpen authority over them through harsh measures were initiated in the early 1990s
and deepened noticeably over the next decade. Many of these adjustments are still
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operational in India and their unfolding continues to forge long-term consequences for
particular groups in India, not all of whom can be deemed as ‘illegal migrants’. Even in
the face of these actions successively bolstering the existing immigration system, the
myriad strategies and practices tied to it remain opaque and under-evaluated, as are the
extensive implications of these significant shifts. With the exception of the lengthening
metal fence being erected along India’s common border with Bangladesh (Mcduie-Ra
2014; Jones 2012a;) now the largest such structure globally and extending for a length of
3,006 km (MHA, 2018a) and associated militarization of these border zones (Sur 2012;
Banerjee 2010; SAFHR 2011, 2010; Human Rights Watch 2008), many other important
aspects of immigration and border enforcement have not received critical attention.
Moreover, the serious effects of such changes on the existence of those branded as
illegitimate, unauthorized migrants have not been adequately examined, especially in the
interior geographies of this nation-state. It is this ‘governmentality of unease’ of
unwanted immigration in India which constitutes a central thematic aspect of this study.

Grounding his work within contemporary preoccupations in the West with notions of
security and insecurity, Bigo (2002: 63) has identified its important characteristics as
“practices of exceptionalism, acts of profiling and containing foreigners and a normative
imperative of mobility.” From the discussion above, it is evident that the ‘illegal
Bangladeshi migrants’ represent the singular, extended targets of such insecurity and
unease in this national setting. Various sections of this dissertation engage with and
address the transformation of such flows from neighbouring Bangladesh as a national
crisis. It shows that a combination of older and more recent arrivals, both preceding and
post-dating its formation, and specific forms of mobility from these areas have become
entangled in this crisis and its governance. My analysis concretely ties the making and
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deepening of this crisis to the growth of the Hindu right-wing forces and their politics of
Hindutva, that is, its logic of Hindu majoritarianism and its associated discriminatory
proclivities. Their direct and indirect impact on other important political actors and statebased institutions and their effects on the intensification of immigration controls are
considered in detail here. The robust linkages between religious identity, ‘irregularity’,
undesirability and the enduring fixation with a national migrant group are highlighted
in the study as are the unresolved problematic aspects associated with them.

The thesis does not provide a linear, chronological narrative of such changes from decade
of the early 1990s to the present moment. Instead, it connects particular strategies of
control at key temporal moments to the formation and deepening of this crisis at various
spatial scales. An additional feature of this study is that it links both immigration controls
and this unfolding crisis to important political developments in India, including some of
the latest developments under the current BJP government. Attention has been given to
the particular fixes or remedial measures undertaken by state agencies to address this
crisis. My work focuses on less studied aspects of immigration governance, particularly
those in locations away from the border zones. The consequences of such changes for
those it targets and other vulnerable residents constitutes another important aspect of this
work. Through the analysis, the key dimensions of anti-migrant tendencies are mapped
for India.

1.1 Research Questions
Four key questions define the intellectual priorities of this dissertation: First, what are the
contours of the national crisis of migration in India and its particular focus on the ‘illegal
Bangladeshi migrants’? Second, how has the rise of the Hindu right-wing forces in India
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influenced the politics of unwanted immigration in India and how has it structured its
delineations? Third, what are the less-examined strategies of control introduced and
implemented by successive governments to address this crisis? Fourth, what are the key
impacts and outcomes of this governmentality of unease and anti-Muslim xenophobia in
India?

1.2 Contribution to the Literature
This dissertation engages with important ideas, concepts and arguments emerging from
four thematic areas of scholarship, all of which focus on migrations and unwanted
migrants in overlapping ways. These areas are: mobilities; immigration and border
controls; ‘irregular’ migrations and xenophobia.

My dissertation is informed by

important arguments and notions emerging out of the latest work in these research areas.
In modest ways, it also attempts to widen the discussion on these themes in the following
ways:

•

It moves the dialogue on immigration/border controls past its
preoccupation with wealthy states in the West or global North to the
remarkable makeover in a major national setting in the South. With a
lengthy tolerant history of integrating immigrants into its national fold
concomitant with rudimentary immigration controls, this swing in favour
of heightened border controls coupled with rising implementation of entry
and post-entry procedures, represents a departure, in many respects, from
India’s previous liberal stance.
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•

As a second objective, it identifies the decisive moments and significant
agents under whose keen influence and maneuvering such drastic
measures have been imposed and important deviations occurred. With
seemingly identical strategies being levied and implemented in diverse
contexts, focus has centred to a great extent on these contemporary tactics
at the expense of the exclusionary politics and its particularities that have
actively engineered these transitions. My analysis shows that the
xenophobic proclivities in India targeting the so-called ‘illegal Bangladeshi
migrants’ are intimately tied to the intensifying politics of Islamophobia
associated with the Hindu right-wing forces. Different sections of the study
highlight the important contours of these escalating biases and draw
attention to the temporal shifts when such tendencies were exacerbated,
especially through the institutional changes.

•

Third, the dissertation highlights and analyzes the unacknowledged key
transformations in the regulatory arrangements for the contemporary
governance of such undesirable immigrants in the Indian national context.

•

Fourth, it thickens the involved spatialities by bringing much-needed
attention to control mechanisms in the core and multifarious geographies
of India. So far, attention has been disproportionately given to the hypervisible border militarization exercises through the new political
geographies of borderlands or border zones. This has overshadowed other
important changes that have contributed to the building up of the
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contemporary inflexible and discriminatory immigration and border
control system in India.

•

Fifth, through the assessment of some key changes, I identify ways in which
regular laws, government institutions and enforcement structures have
been used to authorize illiberal practices and processes to handle these
unwanted mobilities. A much-need exercise given the uniformity of ideas
regrading such migrants, the dissertation also attempts to unsettle the
robustness and uniformity of dominant discourses on such mobilities and
the presumed solidity of the vexed category of ‘irregular Bangladeshi
migrants’ in India.

•

Finally, the multiple adverse, under-researched consequences of these
escalating controls are highlighted, prominently in relation to the marginal,
largely Muslim migrants and non-migrants.

1.3 Literature Review of Thematic Areas of Study

1.3.1 Mobilities
The mobilities approach has become a prominent concept on the academic agenda in
recent years. Waters (2014: 22) characterizes this mobilities turn as a “new and
resplendent focus of study” and observes that the “idea of mobility/mobilities is on the
ascendancy” in human geography. The Dictionary of Human Geography defines this
mobilities turn or the mobilities paradigm as a key transformation within the social
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sciences that prioritizes the notion of mobility (Castree, Kitchen and Rogers 2013).
Influenced by post-modernism and globalization processes, such an approach moves
away from stasis and fixedness to perceive the world as being in constant motion and
circulation (Sheller and Urry 2006). Correspondingly, mobile practices and mobile
subjects are central constituting elements of this approach. All forms, practices,
subjectivities and spaces of movement are the preoccupations of mobilities studies,
captured in its widest sense from actions such as walking and dancing to travelling and
migrating. Consequently, even forms of movement unconnected to the migration of
persons, individuals and groups are incorporated as mobilities. Another important
aspect is to document how the diverse forms of mobility play a constitutive role in
everyday lives and the relational aspects tied to it. For geographers, the specific relevance
of this approach is its ability to re-emphasize the importance of space and spatiality
through mobility practices (Cresswell 2006).

Despite its widespread appeal and popularity, this approach has attracted critical
appraisal, with several inconsistencies and limitations identified in its conceptualization
and substantive content. Jensen (2013) provides a good summary of the various criticisms
directed at the mobilities approach. To begin with, it has been argued that the notion of
flow and movement reifies as well as homogenizes mobilities as unfettered and easy
movement, suggesting seamless migrations and smooth movements of all types of
migrants and refugees. Very diverse forms of movement of different types of entities,
including persons, commodities, signs and transportation mediums are reduced to a
singular plane and undifferentiated level of analysis through movement across space. A
different argument is that the mobilities approach neglects ordinary life, by producing a
“homogenizing discourse anchored in a male, middle-class perception of the world”,
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while endorsing a “one-dimensional and mono-directional notion of abstract space and
time” (Jensen 2013: 24). It is also seen as characterized by over-generalizations and
simplifications about the complex and shifting nature of mobilities.

Drawing from migration studies, other recent assessments have declared that the
mobilities turn is highly celebratory of migrant movements across spaces, such that the
deep relationships of different types of mobility with unequal power relations and border
controls have been obscured from view (Cresswell 2010). In his assessment of this
mobilities turn, Faist (2013) argues that while the mobilities approach may be useful to
accentuate certain forms of spatial mobility, its value will remain restricted unless more
concrete connections are made between spatial mobility and social mobility. He goes on
to suggest a reworked analysis that moves beyond descriptions of mobilities to greater
attention being given to the mechanisms which contribute to social hierarchies and their
intensification. Others like Bauman (2002) have pointed out the many limits imposed on
mobilities. “Despite appearances”, he writes, and “so to conceal rather than reveal the
social effects of the ‘growth”, “mobility is a scarce resource” (p. 83). He adds that as the
values and attractions of mobility increase, so do the problems and deprivations
associated with it. Fortier (2014) contends that while mobilities research addresses the
manner in which mobility is “established as a universal condition if not universal right,”
migration studies accentuates the need for a more critical reading of the “fluidity,
accessibility and desirability of the assumed mobile world” along with the conditions
under which persons/groups can be mobile (p. 65-66).

These critiques of the mobilities approach inform my research in important ways. My
work draws attention to the informal mobilities across national boundaries in South Asia
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largely outside of the global regime of passports and visas and their deep ties with the
reinforcing of socio-political differences and hierarchies, especially within India. It
highlights their key function in the bounding of borders and identities at specific
localized and national-level spatial scales. The uneven and differentiated acceptance of
such mobilities calls attention to the social and political processes that enable and
constrain such migrations and contingent, narrowing conditions under which particular
mobilities are sustained, especially the undesirable forms. In so doing, my work
ensconces such mobilities within the distinctive regimes of mobilities, consisting of the
discourses/ideas, institutions, and processes, along with a careful consideration of ways
in which they shape and influence particular mobilities, both spatially and in a temporal
manner. Finally, the relationship between mobility and immobility, their associated
meanings of freedom and choice, and their coexistent ties with existing/reinforcing social
asymmetries are all relevant aspects in this dissertation.

1.3.2 Borders, Immigration Controls, and Spatiality
Another focus of my research is contemporary border controls, their particular
spatialities and their shifts over time. Geographers and others have given considerable
attention to the scaling up of immigration enforcement by nation-states. Contrary to the
rhetoric of globalization, these analyses of the latest modes of immigration governance,
substantiate irrefutably that deepening restrictions on mobility and selective acceptance
of certain types of immigrants have occurred in contexts such as North America and
Western Europe (Torpey 2018; Hennebry and Walton-Roberts 2014). The highly
discriminating de-bordering of the state has been attended to in many places by re-
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bordering through new ambitious projects to tightly regulate borders and mobilities
(Andreas 2009: 2-4).

The proliferation of methods and arrangements of immigration and border controls have
laid bare the unreality of open borders and free unhindered movement straddling these
national boundaries (Peutz and De Genova 2010). The persistent growth of such controls
and the emergence of divergent practices to manage certain types of mobilities has
mutated, even distorted, the “age of migration” (Castles et al., 2014) into the “unrelenting
age of immigration control” (Wong 2015: 3). This management of migration attempts to
align such flows with the narrow objectives pursed by state and non-state actors (Pecoud
2013). Explicitly, this involves the creation of an “ideal mobility regime” that seamlessly
converts complicated, compound and challenging transnational processes into neat,
orderly and controllable dynamics (Geiger 2013). Other scholars have pointed to the
emerging paradoxical configurations under which certain mobile populations are
accommodated with extending privileges, while others are excluded and their access to
key rights truncated (Rygiel and Walton-Roberts 2015).

The re-organization and disciplining of human mobility is intimately connected to the
broader endeavour of preserving states against undesirable immigrants. Mountz and
Hiemstra (2014) have shown that states are increasingly mobilizing popular, often
unchallenged, discourses of chaos and crisis to create exceptional moments in order to
expand sovereign claims and enforcement powers over weak migrant bodies. The
exercise of power and domination over certain migrant figures through control and
surveillance is a principal objective of such a regime and so is risk management. In
addition to being viewed as existential threats, specific forms of migration have become
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entangled with domains of insecurity, converging the disparate aims of controlling
immigration and elimination of security threats (Huysmans, 2000; Huysmans and
Buonfino, 2009). Emerging as consequences of these changes are new configurations of
liberalism displaying a constant fixation with security, under which a social panopticon
of surveillance and coercion directed at immigrants operates (Bigo 2002; Bigo and
Tsoukala 2014).

The constantly reproducing procedures, mechanisms and institutions tied to the
regulation of immigration have provided fresh productive lines of enquiry for
researchers. Recent studies have focused on the decentralization and devolution of
migration governance (Beckett and Evans 2015; Coleman 2009), new technologies of
management such as the increasing use of biometric information (Amoore 2006), the
growing deployment of the coercive practices of migrant detention and deportation
(Bosworth and Turnbull 2015a, 2015b; Bosworth 2014; Moran, Conlon and Gill 2013;
Mountz et al. 2012; Conlon and Hiemstra 2014), and the offshore processing of asylum
applicants (Mountz 2011). Other scholars have paid careful consideration to new
bordering routines at the margins of the nation-state such as border walls and fences
(Jones 2009b, 2012a; Duie-Ra 2014). The expanding role of newer actors, prominently
private ones, has been documented. Many of these recent works accentuate the renewed
significance of the border even as notions of the border itself are extended beyond clearcut lines on maps to complex bordering practices or “border-work” affecting multiple
geographies within and beyond the nation-state (Johnson et al. 2011).

New discourses and preoccupations about mobility have given rise to new forms of
policing where the locus of controls shifts from boundaries of states to forge new social
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frontiers (Bigo and Guild 2005). The borders of enforcement, control and surveillance of
illegitimate residents or entrants are increasingly spatially ubiquitous, multiplying and
appearing at many locations and not just at the geographical margins of the nation-state
(Balibar 2009; Conlon, Hiemstra and Mountz 2017). With the progressive criminalization
and securitization of certain immigrants and concomitant expansion of spaces of policing,
the spatialities of immigration controls have traveled inwards and outwards in many
different directions, turning interior areas of the nation-state into a border zone where
authorities attempt to regulate supposedly dangerous migrant illegalities (Bosworth
2017; Inda and Dowling, 2013; Coleman and Kocher, 2011). It has been argued that these
border regions have been transformed into “spaces of exception” owing to these new
enforcement practices and that such undesirable migrants are “agents of exception”
through suspension of the rule of law and liberal agendas involving human and civil
rights (Doty, 2013; Jones, 2009a). Certain enforcement practices, particularly migrant
detention and deportation, less utilized in the past as control mechanisms, have received
particular attention (Low and Mokhtar, 2017; Schuster and Majidi 2015; Golash-Boza,
2015; Weber, 2015; Rosenblum and Meissner, 2014; Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo,
2013; Kanstroom, 2012, 2010).

Several studies have pointed to the formation of new vulnerable groups and new types
of precariousness or precarities through these heightened control tactics. Nyers (2010:
413-414), for example, has drawn attention to the growth of the deportspora, an abject
diaspora or a subservient class of asylum-seekers, refugees, non-status residents,
undocumented workers, so-called over-stayers and ‘illegals affected by such processes.
In his assessment of the aftermath of mass deportations from the United States,
Kanstroom (2012: 9) has pointed to the emergence of a new “deportation diaspora.” This
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cohort consists of “a forcibly uprooted population of people with deep, cohesive social
and cultural connections to each other and to the nation-state from which they have been
involuntarily removed.” In her analysis of the Indian borderlands, Banerjee (2010) has
drawn attention to the “circles of insecurity” forged through India’s latest fixation with
the border zones, producing escalating uncertainties for already marginal individuals,
particularly insignificant female migrants. Latest modes of immigration enforcement
such as deportation are, moreover, integral to the delineation of the official and normative
boundaries of citizenship in a global system of territorially independent nation-states
(Anderson, Gibney and Paoletti 2011). As Bigo and Guild (2005) inform us, “identity,
borders and orders are intimately related” (p. 233).

The boundaries of desirability have hardened further and magnified insecurity for certain
kinds of residents and migrants alike through such new exercises. The production of
“anti-citizens” through the figure of the ‘irregular’ and undeserving immigrant reconstitute the boundaries of citizenship. The associated shrinkage of rights, membership
and belonging for undesirable, weaker groups has been observed. Paradoxically, such
tendencies of exclusion are being enhanced alongside other measures to accommodate
certain forms of privileged mobilities. Rygiel and Walton-Roberts (2015) have drawn
attention to the “slippery statecraft” through various forms of hierarchical citizenship
practices that are increasingly being deployed to manage different mobile populations.
In India, dual citizenship provisions and expanding rights for the Non-Resident
Indians/NRIs and certain diaspora members placed overseas have occurred precisely at
crucial junctures of marked closures for those seen as undesirable migrants. The inclusion
of the Non-Resident Indian/NRI who endorse the Hindu Right’s political agenda
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contrasts markedly, as well, with the exclusion of those from Pakistan and Bangladesh,
even with their past of shared histories and geographies.

Ngai’s (2014) compelling historical account reveals how decisive adjustments to legal
frameworks, judicial genealogies and administrative enforcement in the United States
fatefully designed the category of the ‘illegal alien’ and further produced ‘illegal
immigration’ as a key crisis during the previous century. The ‘illegality’ or unlawfulness
attached to certain forms of migration is created through legal norms and administrative
measures (De Genova, 2007). Other scholars like Kanstroom (2010) have argued that new
forms of immigration governance are grounded in political projects of exclusion through
recurrent episodes of xenophobia. Wong’s (2015) new study suggests that the
restrictiveness of immigration control is an effect of the ways the politics associated with
the presence of immigrants evolves in specific contexts. Research on current migrant
policing tactics would therefore be incomplete without grounding it in the specific
national and local histories from which it emerges. Likewise, nuanced understandings
would require a detailed examination of the political structures, including actors,
institutions and practices, that animate these new strategies and their serious
consequences for those they reject. This latter dimension is highlighted here and situated
in the focus on xenophobia and anti-migrant tendencies.

1.3.3 ‘Irregular’ Migration and ‘Irregularity’
In traditional migration literature, ‘irregular’ migration has largely been treated as a
standard immigration class with sharply defined contours demarcated through
unauthorized entry across porous border zones and/or unsanctioned residence within
the receiving state (Orrenius and Zavodny, 2015; Papademetrious and Di Marzo, 1986).
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This popular perspective reifies perceived breaches of state-sanctioned norms of entry as
well as residence. Concomitantly, these migrants’ presence within national geographies
becomes a challenge to state sovereignty (Dauvergne 2008). Moreover, it legitimizes state
efforts to clamp down heavily on such migrants, justifying such draconian actions against
them. More recently, scholars have begun to critically investigate this particular
classification and the stigma associated with it (Menjivar and Kanstroom 2014; Squire
2011; Koser 2010; Anderson and Ruhs 2010). An early work problematized this
homogeneity by uncovering its diffuse character and overlap with other forms of
mobility (Ghosh 1998). Newer studies have examined the various routes through which
individuals end up occupying this undesirable label (Vickstrom 2014; Black et al. 2006).
Squire (2011) has called for a critical re-thinking of ‘irregularity’ through the lens of
“mobilizing politics”. Such an approach questions its treatment as individual status and
objective problem that is to be addressed, considering it instead as a condition formed
and deepened through various processes of (ir)regularization. There is a clear emphasis
on political processes through which ‘irregularity’ is both forged as an “object of security”
and also performed as “subject of citizenship”.

‘Illegality’, as Menjivar and Kanstroom (2014: 1) argue, is “a peculiarly powerful and
amorphous legal concept [which] marks a specific allegation by government enforcement
agents, investigators and prosecutors of a particular type of conduct”. But, it is more than
mere categorization by state agencies. In Ngai’s (2004) historical study of the exclusion
years in the US, the formidable combination of immigration laws and their zealous
enforcement underpinned by racism fashioned the undesirable category of the ‘illegal
alien’. While European migration also continued through informal channels, they were
less vilified and largely escaped the negative attention encountered by non-white groups,
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particularly Chinese and other Asians. Garland’s (2014) narrative of Jewish ‘illegal’
migration during this restrictive period of the quota system based on national origins
(1924-65) reveals that American-Jewish leaders actively sought to distance their
community from the spectre of the ‘illegal alien’ by emphasizing their positive traits.
Other works have demonstrated important ways in which political and popular
narratives along with state-based processes buttress particular skewed representations of
‘irregular migrants’ and their damaging relationships with citizens, decisively moulding
their harsh treatment by enforcing authorities (De Genova 2011). In different studies,
Chavez (2014, 2013) has analyzed the inflammatory discourses on fertility, children of
immigrants and ‘anchor babies’ that have congealed the ‘Latina threat’ as an invading
force destructive to the American way of life.

Many of these newer engagements with the naturalization of irregularity convey that the
boundaries between legality and ‘illegality’ are permeable. Additionally, ‘illegality’ and
undesirability are not identical categories in immigration regulation and its execution.
Enforcing states have selectively accepted and rejected migrants who entered their
territories informally. Focused on a variety of national contexts, a growing body of
writings has connected the deepening of ‘irregularity’ to the erosion of the global asylum
regime (Schuster 2011). Coutin’s study (2007) showed that despite having fled the civil
war during the 1980s, Salvadoran arrivals to the US were uniformly treated as ‘illegal
migrants’, warranting expulsion through excessive controls. More recently, South Africa
rejected many Zimbabweans fleeing their country’s economic and social meltdown,
zealously deporting migrants in vast numbers, despite its own dubious role in
prolonging Mugabe’s regime (Crush et al. 2017; Crush and Tevera 2010).
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The amplification of immigration enforcement targeting ‘irregular’ migrants has often
ended up widening this troublesome category, instead of concretely addressing this
‘problem’. Such “border spectacles”, writes De Genova (2013), make ‘illegality’
prominently noticeable, all the while enabling “the obscene of inclusion through
exclusion” through the subordination and racialization of migrant labour. The adverse
consequences of being labelled as such have been highlighted, from indefinite detention
(DeBono 2013), deportability (De Genova 2002) and deportation/forced expulsion
(Hagan, Rodriguez and Castro 2011), to precarious liminal status truncating migrants’
economic and social participation as well as inclusion in receiving states (Bloch and
McKay 2016; Sigona 2012; Goldring and Landolt 2013). Through “deportability” or the
perennial threat of forced expulsion, De Genova (2009) argues, ‘irregular’ migrant labour
is rendered as a “distinctly disposable commodity” (p. 162). As Dauvergne (2008: 28)
points out, “the exclusionary device of making people illegal is so complete that those
labeled so scarcely even have human rights…Illegality is exclusion from [the political]
sphere, to a status diminished even beyond bare life”. Building from these various ideas,
the unstable dispositions of irregularity in India and its prominent departures from
conventional understanding are outlined in this work.

1.3.4 Xenophobia and Anti-Migrant Tendencies
Another core aspect of this study is xenophobia and its vexed consequences for targeted
groups. With the escalation of anti-migrant sentiments and practices, xenophobia has
become a salient reality in many parts of the world. Various understandings of
xenophobia have been provided by different scholars. As yet, there is no universally
accepted definition of this phenomenon. The standard dictionary explanation is the
intense dislike or fear of strangers or people from other countries which links this
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phenomenon with negative public beliefs about migrants. Other descriptions
characterize xenophobia as the “attitudinal orientation of hostility against non-natives in
a given population” and “attitudes, prejudices and behavior that reject, exclude and often
vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the
community, society or national identity” (ILO et al., 2001: 2). Berezin (2006) considers
xenophobia as an inherently socio-spatial process in which “fear of difference embodied
in groups or persons” is strongly connected with “territoriality and territory” (p. 273). As
such, a bounded geographical space with rules and norms of access is the political bed
upon which xenophobia operates and thrives. Although generally associated with
citizenship-based rights and focusing narrowly on particular groups of non-citizens,
xenophobic politics can target both unwanted migrants and undesirable citizens who are
framed as illegitimate ‘outsiders’ (Crush and Ramachandran, 2009, 2010). Rights of entry,
residence and related social, economic and political entitlements for these unfavourable
‘outsiders’ in the modern nation-state are central questions in contemporary
manifestations of xenophobia.

The combination of animating elements for xenophobia may diverge in specific national
and localized contexts. But, prejudice and discrimination targeting selected groups
remain its key defining features. Exaggerated notions, false beliefs and stereotypes about
migrants and refugees, their perceived numbers within receiving countries and the
supposed multiple risks they bring to the legitimate citizenry, drive and buttress
xenophobic tendencies in particular contexts (Chavez 2013, 2014; Crush, Ramachandran
and Pendleton 2013; Crush 2008). As the examples at the opening of this Introduction
illustrate, the threats attached to ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants,’ or ‘infiltrators’, are acute
and entrenched in India. Common symptoms of xenophobia are the visible and invisible
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forms of harassment of targeted groups by ordinary citizens and state authorities, social
and economic discrimination, and overexposure to physical and verbal assaults
(Ramachandran, Crush and Tawodzera 2017; Crush and Ramachandran 2015a, 2014a,
2014b). Frequent and repeated cycles of physical violence targeting migrants, refugees
and especially those characterized as unwanted or illegitimate outsiders, such as
witnessed in South Africa, can be considered as its acute expressions, or “extreme
xenophobia” (Crush et al. 2017; Crush and Ramachandran 2015b; Crush 2008). Often,
well-entrenched forms of bigotry, such as racism or ethnicity-based preferences and
biases may both inform and strengthen existing or newer forms of xenophobic tendencies
in particular ways (Crush and Ramachandran 2009, 2010). A related aspect, relevant
especially to this study, is that the vilified groups branded as illegitimate outsiders, and
seen to be wilfully flouting established rules of entry and residence, may actually
comprise a difficult combination of persons.

The securitization and criminalization of migration are important aspects in
contemporary public discourses on xenophobia and immigration governance
(Huysmans 2000; Wickes and Sydes 2015). As D’Appollonia (2012) argues, terrorism is
“portrayed as a threat not only to people’s lives, but also to their values, freedom and
economic and social welfare justifying exceptional responses, outside the realm of normal
democratic politics” (p. 4). A pronounced consequence of the securitization of migration
is that the distinctive categories of the ‘foreigner’, immigrant/migrant and terrorist are
blurred considerably, producing “guilt by association” for individuals and groups who
are seen to share some traits in common, such as religion. Huysmans and Buonfino (2009)
identify two distinctive ways in which contemporary concerns about terrorism have
embedded migration within security debates. The first of these is the “politics of
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exception” legitimizing the use of exceptional immigration policies and practices to
address the threats to the nation and involving trade-offs between liberty and security. A
“politics of unease” also operates where these threats are extended beyond the territorial
and functional integrity of the nation-state to other policy areas, such as ‘irregular’
migration and welfare provisions by creating a broader rhetoric of safety and anxiety.
While the securitization of migration is a relatively new development, certain groups of
migrants and residents have repeatedly been seen as sources of insecurity and anxiety in
many different contexts. New anxieties over terrorism, for instance, may fuse with older
discourses centring on crime, unemployment and loss of cultural identity. In some cases,
certain anxieties may be amplified at certain times. Of course, the association of particular
targeted groups with multiple threats adds greater weight to the urgency for
continuously escalating immigration and border controls. The expansion of deterrence
measures and punitive sanctions in order to repel and discourage unwanted flows are
high-priority areas in settings with escalating anti-migrant antipathies.

1.4 Organization of Chapters
Chapter 2 has two objectives. To begin with, it provides an account of the research
materials and methods accumulated and utilized for this work. Given the fraught and
sensitive nature of this research project, the protracted difficulties associated with
archival research and fieldwork are discussed in some depth. I have identified the
numerous hurdles encountered through the course of such engagement and the
persistent gaps and limitations attached to official materials on immigration enforcement
and its controls. A discussion is provided of attempts to mediate such hurdles through
the deployment of a diverse combination of primary materials.
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The latter part of that chapter offers a comprehensive overview of the broad contextual
elements that shape the larger narrative which follows in the subsequent chapters. It
introduces my research scenario and several nuances and specificities accompanying it
that may be less familiar to those engaged with Western settings outside of South Asia.
This section presents the micro-level texture of Chapter 3 and 4 focusing on New Delhi
and its research sites, while connecting its vital details with the macro-level perspectives
analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6. This is an important exercise as the various chapters were
not written as a coherent, singular, chronological meta-narrative covering a specific
period, Instead, the core elements that bind my work have been retained, addressed and
analyzed in various ways in the different sections of this dissertation. These core elements
are: anti-migrant tendencies, politics of the Hindu right and anti-Muslim biases, and
immigration enforcement strategies. Therefore, this contextual framings section acts as a
unifying piece for these various contributions (Chapter 3 to 6) by isolating the significant
nation and local-specific cues for my study. Key political events that frame my work are
discussed briefly, including the histories of post-colonial nation-formation in the Indian
subcontinent (1947 and 1971) and associated large-scale mobilities, along with the politics
of Hindutva of the Hindu nationalist organizations which emerged during the late 1980s
and its ‘anti-infiltration’ strategy. These occurrences are tied to the politics of migration
and other social and political processes in India relevant to the topic.

Chapter 3 revisits research conducted at the selected field sites in New Delhi and my
interactions with my migrant participant cohort through the course of it. It connects my
study and its decisive shaping by the inclusive research agendas of feminist and
progressive human geographers. The need to produce situated knowledges, issues of
social justice, social differences, and the uncovering of power differentials have been vital
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aspects of such research (England 2015). As Coddington (2015) has recently observed,
feminist geographies have both addressed and transcended gender by paying close
attention to difference and oppression in its broadest sense and the role of
intersectionality in knowledge production. Chapter 3 engages with these considerations
by discussing the challenges of researching marginal or subaltern groups at localized
settings where such individuals and groups are under increasing scrutiny and principal
targets of prejudice and hostility. The chapter introduces the neglected spatialities of
slums, squatter settlements and the resettlement colonies of New Delhi, India’s capital
city, where research was conducted for this dissertation. It is these “Bangladeshi-prone
spaces” populated by the poor urban residents that have remained the specific focus of
enforcement agencies, especially local police, for locating and apprehending ‘irregular
Bangladeshi migrants’ for many years. The chapter discusses the fragmented character
of these marginal spatialities and the risks of everyday lives that both migrants and the
researcher are required to navigate.

In Chapter 4, a narrative account is provided of a high-profile deportation campaign
known as “Operation Pushback” conducted in the capital city of New Delhi in the early
1990s. Carried out in the geographical, material and political centre of the Indian nationstate far away from the border zones, this expulsion exercise represented a watershed
moment in the management of unwanted migrants. It also pointed to the reframing of
the xenophobic politics of ‘infiltration’ by the Hindu right-wing forces in India. Troubled
by its eroding hegemony and the growing influence of these entities, the Congress-led
government abandoned its largely liberal approach towards these migrants. The
inauguration of this campaign on the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday and an
overemphasis on Muslim detainees betrayed the xenophobic tendencies and religious
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biases that had driven it. Yet, Bangladesh’s failure to accept the migrants as its citizens
brought this campaign to an abrupt halt. Low-wage earning, insignificant residents living
in the city’s marginal slums were easy scapegoats of such detention and deportation
exercises and the ones that were to follow in successive years. The term pushback is
striking as it refers to the common mode of forced expulsion, using the threat of violence
of detainees, across the common border, largely without the consent and cooperation of
Bangladeshi authorities. This practice of migrant expulsion is active to the present day.
Materials from the extensive newspaper coverage of this event and my own research in
several of these insignificant urban spaces have been used for this account.

A key element running through much of this research is the persistent ambiguities of
identities between legitimate residents and illegitimate foreigners, along with their
troublesome effects on the well-entrenched stereotype of the ‘irregular Bangladeshi
migrant’. Citizenship itself is a fuzzy idea, apparent so much more in practice, and also
highly contested in its formal substance and who has and can be included as ‘citizens’
(Sadiq 2017; Roy 2016, 2011; Jayal 2017, 2013). An added core element is the slanted focus
on the Muslim residents, often poor and insignificant in less-privileged neighbourhoods.
Chapter 4 takes up this aspect in detail using the concept of capricious citizenship. Weak
official processes for confirming citizens’ status have reinforced these problematic strains,
threatening to turn many insignificant residents into undesirable, illegitimate migrants.
A new edited volume has shown that such challenges associated with the confirmation
of citizenship status and identity may not be localized to South Asia and are, indeed,
relevant to many different parts of the world (Lawrance and Stevens 2017; Stevens 2017a,
2017b).
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As Chapter 5 shows, due to the workings of capricious citizenship, the considerable
blurring between undesirable and ‘irregular’ and the hardening of anti-Muslim
sentiments, owing largely to the upsurge of Hindu right-wing forces in this national
setting, have entrenched unchallenged stereotypes of migrants as residents/entrants
associated with this faith. The assimilation of earlier generations of migrants as de facto
citizens through voting rights and who cannot be easily identified due to marked ethnic
and physical affinities between citizens and foreigners have sharply boosted public
unease over such flows. In this respect, the recent political narrative of ‘infiltration’
regarding such migrants is at least as much about those inside the territorial nation-space,
who are seen not to belong and to present threats to the legitimate citizenry, as it is about
imminent flows across vulnerable borders. Framing these particular configurations as
“capricious citizenship”, newer modes of management of such migrations that attempt
to address these anxieties are discussed. It is shown that the state’s responsibility to
protect the rights of vulnerable groups who may be excluded through such processes has
been minimized due to its constant preoccupation with the unwanted migrants. In
particular, the chapter draws attention to the two unfolding projects of the National
Citizens’ Register and Aadhaar and their long-term significance for the governance of
‘irregularity’ in India.

The interlinked mechanisms of migrant detention and deportation are re-appraised in
relation to the regulatory frameworks of immigration and its enforcement in Chapter 6.
Engaging with the concept of crimmigration developed by Juliet Stumpf (2006, 2013,
2015) and the related idea of immcarceration (Kalhan 2010), the criminalization and
securitization of unwanted migrations in India are analyzed. An attempt has been made
to identify some continuities and discontinuities between these tendencies in India and
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other contexts in the global North. The analysis shows that a robust regulatory
arrangement inherited from the colonial era granting unrestrained and expansive powers
to state authorities has structured this detention and deportation dispensation. These
regulatory arrangements have boosted the disciplinary character of such practices,
through extended detention of an uncertain tenure and excessively delayed deportation
for detainees, conceived as crimmigration effect. Attention is drawn to the amplification
of penalties for informal border-crossings and their abetment under the BJP-led coalition
rule in the early 2000s. Examples drawn from selected court judgments show that the
migrants’ presence has been re-securitized and re-criminalized through these practices.

The concluding Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings of my research and identifies
ways in which my work has contributed to the existing discussion on mobilities,
xenophobia, immigration/border controls and ‘irregularity’. An update is provided of
some of the governance strategies discussed in the various chapters. Finally, these results
are connected to the newest developments under the current Hindu right-wing BJP
regime governing India. Linking these events to the further growth of anti-Muslim biases
since 2014, the codification of ‘irregularity’ and citizenship along religious lines and
documentation of citizens through the unfolding National Citizens Register and Aadhaar
are briefly discussed.
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CHAPTER 2
Contextual Framings and Research Approach
2.1 Introduction
This chapter sets the stage for the ideas and arguments in the chapters that follow and is
divided into two parts. The preliminary section provides a general discussion of the
diverse research techniques that were used to build and structure this study. The latter
part of this chapter offers understandings of the social relationships and political
arrangements relevant to my work. It identifies important historical moments in the
Indian subcontinent along with subsequent significant developments in India. By doing
so, it temporally connects the past with the contemporary times and supplies the required
backdrop for the concluding chapter in which some of the latest unfolding events are
discussed. Moreover, this section identifies and isolates several key elements and
common strands linking the various chapters. Since these chapters are individual essays
and not a linear account or story, it allows the reader to familiarize themselves with these
aspects. The contextual framings section presents some understandings of the various
geographical scales (locality, city, nation and transnational dimensions) at which my
analysis unfolds and specific nuances associated with it. Special attention has been
devoted to the intricate and overlapping configurations of ethnic identities within and
beyond India and its important role in both solidifying and obfuscating the
representation of the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrant.’ The entire section alludes to the
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complex renderings of the undesirable category of the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrant’ in
India.

2.2 Research Methods and Materials
This dissertation draws on multiple research efforts carried out at different points of time.
Adopting this longitudinal approach has enabled me to chart the diachronic relationship
between the national crisis of migration and the politics of the Hindu right-wing forces
from the early 1990s to the current period under a BJP-led regime. As this study shows,
the anti-Muslim orientation of this particular xenophobia has become more overt with
the passage of time. Moreover, it has allowed the assessment of a wider range of
governance strategies implemented over the course of the chosen time frame for this
study. Chapters 3 and 4 are based on research conducted in 1998 involving a combination
of interviews with key informants, migrant and non-migrant participants at selected
locations in New Delhi and accumulation of other additional primary materials, such as
those extracted from English and Hindi-language newspaper and magazines. Chapter 5
and 6 engages with research carried out in 2013. Additional materials were collected,
including official materials from Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha of the Indian Parliament,
Ministry of Home Affairs’ Annual Reports, Press Information Bureau statements, Gazette
of India, National Crime Records Bureau statistics and Law Commission of India’s report
supplemented with key informant interviews. The limited number of these interviews
reflects the weak involvement of civil society organizations in these vital issues. Court
cases involving the detention and deportation of Bangladeshi migrants were identified
and accumulated, some of which have been used in the analysis. Brief interviews were
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conducted in the early months of 2018 with Moyna’s lawyers to obtain additional
information about her case.

It is the specific nature and particular attributes of this project that have shaped the
eclectic research methods that have been adopted for it. It is also one of the main reasons
for the diverse set of research materials that has been utilized for this study. The principal
intention has always been to draw on a wide range of resources in order to provide a
comprehensive account across a particular timeframe. A related effort has been to make
judicious use of these materials in order to highlight particular aspects that have been
given far less attention in the high-pitched, slanted discussion on the so-called ‘illegal
Bangladeshi migrants’ in India.

This is an important consideration especially for this national setting where opinions are
fairly uniform both outside and within academic institutions (Deb and Mahato 2017;
Kumar 2008, 2015; Das 2010; Sarkar 2010). While there are some important exceptions,
marked overlaps exist between scholarly writings on these migrations and the dominant
public rhetoric (Deb and Mahato 2017; Sharma 2012). Indeed, a section of such work
reifies such exclusionary tendencies by comfortably reproducing them. To date, there is
meagre progressive work on these migrants, especially research that engages seriously
with the dominant discourses of ‘infiltration’ and its mounting effects (Ahmed 2017; R.
Mehta 2015; Chakraborty 2012; Banerjee 2003, 2010; Kapur 2010; Samaddar 1999, 2003,
2012, 2016). Certain immigration enforcement practices, prominently migrant detention
and deportation, have been understudied, especially in comparison with work in
Western settings.
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Moreover, other substantial challenges and dilemmas associated with this topic have
necessitated such an approach. The limited nature of secondary materials including other
studies and research on immigration controls and their consequences, means that there
is often little or no work from which one can draw certain understandings and fill in some
of the obvious gaps. Another important reason for adopting this mode is that information
on particular immigration and border enforcement strategies has not been particularly
forthcoming from state-based agencies. As Chapter 6 will show, there are pronounced
evasions regarding migrant detention and deportation procedures. Formal answers
issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and tabled in the two Houses of the Indian
Parliament (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha) to MPs’ queries on immigration and border
enforcement are often brief and adhere to a sanitized script, in order to avoid additional
inquiries that may prove awkward and difficult.

Such hesitations and absences stand in marked contrast to other governance tactics such
as the border fence construction and expansion for which a lot more details are constantly
forthcoming. Of course, some of the visibly publicized announcements of proposed
changes are themselves symbolic acts of posturing whose performative role is to
underscore state sovereignty and assertions of control over unwanted mobilities. Besides,
this does not mean that no information has been provided about the other strategies.
Rather, this communication has appeared in a fragmentary, sporadic manner through an
assortment of sources. Officials have been known to provide vital information on
significant topics of public interest in an informal or ‘off-the-record’ fashion to media
sources and news reporters. Such selective disclosures add other details, especially the
difficulties and hurdles faced by state authorities, which cannot be acknowledged in
official statements. Chapter 4 on Operation Pushback provides a critical reading of a very
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large body of coverage and accounts of this high-profile deportation campaign by Indian
newspapers and magazines. Likewise, the contents of the secret set of instructions for the
exceptional management of the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ through detention and
deportation have been selectively shared with the news media at various times.
Recounting their experience of ethnographic and archival research within military and
immigration agencies, Belcher and Martin (2013) have shown that such selective
disclosures, in which openness and closure are closely woven together, are
manifestations of particular forms of governmentality.

Above all, it is the fraught nature of this topic that has shaped my research methods in
particular ways. The anxiety of certain groups in this research setting and the high levels
of discomfort amongst Indians over their presence also extends to the researcher and their
research undertaking. In the incipient stages of organizing my research in New Delhi,
this was strongly emphasized. My chosen theme was characterized, on several occasions,
as a “dirty and dangerous topic” by well-intentioned friends and acquaintances in the
capital city of India. “Why has Sujata chosen to work on such a dirty and dangerous
topic”, they often asked my concerned parents in my presence while in New Delhi. This
query added to the apprehensions of my relatives who, while very supportive of my
research, had to contend with my regular visits to the undesirable neighbourhoods. These
are spaces generally avoided by most middle-class and privileged residents of the city.
As someone who spent over two decades in this city before migrating to Canada and is
very familiar with its rhythms, issues and problems, individual safety and security
remains a constant concern for the female residents. Many public places are not deemed
to be safe spaces for women and being present at risky locations especially at certain times
of the day, especially beyond dusk, is tantamount to inviting problems. It was also not
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certain if, despite my best efforts, I would be successful in locating, accessing and
interviewing Bangladeshi migrants and documenting their realities. I have written in
detail about the challenges of accessing the migrants and conducting research in these
neglected locations in Chapter 3. That chapter focuses largely on the dilemmas of
researching these undesirable migrants. However, research was also conducted at other
poor neighborhoods where there were no visible concentrations of Bangladeshi migrants.
All of these locations had a significant clustering of Muslims inside them.

Numerous myths and misinformation about the two overlapping groups, the unwanted
migrants and Muslims, circulate freely through public discourses and are tolerated and
accepted by many sections of Indian society. This includes some within my circle of
friends and acquaintances in New Delhi. The two pieces of anonymous writing at the
beginning of the previous chapter were sent to me by email through my school’s Yahoo
group. I spent a large part of thirteen of my formative years with this cohort. From online
interactions with this group of schoolmates over the last few years, it is very apparent
that at least some of them endorse the biased opinions which oppose Muslims in general
and these migrants in particular. Such prejudices are often presented in an undisguised,
open manner, notwithstanding the disquieting fact that some of our school cohort are
non-Hindus. The hard reality that the unconventional, exceptional nature of this project
and the broad position it adopts would not be approved by many people, including those
known to me, was driven home to me very quickly.

It was obvious early on that to conduct any form of archival and ethnographic, fieldbased research would be fraught with challenges and have to be conducted carefully and
with caution so as to avoid potential problems and adverse consequences, especially for
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my research subjects. Chapter 3 discusses some of these dilemmas. While conducting
fieldwork in New Delhi’s marginal neighborhoods, some of my key informants openly
expressed admiration for my willingness to enter these spaces and spend time there with
the poorest residents. As working class individuals, they now occupied a slightly higher
social position than the indigent slum residents, even though they had originally
emerged from its ranks. Then again, this identical activity was perceived with contempt
by my privileged, middle-class circle of acquaintances. “Why don’t you go and do a
survey of the sewers of Delhi”, the class-conscious spouse of an acquaintance mockingly
suggested to me a few years ago. For such residents of the city and India at large, there is
little difference between the ganda nala (sewers) and the marginal occupants of these
undesirable urban spaces forced by circumstances to live near them. Needless to say, my
research undertaking carried very little value for them.

Even if it is engaging on a scholarly level, the necessary undertakings of fieldwork and
archival research when working on a “sensitive topic” bring numerous challenges. These
barriers may not be resolved even after research is completed in the field. The process of
conducting such work is often, by necessity, prolonged, meandering and tedious,
requiring numerous adjustments along the way. There are constant conscious, guarded
and often calculated decisions about how to carry out work, what to reveal about one’s
work to others who may not understand its purpose or relevance, what to write and,
moreover, where to present one’s work. Our research may be susceptible to being
appropriated in ways by the dominant xenophobic narrative and associated actors that
may seriously undermine the rights-focused approach that has always shaped it. The
consequences of my work and its (mis)use by others to drive rigid, often discriminatory
agendas was driven home to me when one of my previous writings (not included in this
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thesis) was cited extensively in an op-ed piece in a prominent Indian English-language
newspaper by a high-ranking ideologue of the Hindu right. As can be expected, the
commentary had focused narrowly on the easy assimilation of the so-called ‘illegal
Bangladeshi migrants’ before the decade of 1990s. The failure to stringently manage such
unwanted migrants in the past through suitable punitive actions and robust deterrent
measures was the main point highlighted. This widely accepted belief has given
considerable weight to the constant need to continuously amplify immigration and
border controls in more recent years.

Most of the limitations associated with such sensitive research are highly relevant
considerations even today. It may even be argued that such anxieties tied to this form of
research have intensified under the right-wing regime that is currently governing India,
where the contours of public opinion are increasingly being controlled through a
heightened form of rabid jingoism. Any argument by individuals, even well-respected
persons, that does not conform to the accepted, narrowed stance on particular issues,
especially when the latter are delicate, fraught topics, is increasingly perceived as being
“anti-national” and unpatriotic (Singh 2017; Bhattacharjee 2016). Many such individuals
have been openly vilified and intimidated online and at other places, some even receiving
threats to their lives.

There are other marked restrictions as well. In a recent essay, Schendel (2013, 267) has
argued that mainstream thinking about postcolonial borders in South Asia as “sensitive”
has affected research in highly adverse ways. While social researchers have often
succumbed to the “national mindset” by reifying biased ideas; politicians and
bureaucrats have created an “overarching security discourse”. Consequently, it has made
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it extremely difficult for those interested in engaging with these issues to accumulate data
with vital information being treated as classified information. Joshi (2013) has discussed
the mandatory visit to the Nagaland House in New Delhi to acquire the Inner Line
Permit/ILP and subsequently to the district commissioner’s office in this northeastern
state along with the need for a local guarantor and host to conduct research in that state,
despite being an Indian citizen. Since the early part of the previous decade, such crossborder mobilities have been implanted within national security parameters tied to
terrorism and other “anti-national” activities. As a result, conducting research at certain
locales such as detention centres and prisons is likely to be extremely challenging and
nearly impossible. One may not receive formal access to such institutions operating in
various parts of India and their temporary residents. To date, only one in-depth study
exists that involves direct interviews with female Bangladeshi detainees at two of
Kolkata’s Correctional Centres (prisons) (Mehta 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). Such research is
really necessary because it allows much-needed understanding of newer processes and
the imperceptible short and long-term adversities they impose on those its targets.

A few years ago, a well-recognized and respected human rights organization with a long
history of work with vulnerable groups was refused permission to enter the Lampur Seva
Sadan/Lampur Detention Centre in north-west Delhi/New Delhi (Singh 2010). They had
been contacted for help by migrants from various African countries who were being
detained in deplorable conditions and whose deportation formalities had been
excessively delayed. This detention centre has been in operation for many years, perhaps
as far as the early 1990s. Fashioned out of a former institutional complex to reform and
rehabilitate ‘beggars’, it is jointly managed by the Department of Social Welfare of the
Delhi government and the local Foreigners Registration Office. The latter structure is part
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of the Foreigners Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India. It
earlier housed mostly Bangladeshi migrants apprehended in the city and held in
administrative detention while their deportation modalities, such as transportation to the
border locations, were being organized. In more recent times, it has been expanded to
include migrant detainees from other countries. To the best of my knowledge, no
representative of any newspaper group or other media organization has been allowed
into this institution, despite the fact that several news stories have appeared on it over
the years (Vatsa and Ghosal 2017; Business Standard 2014). Outside of South Asia, work
on migrant detention and deportation processes have drawn attention to the “messy”,
“chaotic”, “fraught” and “emotion-laden” nature of fieldwork (Bosworth et al. 2018;
Hiemstra 2013). Other constraints associated with such work have also been highlighted.
Hasselberg’s (2016) ethnographic account of deportation from the UK, for example,
points out the limitations of data released by state agencies.

Unfortunately, such thorny issues around entry and access extends to archival research
in India as well. In order to explore materials housed in the National Archives of India
located in New Delhi, one now requires formal approval by the Ministry of Home Affairs
(MHA) and the completion of a “character certificate.” While these archives are attached
to the Ministry of Culture of the Government of India, it is the central government
department responsible for immigration that grants official consent for conducting
research. Open disclosure of research on what are perceived to be sensitive and
controversial topics can bring unwelcome scrutiny of the researcher/scholar and their
project. State agencies have been known to discourage such work by refusing “official
clearance”, especially for non-Indian, foreign scholars and those affiliated with
educational institutions, universities and/or colleges outside the country. Even members
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of the Indian diaspora holding Overseas Citizens of India/OCI and/or Persons of Indian
Origin/PIO status must obtain this clearance from the MHA (2018b). In late 2014, an
Amnesty International researcher carrying an OCI card and authorization to work in
India was issued a “Leave India Notice” for voluntary self-removal. The Notice was
issued after it was discovered that as part of her employment for this organization, she
was conducting research on human rights violations by the security forces in Jammu and
Kashmir under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (C. Mehta 2015). She had failed to
acquire the requisite special permission to conduct this work and, in all likelihood, would
not have been granted it had she followed the established protocol (Srinivasan 2015).

In another example, Japanese scholar Makiko Kimura’s (2013) doctoral research project
on Assam was opposed by the previous central and provincial governments. This
disapproval belied the fact that her program of study was at a reputed Indian university.
She had to obtain official acquiescence to conduct fieldwork in this province from
Assam’s Deputy Commissioner of Police and report on several occasions to the district’s
Superintendent of Police (Kimura 2003). In early reconnaissance trips to her field sites,
she was accosted by the local police personnel who encouraged her to abandon her study.
Later on, the Government of India ordered the cancellation of a seminar at the OKD
(Omeo Kumar Das) Institute of Social Change and Development in Guwahati where she
was to present her research findings, using the convenient claim that it could unsettle
peace and harmony in the state (Kimura and Begum 2011).

Kimura’s (2013) work focused on the ‘anti-foreigners’ movement’ that occurred in the
Assam state/province in northeastern India between 1979 and 1985 at the peak of which
the local Tiwa/Lalung ‘tribal’/indigenous group violently attacked their neighbours in
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some 14 villages of Nagaon (now Morigaon) district resulting in at least two thousand
deaths. Her empirical study showed that unconfirmed, rampant rumours of impending
attacks by Muslim migrants triggered the violence in a localized context where there was
widespread endorsement of xenophobia by nearly all of the social and political actors,
including the state-level administration. Although the victims have been widely
portrayed as ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’, they were really ‘Bengali’ Muslims who had
migrated around the time of the Partition. They were not recent, illegitimate arrivals and
the perpetrators, albeit a marginal socio-economic group, were fully aware of the actual
identities of their neighbours. They had lived in close proximity to them for an extended
period and yet opted to redress their own economic hardships and sense of acute socioeconomic deprivation by ferociously eliminating them. Her work acts as an important,
though uncommon, corrective to the mainstream understandings of migrants and
mobilities and their complex entanglements with social and political processes in India.

To manage these obstinate difficulties and hurdles, I have accumulated and drawn on a
very large body of primary materials. The reportage of a variety of local and national
daily newspapers and popular magazines/journals in both English and Hindi languages
was consulted first by obtaining paper copies of articles and later accessing the online
versions. These resources were collected from various research libraries in New Delhi.
These include among others the Nehru Memorial Museum and Indian Social Institute’s
libraries along with the Indian Parliament’s extensive documentation and research unit
meant largely for the benefit of the Members of the Indian Parliament/MPs. I also
gathered relevant materials from the documentation units of several prominent
newspaper groups in New Delhi. Similar coverage on the ‘Bangladeshi migrants’ and
their detention and deportation from Mumbai city, another location where such exercises
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were regularly carried out, was obtained through the Sabrang Communications and Khoj.
This shared collective has a long history of human rights activism, documenting and
highlighting anti-Muslim biases in particular in India. In more recent years, I have been
able to access many of these resources online. Older media coverage on this broad topic
has been appended with newer articles, reports and commentaries.

Of course, all of these materials have been read carefully and critically to be deployed in
a variety of ways. They have been reviewed partly as sources of information, as materials
to understand shifting public discourses about migrations in India, and to identify and
locate potential key informants. While a growing uniformity of opinion on unwanted
mobilities across such publications cannot be denied, the large numbers of Hindi and
English-language newspapers, magazines and other media sources in this national
setting represent the existence of diverse views and narratives. Media agencies generally
known for their balanced perspective and progressive slant on the various social issues
(especially established newspapers like the Hindu with an online presence and newer
online sources such as the Wire and Scroll) have been favoured as knowledge sources to
some extent, supplemented with other official materials and reports by human
rights/civil society organizations. Several reporters who had produced open-minded
news stories on the migrants and their deportation were approached and interviewed. So
were other key informants outside of the field sites. In more recent years, human rights
groups and lawyers involved in positive ways in addressing the challenges associated
with migrant detention and deportation processes were contacted and interviewed. All
of these were unstructured interviews, drawing on relevant themes and events associated
with the issue of the ‘irregular Bangladeshi migrants.’
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The extensive body of media-based resources and interviews have been complemented
with a variety of official materials. A wide range of official sources were scrutinized to
obtain the fullest knowledge and understanding of immigration enforcement policies and
practices in India. Here again, it is the noticeable deficiencies in particular documents that
partly compelled this engagement with an expansive range of official resources. In the
annual reports of the Ministry of Home Affairs, for example, a separate chapter on Border
Management has existed for a decade or so providing detailed up-to-date progress
reports on these locations. The detention and deportation of ‘foreigners’ in these reports
stand in stark contrast with the barest of details provided. Included in a different chapter
awkwardly titled “Foreigners, Freedom Fighters’ Pension and Rehabilitation”, the
paucity of information on control practices requires them to be lumped together with a
totally unrelated subject. ‘Freedom Fighters’ ‘pension’ refers to special benefits for
persons who had participated in the anti-colonial movement before 1947 and has no
connection whatsoever with the issue of foreigners and migrants. In the latest 2018 report,
two meagre sentences exist on the deportation of foreigners from India (MHA 2018a).

For official information on immigration controls, this study has relied on the formal
answers issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs to regular queries on immigration and
border management by the MPs in the Lok and Rajya Sabha (Lower and Upper Houses)
of the Indian Parliament. These responses have been consulted and collated for an
extended period stretching from the mid-1990s to the present. Additionally, formal
statements released to the media through the Press Information Bureau/PIB of the
Government of India on these topics were surveyed. Longstanding laws such as the
Foreigners and Citizenship Acts and documents on policy revisions like the Foreigners
and Citizenship Amendment Bills were reviewed. Formal notification of certain changes
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to existing policies that appeared in the Gazette of India of the Government of India were
examined. Statistics on migrant detention and deportation were extracted partly from the
Lok and Rajya Sabha ‘questions and answers’ and also gleaned through the two annual
reports on ‘Crime in India’ and the ‘Prison Population of India’ released by the National
Crime Records Bureau/NCRB. The latter is an organization attached to the Ministry of
Home Affairs of the Government of India whose main task is to collect and analyze crimerelated statistics.

It must be divulged here that a large part of research materials from ethnographic
fieldwork in New Delhi have not been incorporated in this dissertation. Some glimpses
of it have been provided in Chapter 3 and the next section of this chapter. This omission
is largely because of the shift in the particular focus of my work after I recovered from
serious illness. My research objectives moved away from the fluid landscapes of
marginality in which migrants were situated and their lived experiences to a deliberate
emphasis on analysing the politics of anti-Muslim xenophobia, its governance by state
agencies and plotting their after-effects. Political and social changes in India, especially
the growing legitimacy of the Hindu right and its Hindutva ideology along with the
unceasing expansion of drastic strategies to harshly manage such unwanted residents
and entrants have had a strong bearing on this research turn. The near-absence of
progressive writings focusing on certain governmentalities, such as migrant detention
and deportation, also shaped the subsequent modification of my research priorities.
However, evidence-based research on the ‘irregular Bangladeshi migrants’ continues to
be very limited for New Delhi even up to this day. Some of the points addressed in
Chapter 3 are relevant even as the literature on irregular migration and feminist
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methodologies from which I have drawn on extensively for my analysis in Chapter 3 is
now dated.

Wherever possible, I have tried to locate materials about and construct narratives of
individual migrants from various sources and weave them into my writings. My aim is
to utilize such resources to humanize the account and address the deficiencies of other
materials, especially the available statistics. Moyna’s experience of prolonged detention
and delayed repatriation (in Chapter 6) was summarized using newspaper coverage and
court documents. These were supplemented with brief interviews with the lawyers who
filed the habeas corpus/writ petition at the Karnataka High Court to secure her release and
return to Bangladesh. Likewise, the extensive coverage of the first high-profile
deportation campaign in New Delhi has been used to write about the migrant deportation
processes during the 1990s. Sarifuddin’s narrative (in the concluding chapter) has been
constructed from the numerous news reports on his public lynching which are freely
available on the Internet. Building from a carefully chosen set of legal cases and court
hearings in India, mostly from West Bengal’s judicial system, several additional examples
of individual migrants have been provided in chapters 5 and 6 to illustrate the punitive
character of immigration enforcement. Some of this caselaw accentuates the
criminalization and securitization of informal mobilities through these enforcement
tactics. The singular accounts of Sarifuddin, Moyna, Razia and her relatives, and others
highlighted by this study illustrate the real hardships faced by such migrants and nonmigrants that bare facts are unable to convey. These real ‘stories’ and individual
narratives have also helped to bring my account all the way to the present moment and
connect it to several of the important latest developments in India. Finally, my work on
xenophobia in South Africa in collaboration with Professor Crush has allowed me to
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draw on another large setting in the global South and through that engagement build on
my research in India.

2.3 Staging the Indian Setting
2.3.1 Burden of Histories
In a well-known text, Krishna (1994) ruminated on the “cartographic anxiety” of the
postcolonial nation-state of India during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This outlook of
uneasiness, of fear, anxiety and disquietude, he asserted, involved a tenuous creation
suspended in an uncertain state between a former colony and not yet a “post-colony”. By
“cartography”, he was referring to the “representational practices that in various ways
have attempted to inscribe something called India and endow that entity with a content,
history, a meaning and a trajectory” in addition to the scientific and technical mapping
of the country (p. 508). In these imaginative/symbolic geographies, that is, the rituals and
associated processes to secure India as a bounded, sovereign entity with a uniform
identity, he maintained, that borders play a crucial, often violent role.

Nationhood and the related idea of a cohesive national identity are decisive questions for
all contemporary nation-states, not just postcolonial ones. Borders and who/what moves
across them, especially various forms of mobilities, are also common concerns tied to
such identities at most national settings. Such cartographic anxieties are certainly not
limited to India alone. And, if border controls can be treated as an important marker of
such anxieties, then it may even be claimed that such fears and unease are acute and
overdeveloped in Western countries. After all, it is these contexts that have the longest
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and most active histories of restricting cross-border migrations. Burgeoning studies on
Western states’ growing preoccupation with border and border controls, which inform
many aspect of this dissertation, likewise convey that such tactics are being implemented
at many other national contexts (Wong 2015; Hennebry and Walton-Roberts 2014;
Mountz et al. 2012; Johnson et al. 2011). Moreover, violence accompanies bordering
practices at many contemporary settings, involving diverse spatial locations and scales
along with its focus on specific migrant bodies (Jones 2012a; Mountz et al. 2012; SAFHR,
2010, 2011,). Citizenship is another important institutionalized practice through which
such anxieties are being managed in contemporary national contexts on a global scale
(Howard-Hassman and Walton-Roberts 2015).

Not surprisingly then, this appealing concept of cartographic anxieties has been utilized
extensively by numerous works engaging with the Indian and other national and
transnational settings (Ahmed, 2017; Bille 2014; Cons 2016; Dasgupta 2011; Rao 2013; Sur
2013; Samaddar 1999, 2012; Painter 2008). It is, however, important to identify the
particular dimensions of such cartographic anxieties in specific geographical settings and
their dynamic manifestations at various spatial scales. Another crucial question for India
is why at a particular juncture it experienced such unease and anxieties, not earlier or
later. Historicization, by linking past events to more recent ones, and, in particular, newer
key occurrences, is relevant and highlighted by this study. Besides, such nuancing helps
to underscore and explain why certain borders and mobilities are persistent sources of
hyper-anxiety for India and not all in a uniform manner. India’s northern border with
Nepal continues to be open and movement across it has been sanctioned without
passports and visas under the Peace and Friendship Treaty, 1950 (Baral and Pyakurel
2015; Hausner and Sharma 2013).
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In any case, the end of India’s existence as a colony attached to the Empire, and the related
splitting up of the Indian subcontinent into distinct entities or Partition as it is generally
known, occurred as far back as 1947. The postcolonial states of India and the divided
entity of West and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), were forged. Some two and a half
decades later, Bangladesh was liberated from Pakistan as a separate, independent nationstate. Dominant ethnic identities formed the core basis of such spatial and territorial
arrangements. While India and Pakistan were mapped on the basis of religion, for Hindus
and Muslims respectively, Bangladesh’s split from Pakistan occurred later on, drawing
on the shared linguistic and cultural identity (Bengali/Bangla-speaking) in preference to
its common religious character. Schendel’s (2002, 2005, 2007) various writings on the
Bengal borderlands have shown that as a result of these historical spatial
reconfigurations, these South Asian states have inherited troublesome border
delineations and difficult relationships with certain mobilities.

Nuanced studies on the Partition have shown that this mapping of postcolonial territories
was highly fraught as the spatial distribution of residents by religion in many areas was
of mixed composition and not neatly separated (Alexander, Chatterji and Jalais 2016;
Jalais 2013; Zamindar 2010; Chatterji 2007, 2012, 2013). Recurring sectarian violence
continued well into the 1960s, triggering large-scale forced movements of religious
minorities for prolonged periods, often into adjacent geographies of India’s north-east
which surround Bangladesh on its three sides. This produced and, for reas like Assam,
solidified localized anxieties about the presence of undesirable Others’ as well as mass
migration and its perceived consequences. These fears were and continue to be connected
with local-specific ethnic identities and their divergences from the broad ‘Bengali’
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character (representing both cultural, physical and linguistic identity) those seen as
illegitimate migrants. Bangladesh’s violent separation from Pakistan contributed to
newer, large-scale forced mobilities, reinforcing these older xenophobic tendencies. India
provided military support against (West) Pakistan to stem these large-scale refugee flows
(Oberoi 2006).

The protracted flows of refugees and their descendants are implicated in the
contemporary politics of ‘illegality’ and its various framings in this national setting. The
persistence of longstanding inter-regional patterns of migration, predating and
succeeding these crucial events has given an added complicating dimension to the
mobilities. It has offered tremendous resonance to such exclusionary strains, while
muddling its contours in certain areas. Assam is one such example which has an extended
history of antipathy towards the so-called ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’, the latter
comprising a vexed combination of the Bengali, often Muslim residents, refugees and
migrants. In popular imaginations, a persistent divide exists between the northeastern
region and other parts of India in the construction of the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’.
The emphasis on the Muslim migrants may seem to be less relevant here. Yet, the
contracted notion of the legitimate insider, the autochthon or “sons of the soil” rooted in
the localized dominant ethnic identities has driven the politics of xenophobia in these
areas (Ahmed 2017).

2.3.2 Bordering Practices and Controls
To begin with, localized unease in areas like Assam regarding mobilities from
geographical areas now recognized as Bangladesh did not result in drastic and extensive
national-level changes in terms of border and immigration management, at least for some
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time. This is to some extent because the relationship of these northeastern states with the
rest of India and the broader Indian identity, has long been troubled and, at best,
ambivalent. Ethnically heterogeneous within and distinct from India’s remaining areas,
it lies outside India’s main body and core geographies, namely, the northern parts of the
country. This region constitutes a generally-neglected, yet highly volatile region marked
by insurgencies and separatist movements, some of whom also eschew the dominant
‘Indian identity’ (Bhaumik 2009). Moreover, for a welfare-oriented state with more
pressing responsibilities of tackling poverty and inequality, border and immigration
enforcement remained lower priority issues well into the decade of the 1990s. India’s
paramilitary force, the Border Security Forces (BSF), which guards the two most
securitized borders on its west and east (with Pakistan and Bangladesh correspondingly),
was created as recently as 1965. The war waged with Pakistan that year over incursions
in the Rann of Kutch located in Gujarat in western India provided the final impetus for
its formation (Ganguly 2016). Before that, armed battalions of state police in these
peripheral zones managed most of the international borders of India (Banerjea 2005).
After 1971, when East Pakistan was transformed into Bangladesh, its smaller western
border with Pakistan (2,285 km) would be securitized and militarized with augmented
checks and limits well before its larger (4,096 km) eastern border with the former.

This is not to claim that no efforts were made to manage and hinder undesirable forms of
cross-border flows on its eastern side. The BSF is believed to have played an important
role in stemming the flows of refugees through the course of the formation of Bangladesh
(Banerjea 2005). Nearly 200,000 Muslim arrivals are reported to have been removed from
Assam under the Prevention of Infiltration from Pakistan scheme between 1961 and 1969
(Bhaumik 2009). By the early 1970s, Mobile Task Forces were set up within police
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structures for selected bordering provinces to allow the detection and removal of the
‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’. Such specialized structures focusing exclusively on the
control of unwanted migrants existed for selected provinces, such as Assam, West Bengal
and Tripura, until the late 1990s. These are all locations that are spatially contiguous with
Bangladesh. The reported capacity of such forces varied by province, with the sanctioned
capacity for Assam being 3,153 officers, while West Bengal had 165 officers with 1
Superintendent (Law Commission of India, 2000). Between 1974 and 2006, they are said
to have detained and removed an average of some 5,000 migrants annually from Tripura
alone (Kapur 2007). It is from the 1990s onwards that these localized strategies of
migration control saw the strongest traction, by moving inwards to core interior areas
and later to the multiple locations inside and at the border zones. Eventually, nationalscale management tactics were imposed, some of which are still being carried out. Several
of these prominent governance strategies have been examined in various sections, while
their function and impact has been assessed carefully. The punitive aspects of such
exercises were enforced and heightened as well.

2.3.3 Identity and Belonging: Local, National and Transnational Dimensions
In the highly diverse, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic setting of South Asia, where individual
and group identities continue to be imagined and experienced in multiple, and
intersecting, ways (religion, language, culture, caste/sub-caste, tribal affiliations, and
class), the geographical division of the Indian subcontinent and its momentous
consequences, especially the large-scale refugee flows, created new, protracted
challenges. The emphasis on certain differences, religious ones in particular, marked the
presence of some less-desirable Others within. Be that as it may, religious minorities have
continued to exist across national borders in South Asia, with a substantial cohort present
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inside India, the supposed, rightful nation-space for Hindus. It also could not minimize
or eliminate other deep cultural and ethnic commonalities that exist across postcolonial
borders. For example, Bengalis in India share cultural and social affinities with
Bangladeshis, in terms of their attire, language, food, and other social practices. Likewise,
there are obvious physical similarities between citizens and non-citizens across these
territorial boundaries. Conversely, there are differences in terms of language and other
similar ethnicity-based attributes between the Bengali migrants and local residents of
particular areas.

These continuities and discontinuities have become vital factors in the unfolding
xenophobic narrative of illegitimate mobilities centring on the ‘illegal Bangladeshi
migrant’ and the implementation of measures by the Indian state to manage them. Based
on research conducted in a border village in West Bengal which she named Prantapur
(border place), Ghosh (2011, 58) shows that local populations are unified by a shared
transnational Bengali identity, submerging other “sleights and differences of nationmaking.” Even the gradually increasing and intrusive presence of the border fence and
BSF personnel, who were non-Bengalis and thus presented as ‘outsiders’, have not
completely disrupted such narratives. Constant complaints by villagers about the
inconveniences caused by escalating border enforcement throws into sharp relief the
weak level of identification with the overarching narrative of national security. In these
border zones, tacit accommodation of the informal flows of persons and commodities
blur rigid categorizations and distinctions between “legal” and “illegal”, “licit” and
“illicit” processes. These well-entrenched, fluid arrangements have been documented by
a newer body of textured research in these border zones (Samaddar 2012, 1999). Such
configurations structure and sustain informal flows across borders and forge “zones of
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licitness” through which they are channeled (Kalir, Sur and Schendel 2012; Sur 2012).
While the tolerance of these flows cannot be overlooked, it predictably and powerfully
nourishes contemporary dominant discourses of xenophobia focusing on the ‘illegal
Bangladeshi migrants’ in the core, privileged parts of India. Localized forms of
acceptance and support of such mobilities, shaped by transnational social and economic
networks and shared histories, are reframed through narrowed lens as evidence of the
limitations of immigration/border controls and, by extension, of weakening state
sovereignty.

While certain areas accept such mobilities, there are other locations where they have
created unchecked worries about the erosion of local-specific cultural identities and their
dominance. One of the main sticking points of the so-called “anti-foreigner” agitation in
Assam was the demand to consider 1951 as the cutoff point for accepting refugees and
demarcate the contours of the Assamese citizen in opposition to the March 1971 deadline
decided by the central government (Bhaumik 2009; Hazarika 2000). In nearby Tripura,
the presence of Hindu Bengali refugees later produced tensions with indigenous groups
(Bhaumik 2009; Schendel 2005). The difficult historical legacies in which these various
mobilities are imbricated have been reinvigorated in particular ways in more recent
times. These various trajectories have shaped contemporary cartographic anxieties in
India and Indians’ attitudes towards certain informal cross-border mobilities. My work
focuses on the role of the Hindu right forces and their politics of Islamophobia in steering
such anxieties in particular ways since the early 1990s. These mobilities are a complicated
combination of past forced displacement tied to postcolonial nation-formation and later
arrivals, and remain entangled in the evolving construction of the ‘illegal Bangladeshi
migrant’ and, more broadly, with who can be considered as an Indian and citizen. As the
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last chapter will show, this former category has not yet been conclusively settled through
administrative measures. At the same time and paradoxically, its contours have been
sharpened through the newer political developments discussed in Chapter 6 and the
concluding chapter.

2.3.4 Rise of the Hindu Right and Anti-Muslim Xenophobia
This chapter and the next connect the cartographic and border anxieties to the decisive
political changes within India at the end of the 1980s and early years of the next decade.
In this period of upheaval and transition in India, the long-dominant Congress party that
had largely governed this country since its independence from colonial rule in 1947
experienced a pronounced downturn in popularity. It is this “crisis of faith” that forged
the generative conditions for the forging and deepening of a national crisis of migration.
The decline in the hegemony of the Congress party also led to the erosion of the
progressive ideals of secularism (delinking state character and practices from faith-based
identities) and “unity in diversity” which it had long pursued to accentuate India’s
pluralistic, inclusive character. Although the decay itself was caused by other reasons,
prominently an economic crisis and corruption-related scandal, it would be magnified
soon enough by the resurgence, through the course of this volatile period, of the political
forces tied to the Hindu right.

Sometimes referred to as the Sangh Parivar or the family of the Sangh or the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh/RSS, their reemergence brought with it a reconstituted vision of India
and ‘Indian-ness’ tied to an explicitly Hinduized, majoritarian identity. The Hindu right69

wing groups, a motley collection of proliferating organizations some of whom claim to
be cultural entities, view selected non-Hindu groups located within India as undesirable
‘outsiders,’ including some who are legitimate citizens. As the largest religious minority,
Muslims have been singled out for exceptional and constant negative attention. In the
politics of Hindutva or Hindu-ness, Muslim residents are viewed as descendants of
‘invaders’ and are therefore positioned outside of the real and imagined nation-space,
with some extreme arguments demanding their expulsion en masse using violent means
from Indian territories (Chatterji 2009; Jaffrelot 1996). Second-tier status is conditionally
granted to Muslims in softer, more conciliatory versions. The formation of the separate
nation-states grounded in these dominant religious identities in 1947 has provided a
ready ideological arsenal for their central argument that Muslims in India belong to and
ought to exist in the neighbouring territories of Pakistan and Bangladesh.

In other accounts, it is the ideal of an Akhand Bharat that fuels such resentment (Mehta
2018). This invokes the idea of a unified, undivided India incorporating territories now
recognized as Pakistan and Bangladesh and their permanent loss in 1947 As Zamindar’s
(2010) textured narrative of the “long Partition” has revealed, the consequences of this
geographical split have been momentous, prolonged, and vexed, and not temporary as is
generally believed. Such ideas also drive the core belief that these two fundamentally
incompatible groups, Muslims and Hindus, carrying negative and positive traits
respectively, must occupy separate and segregated territorial and spatial units (Zamindar
2010). The upsurge of anti-Muslim bias in India since the late 1980s has contributed to the
increased social, economic and political marginalization of this community in many
different geographies of India, including its capital city of New Delhi (Chatterji 2015,
2017; Gayer 2012; Gayer and Jaffrelot 2012). Strikingly, it is these distinctive enclaves of
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residents in the city and other areas, especially poorer and Muslim ones, that have
remained the marked objects of careful attention over the course of the migrant detention
and deportation exercises over the last two decades or so.

In his updated work on the rise of Hindu authoritarianism in India, Vanaik (2017) has
observed that the Hindutva politics and its core character of unceasing opposition to
Muslims, and by extension Islam, operates through a series of interlinked strategies and
ideas. Prominent among them is the invocation of a specific interpretation of history
encompassing the past persecution of Hindus by Muslims coupled with the denigration
and destruction of symbols and institutions of Hinduism by the latter. The current
community of Muslims in India are held responsible for these “past crimes”. To be sure,
the Sangh Parivar achieved remarkable prominence in India from the late 1980s through
their Ramjanmabhumi campaign. This concerted drive to “liberate” and “purge” the
sacred space of Ayodhya, the birthplace of Lord Rama, a principal deity of the Hindu
religious pantheon, consolidated their political position in India (Oza 2007). It culminated
in the forceful demolition of the nearly 500-year-old Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, Uttar
Pradesh, on December 6, 1992. The rapid deepening of social divisions between the two
communities, a decline in the status of Muslims, and repeated anti-Muslim riots were the
immediate and long-term legacies of this campaign (Jaffrelot 1996). It is important to note
here that it is at this highly unstable point, newer anxieties about the presence of the socalled ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ emerged in interior locations away from the border.
Operation Pushback was implemented in New Delhi by the central government and the
local administration during this fraught time frame.
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A related political tactic has been to build on the sense of deprivation and grievances of
the majority Hindu community by emphasizing their unfairness of treatment resulting
from the perceived appeasement of Muslims. As pointed out in the previous chapter,
weaknesses in border and immigration governance have been framed as purposeful
inaction by other political parties largely to placate their Muslim electoral constituencies
by undermining and neglecting the gravity of the ‘illegal Bangladeshi problem’. Here,
the uniting of the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ issue with that of the ‘Muslim vote-bank’
of political parties reorients unwanted mobilities through the lens of religion, far less so
than other undesirable attributes. The pressing national issue of the ‘illegal Bangladeshi
migrants’ is interlinked with the growth of anti-Muslim biases and weakening position
of Muslim residents (both citizens and non-citizens) in India.

But, there are other animating elements as well. The growing numbers of Muslim
residents, and their higher fertility rates, are viewed as a deliberate long-term agenda by
the so-called, amorphous “Islamic forces” to transform Hindu-India into an “Islamic
space” (Rai 1992, 1994). Muslims and Hindus constituted 14 percent and 80 percent
respectively of India’s population, as per latest estimates derived from the census count
of 2011 (Office of Registrar-General & Census Commissioner of India 2018). The
considerable differences in the proportionality of these two distinctive groups openly
points to the obvious irrationality of such prejudicial arguments. Likewise, the increase
in Muslim residents in border areas of Assam has often been crudely explained as the
augmented massive presence of the ‘irregular migrants’ (Saikia 2006). The concomitant
decline in the fertility rates of other communities, especially of Hindus, exaggerates such
differences and deepens fears.
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As absurd as these ill-informed ideas may appear to more discriminating individuals,
they have had tremendous appeal and acceptance in India. Many well-educated,
privileged citizens whose lives are untouched by the presence of these undesirable Others
have unquestioningly accepted them. They have resonated with the diverse
constituencies of India in various ways. Ghosh’s (2015) analysis of the growth of antiBangladeshi sentiments amongst middle-class Bengali Hindus in West Bengal and their
opposition to immigrants from Bangladesh provides one such interpretation. India’s
historic support for the creation of an independent Bangladesh, refugee migrations and
subsequent ties with Bangladesh, together with the recent cross-border flows, are all
perceived as detrimental to the economic progress of India. For the Bengali bhadralok
(gentility or the privileged classes), it is also the loss of their own clout, seen as their
rightful central role within the Indian nation-space and aspirations, that has contributed
to their intensifying hostility. Such sentiments undermine the unifying association with
‘Bengaliness’, despite their continued reliance on cheap migrant labour and comfortable
acceptance of ‘smuggled’ goods from the across the border.

In addition to a section of the country’s legitimate citizens being rejected as outsiders, the
presence of other more recent arrivals from outside the territorial space from adjacent
countries has generated intense concern. Here, prominence is given yet again to the weak
Hindu-Indian nation-state which is unprotected across its western and eastern borders
with neighbouring Pakistan and Bangladesh. Their ‘Islamic’ identity and related
character sets them apart from India and the newer cross-border mobilities are saturated
with negative intent. These mobilities are characterized as “demographic aggression”
and equated with overt acts of aggression such as war. Tracts produced by the Sangh
Parivar’s ideologues and sympathizers have long claimed a sinister, orchestrated plot to
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transform large geographical tracts belonging to India into a broader, independent
homeland for Bengali Muslims, the Bangabhumi or Bengali-land (Bharatiya Janata Party
1994; Joshi 1994; Rai 1992, 1993). This argument has been applied especially to areas of
north-east India lying adjacent to Bangladesh (Organiser 2018, 2017).

Some mainstream writings similarly suggest that there is an attempted creation of a
“greater Bangladesh” by usurping border zones through unceasing migrant flows and
by reducing the original, indigenous inhabitants of these areas to minorities (Karlekar
2005). A new text, for instance, claims that ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ constitute the
largest segment of the total population in many border districts of northeastern India
(Bhattacharyya 2018). It goes on to unveil a sinister plot by militant groups like Al Qaeda
and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami/HuJi to create “a larger Islamic land” beyond the
territorial limits of Bangladesh to encompass the “Muslim areas of Assam, north (West)
Bengal and Burma’s Arakan province” (p. 23). The relationships between territory,
terrorism, religion and mobilities are blatantly delineated here (Karlekar 2005). The fact
that large-scale migrations tied to post-colonial nation-formation have occurred into
these areas in the recent past has boosted this flawed claim. The marked slippages
between the mobilities of Muslims, informal mobilities and other (refugee) mobilities at
different times from areas only known since 1971 as Bangladesh is worth emphasizing.
An added conflation is commonly witnessed for the Indian Muslim and Bangladeshi
Muslim migrants, with the figures for one often standing as a proxy for the other. The
growth of Muslim populations in specific areas of India is often attributed to the elevated
presence of the ‘illegal migrants’. Thus, the obvious differences between these distinctive
categories have been erased.
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The Hindu right’s crucial role has also been to vastly expand these local biased notions
to all of the national territorial spaces consisting of India. In so doing, it has seamlessly
converted localized unease afflicting the region of northeast India into a national problem
and an urgent, festering crisis encompassing most, if not all, of the diverse geographical
territories of India. Resistance to what has been characterized as ‘infiltration’ has been a
strategic element of the Hindu right’s majoritarian, exclusionary politics since the late
1980s, and in its vigorous efforts to redefine national belonging, community identity and,
indeed, the contours of citizenship through faith-based characteristics (Gillan 2002;
Navlakha 1997). The right’s well-established and strong aversion to such migrants, and
its steady demands for their large-scale removal, are familiar arguments now to most
Indians. A clear-cut differentiation exists between the Hindu and Muslim migrants from
neighbouring countries, with the former treated as rightful members of the Hindu-Indian
nation-space and as deserving refugees fleeing the rise tide of religious extremism in
these Muslim-majority states. The latter are rejected as the ‘illegal migrants’.

The Hindi terms ghuspaith and ghuspaithiyey, ‘infiltration’ and ‘infiltrators’ in English,
require careful attention because they are overtly suggestive of regular, albeit insidious,
attempts by persons to gain admittance into a socio-spatial setting and then insinuating
themselves slowly and gradually inside it. Completely negative in their orientation, these
derogatory terms attribute sinister motivations to actions by the so-called ‘infiltrators.’
Unsurprisingly, these terms are often used in contemporary contexts to refer to attempts
by those engaged in anti-national, subversive activities to harm India in some fashion.
They have mostly been associated with terrorism-related acts and events. Equally
importantly, they symbolically connect migrant flows from outside the territorial nationspace across insecure borders to what already exists inside it, but does not belong. Deep
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fears and suspicion about a section of the country’s residents, and increasingly negative
beliefs regarding unceasing newer flows, have driven this politics of unease and its
particular governmentalities. Specific neighbouring states and adjacent ‘risky
geographies’ have animated and reconfigured older xenophobic strains.

As my analysis shows, the Hindu right’s political beliefs and tactics, and with their
growing impact in India, have reorganized the contours of undesirability and migrants’
legality, with religion as the central parameter for inclusion and rejection. Over time,
their growing influence in India has seriously vitiated public rhetoric by infecting the
stance of other political parties and Indians at large. In the late 1990s and the early 2000s,
their role in government at the central level would further deepen this crisis by linking
such flows to internal security and through the drastic transformation of legal devices
and other enforcement mechanisms to manage such mobilities. These political forces also
established a negative precedent for the draconian governance of such flows which have
been adopted by succeeding governments on a national and state/provincial scales. The
linking of such mobilities to national security, and anxieties about cross-border terrorism
tied to extremist forms of Islam, have further deepened the perceived need for robust
border and immigration controls, orienting the focus yet again on Muslim mobilities and
bodies (Jones, 2012a, 2009b). As a result, this national crisis and the expansion of affected
spatialities has intensified.

The awkward reality that India has easily accepted and integrated earlier waves of
migrants and refugees arriving from across its eastern border as de jure citizens has
brought as much scrutiny to the interior of Indian territories as the peripheral border
zones. The perceived absence of well-developed, vigorous measures for immigration and
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border management has encouraged such anxieties. The multiple spatialities requiring
concerted attention would be addressed through a diverse set of governance strategies
that appeared at various times, and overlapped at other periods. My work has given
critical attention to some of these lesser studied tactics. Migrant detention and
deportation have been entrenched as a standard practice of immigration control,
although, somewhat contradictorily, not resulting in mass expulsions. For the last decade
or so, the Ministry of Home Affairs has regularly informed the Indian Parliament that the
“deportation of illegally staying foreign nationals is a continuous process [emphasis mine]”
(Rajya Sabha, 2017, 2016).

2.3.5 Migrants, Muslims and Urban Marginality
Such strategies of control were (and continue to be) not devoid of their knotty, unresolved
aspects. In New Delhi and elsewhere crude stereotypes centring primarily on religion,
and to a lesser extent on cultural/linguistic identity, have powered such identification
and expulsion exercises. This has occurred in the absence of concrete measures to easily
verify the antecedents of residents and marked (physical and cultural) similarities
between Indians and Bangladeshis. Class-based standing is an additional element
decisively steering such practices towards particular residents. These workings of
capricious citizenship and its tricky after-effects have been examined in detail in various
sections of this study. The constant locus of scrutiny, surveillance and stringent
management has become Muslim and Bengali (or Bengali/Bangla-speaking) marginal
residents. The predominant attention, however, has centred on Muslim bodies, identified
through their names and their distinctive social practices. An ‘off the record’, informal
meeting with a high-ranking official from the Slum and Jhuggi-Jhonpri Department of
the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (section responsible for the slum and squatter
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settlements) substantiated this emphasis. While freely admitting that the numbers of the
‘illegal Bangladeshis’ in this city were considerably lower than generally believed, he
linked their presence to specific, indigent residents with ease: “Go to the Muslim areas.
Those are their [migrants’] hiding holes [emphasis mine].” The term “hiding hole” debases
both Muslim and migrants as sub-humans. Such pejorative descriptions attributing
bestial properties to the Muslim citizens and migrants can be seen in texts aligned with
the ideas of the Hindu right (Rai, 1992).

The deprecatory attributes ascribed to migration in popular rhetoric in India are far
removed from the motivations my research participants commonly articulated for their
informal cross-border migrations. Grinding poverty, associated forms of oppressive
socio-economic deprivation, strong aspirations for an improved existence for their selves
and their family members, and personal choice were the straightforward reasons offered
for their migrations at various times to New Delhi, India’s capital city. In a memorable
interaction, the driving compulsion of such motivations was highlighted in the starkest
of terms. When asked why he had migrated from his village in Bangladesh, one of my
indigent respondents gestured forcefully at his lean midsection while uttering brusquely
in Hindi: “Kyon aayen hain! Peit ke liyey aayen hain! [Why have we come here! We have
come for the sake of our stomachs].” In the course of their initial journeys to the Indian
geographical territories, many of my research participants traveled with few, if any,
possessions, and often with only the garments that draped their neglected bodies to their
name. Some had actually ‘begged’ their way as panhandlers in order to reach the city. In
India, which has a significant cohort of indigent population, these migrants represent
some of the poorest residents of underprivileged, marginal areas. One of my middle-class
key informants summarized the migrants’ dire state of affairs as follows:
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Can you imagine how horrible their [the migrants’] conditions must be back in
Bangladesh that they have to come to India and live in such pathetic conditions?
Have you seen the wretched circumstances in which they live? I don’t know how
any human being can really live like that. Those places [slums and squatter
settlements] are so dirty and filthy. I cannot ever imagine existing like that.
Some individuals had simply walked across the common, largely open border into India
at stretches where the Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) personnel were absent. Later
arrivals had used dalals (informal brokers) to travel without interruptions and to mitigate
the growing risk of apprehension. A few participants had been halted briefly by
Bangladesh’s border security personnel, but were eventually permitted to proceed with
their informal crossings. None of these respondents had used passports or visas to
formally traverse national borders, even those moving across them on several different
occasions at various times. It must be mentioned here that in India and Bangladesh,
passports are generally associated with privileged forms of international mobility. They
are widely regarded as a requirement for foreign travel outside South Asia and not
commonly considered as definitive evidence of citizenship. Indigent persons suspected
of being ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ have usually been asked to provide land deeds to
satisfactorily confirm their citizenship, another privilege that many poor residents may
be deprived of. Those who never owned land or lost it in the past due to financial or
personal hardships would not be able to furnish such evidence.

The class-based associations of the passport mean that many poor residents would have
considerable difficulty in acquiring this official document, even if they are citizens. Sur’s
(2013) work with informal Bangladeshi migrants and flows of commodities in north-east
India shows that they are excluded from the international regime of passports and visas
owing to their weak socio-economic position. In the under-privileged neighborhoods
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where my research was conducted, the acquisition of passports by a miniscule number
of residents was met with intense misgivings by others, particularly those opposed to
their presence. One such observer was a local-level pradhan (informal leader/powerbroker) of a smaller political party tied to the Hindu right. “Inhey passport kyon chahiyey?
Videsh kahan jaaney waley hain yeh log [Why do they need passports? These people are not
going to travel abroad to the foreign (read Western) countries]”, he argued. He
maintained that the handful of passport-holders in the ‘slum’ settlement where he lived
had procured them fraudulently by bribing officials and were ‘illegal Bangladeshi
migrants.’

For most migrants, the adjoining province of West Bengal, which shares strong cultural
and linguistic affinities and the largest shared border with Bangladesh (2,217 kms of the
total length of 4,096 kms), was invariably the original destination point. But the lure of
higher daily wages soon drew them to affluent, urban locations with greater
opportunities located further away from the border. In New Delhi, they were absorbed
in the marginal spaces where the city’s poorest residents congregate. It is this social
standing in the city’s marginal bastis, squatter settlements, ‘slums’ and resettlement
colonies, and equally importantly their faith-based characteristics, that have become vital
in the expulsion exercises. The Bangladeshi-prone spaces identified by state agencies for
the Operation Pushback were all unprivileged, neglected areas. In these mixed
settlements which are often arranged in distinctive spatial blocs, many different ethnic,
cultural and religious groups coalesce. The presence of growing Muslim (and Bengali)
bodies has brought escalating surveillance and coercive interventions by state and nonstate agencies. In the construction of the illegitimate resident (the ‘illegal Bangladeshi
migrants’ or ‘infiltrators’), faith-based identities have connected seamlessly with class80

based standing to drive exclusionary tendencies. Problematic ideas regarding poor
individuals who could be ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ have regularly moulded such
enforcement exercises.

A quick stroll through these marginal areas quickly gives away the composition of its
various constituents. In areas where there is a significant cohort of Muslims, one sees
bearded males sometimes carrying skull caps on their heads, and on occasion clad in the
long tunics and shalwar (trousers) worn in parts of north India and Pakistan. A section of
women will be garbed in burkhas, the full body cloaks concealing their clothed bodies or
wearing chunnis (stoles) covering their heads. At several such locations, mass-produced
paper calendars depicting various scenes of Mecca are visible. Prominent among them is
the Kaaba, the sacred stone structure draped with black covering in the heart of the holiest
mosque. Nearly all of the dwellings and shops that had a solid wall or partition from
which something could be suspended securely have such time charts with Islamic images
prominently displayed on them. Often, this is the only adornment on such structures
which stands out almost immediately, drawing one’s attention to it. The religious
composition of these areas is not hidden at all, but is rather highly conspicuous. It is also
very easy to pick out the names of Muslim residents from collective lists, such as the
voters’ registries by electoral wards/constituencies and ration card lists. The latter
enumerates the names of all members of each household and their ages. Most state
agencies have easy access to these official lists, which provide a fairly accurate and nearcomplete inventory of residents of various areas.

Similarly, in neighborhoods that have concentrations of Bengalis, one sees males clad in
lungis (sarongs) and sari-clad women draping them in particular ways seen in West
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Bengal and Bangladesh. Fish is widely sold, which is a regular part of meals for Bengalis
and many residents of West Bengal and Bangladesh. It is not a common item of daily
consumption in northern India, including New Delhi. On one of my field trips, I was
offered mishti doi (sweetened yoghurt) by my participants. This is a Bengali dessert
delicacy I associate with my mother who was born and raised in West Bengal. Bengali is
spoken along with Hindi as one walks down the roughly-fashioned passages and lanes
in indigent neighbourhoods with a significant population of Bengalis. State agencies have
drawn on other subtle distinctions that may not be familiar to many non-Bengali persons
in their efforts to detect these migrants. Delhi police, for example, have relied on
personnel of Bengali ethnic background on several occasions. They may be able to easily
identify subtle differences in the dialects of Bengali spoken by the Indian and Bangladeshi
Bengalis, the ghotis and bangals as they are sometimes differentiated.

Of course, ethnicity-based particularities can be transformed and rendered indistinct
through the inevitable pathways of socio-cultural integration and local assimilation.
Migrants adapt to localized customs such as spoken languages and pick up other habits
that end up obfuscating their true identities and origin. In the mundane interactions of
daily life in New Delhi, for example, familiarity with Hindi is needed. There are migrants
who speak local languages like Hindi fluently and have adjusted to local modes of
dressing. Many female migrants in New Delhi wear salwar kameez instead of the saris they
swathed around their bodies in Bangladesh. These processes of blending and inclusion
have only added greater murkiness to the unresolved ambiguities and perpetual
problems regarding the true origin and identity of the poor residents. It is also the
seamless integration of the unwanted migrant group in India that has been a persistent
source of concern, rather than their failure to integrate.
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Enforcement agencies have had to constantly contend with these tricky issues in the
detection and identification of the unwanted Bangladeshi migrants. It has been extremely
difficult to effortlessly pinpoint the origins of the poorest residents who lack the
documentary proof to link their domicile and lineage to particular places within India.
When first approached during fieldwork, the residents of these poor neighbourhoods
immediately drew out whatever documents they possessed and brandished them to
emphasize that they were the legitimate insiders. These documents are usually voter
cards and ration cards, often in a tattered and worn out condition. And yet, these official
papers are extremely valuable for the holders to remain securely. Residents complained
of having had their documents destroyed by police during efforts to apprehend ‘illegal
migrants.’ Others claimed that they had lost their documents in a fire or simply misplaced
them and were having great difficulty in obtaining replacements. The need for a surfeit
of official documents to conclusively prove domicile, lineage, and citizenship has only
become greater over the years, presenting a deepening predicament of those who lack
the capacity to acquire and accumulate them.

As recently as March of this year, the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of
India acknowledged the persistent barriers tied to these uncertainties while responding
to an MP’s query regarding the ‘illegal migration from Bangladesh’ into India’s northeast region (Rajya Sabha, 2018b). The statement read, in part, that “infiltrators [emphasis
mine] generally cross over to India clandestinely and mingle with the adjoining
population taking advantage of the physical, linguistic and cultural similarities [across
borders]”. Other formal rejoinders in the two Houses of the Indian Parliament have made
nearly identical official claims. “It is difficult to identify Bangladeshi nationals living
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illegally because they are able to mingle easily with the local population due to ethnic
and linguistic similarities,” the Rajya Sabha (1999) was told. The Upper House was
likewise notified a year later: “It is difficult…to make any exact estimate of such illegal
immigrants because they enter surreptitiously and are able to mingle easily with the local
population due to ethnic and linguistic similarities”, (Rajya Sabha, 2000). Also in 1999,
the Lok Sabha (2000) received this statement:
In view of the long and porous border with Bangladesh and also on account of the
various push and pull factors, many Bangladeshis have managed to sneak into
various parts of the country. Due to ethnic and linguistic similarities, they are able
to mingle easily [read blend in] with the local population.
Drawing on common transnational qualities associated with culture, ethnicity and
associated social practices, as well as to address growing insecurity, migrants have
sought to present themselves as Indians. “Hum Culcutta sey hain [We are from Calcutta]”,
I was informed by some residents, affixing their origins to the large metropolis of Calcutta
in West Bengal. The urban area of Calcutta (now known by its indigenized name as
Kolkata) stands as a synonym here for the Indian part of Bengal; that is, West Bengal and
more broadly with Indian Bengali ethnic lineage. Many female Bangladeshis working as
domestic help in middle-class, Hindu households wilfully camouflage their identities by
using Hindu monikers and openly professing, or rather emphasizing, their Bengali
Indian ethnic background. A well-to-do, Hindu employer commented on the ambivalent
characteristics of her part-time female naukrani, ‘maid’ and ‘domestic servant’ as follows:
Pata nahi iss ka naam kya hai. Mujhey bola hai ki Rekha hai, doosrey ghar mein kuch aur
naam bataya hai. Log kehtey hain ki yeh Bangladeshi hai [Who knows what her name
is. She has told me that her name is Rekha. She has given a different name in
another house. People say that she is a Bangladeshi].
This Muslim Bangladeshi employee had attempted to alleviate her sense of insecurity by
assuming the Hinduized Indian identity. There can be no doubt that Rekha is a
Hinduized name. After all, in the context of intensifying anti-Muslim and anti-migrant
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biases, being Hindu has increasingly become the accepted standard or gauge for being
considered as Indian. Such discriminatory tendencies rooted in religious affinities are not
confined to New Delhi or other parts of India. Drawing on her ethnographic work on
both sides of the Indo-Bangladesh border (West Bengal and its other side), Jalais (2013)
has documented a comparable transnational pattern. As right-wing politics frame the
Muslims of West Bengal as being less Bengali than their Hindu counterparts, on the
Bangladeshi side, it is conflated with being Muslim. On the other side, the Hindu
residents/citizens are viewed as “secret India-loving traitors to the Bangladeshi nation”
(p. 259).

Interviews with a smaller set of Hindu female migrants at a different slum in New Delhi
provided grim confirmation of this pattern of selectivity and its associations with
religious identities and narrowing meanings of illegitimacy, ‘illegality’ and ‘irregularity’.
Their presence as Bangladeshis without passports and visas had also been registered by
the local police station, the main state-based institution involved in the detection of
‘illegal migrants’ in all of the interior locations. As a result, they had been interrogated
briefly by the station personnel seeking to detect ‘illegal Bangladeshis’. In spite of that,
they were released without dire consequences. Their explanation to the law enforcement
agencies of having fled increased discrimination and harassment as religious minorities
in their Muslim-dominated village, while not untrue or false, proved satisfactory to these
enforcing agents. They would not have been so sympathetic to my Muslim respondents,
even if they had drawn attention to the bleak realities they faced in their natal villages.
Fully aware of this focus only on certain ‘Bangladeshis’ who were being largely treated
as illegitimate outsiders, my Muslim migrant participants complained bitterly: “Woh log
bhi toh Bangladesh sey aayen hain. Unhey kyon nahi pakadtey. Sirf humko kyon pakada jaa raha
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hai [Those people have also come from Bangladesh. Why don’t they apprehend them?
Why do they only apprehend us?].” By “woh log” or “those people”, they were pointing
to the Hindu migrants who were often being exempted from coercive state practices,
ignoring the fact that they had adopted the identical informal mode of travel and bordercrossing into India.

Other poorer neighbourhoods with concentrations of Muslim residents in New Delhi
received formal notices during the 1990s asking them to confirm their Indian citizenship
to the state authorities through documentary evidence (Roy, 2011, 2012). At visits to some
of these areas, local residents who had no connections whatsoever with Bangladesh
reiterated the fervent belief of my migrant participants. They had migrated to this large
metropolis from other parts of north India and were lawful citizens. But their religious
identity as Muslims set them apart and subjected them to suspicious scrutiny as the
illegitimate outsiders in the Hinduized nation-space. “Sirf Mussalmanon kon poocha jaa raha
hai [Only Muslims are being asked (to furnish evidence of their Indian citizenship)],” they
reasoned bluntly. There can be no denying that in the state-driven procedures of
identifying the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’, there has been a particular, skewed
concentration on the Muslim residents within this city, in many other parts of India, and
prominently, in its indigent cohort.

Samaddar (2012) shows that Hindu and Muslim migrants enter India informally from
Bangladesh in similar numbers. While the former group is generally able to easily settle
permanently in India, the latter exists in a state of permanent temporariness, required to
shuttle back and forth between the two countries. Some of my migrant respondents
returned hastily to their villages for a brief time when detention and deportation exercises
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were escalating in this city. Another study on the migrants in Rajasthan, likewise noted
that indigent Muslim migrants were being targeted by police in the enforcement drives
against the ‘illegal Bangladeshis’ (Sachar and Kapur, 2008). Roy (2012) has claimed that
the migrants entering India from Bangladesh after its inception, especially through the
decade of the 1970s and 1980s, were largely Muslims. They could not be offered the easy
acceptance tendered to the previous Hindu refugees tied to the Partition. But in a scenario
where it is difficult to easily distinguish between legitimate citizens and illegitimate
outsiders, religion has become a troublesome, shortcut substitute for delineating and
locating the latter. Das (2011) notes that the pauperized Bengali Muslim peasantry
migrating to urban areas like New Delhi, Mumbai and Bangalore from areas like Malda
in West Bengal is exposed to new forms of exploitation by state agencies and other social
actors, but is mistakenly treated as ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’. The making of a hostile
environment for the Muslim residents has thus intersected closely with the politics of
unwanted immigrants and their shifting form.

In spite of the unresolved uncertainties and escalating anxieties surrounding citizenship
status the absence of clarity or easy recognition of the ‘Bangladeshi infiltrators’ has
sharpest resentment by Indian Bengali residents. What is perhaps unusual is that they
did not repeat the popular ideas about the unwanted migrants as ‘thieves’ and ‘terrorists’
circulated through public discourses. Instead, their complaints were that they themselves
were often being mistakenly labeled and treated as ‘illegal Bangladeshis’. They also had
to endure regular harassment and mistreatment by the local police in their periodic
search for the ghuspaithiye or the ‘infiltrators’. For this reason, they objected stridently to
the presence of the ‘Bangladeshi migrants’, characterizing them a “nuisance” and
“problem” for their own existence:
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Inn Bangladeshi logon ki wajah sey humko pareshaani uthaani padh rahi hai. Log
samajhtey hain ki hum Bangladeshi hain. Par hum toh Bangladeshi naheen hain. Hum to
Paschim Bangal sey hain. Hum Bharatiyey hain [It is because of these Bangladeshi
people that we have to suffer. People think that we are the Bangladeshis. But we
are not Bangladeshis. We are from West Bengal. We are Indians].
The likelihood of misidentification, of branding non-migrant residents as ‘illegal
migrants’ and then exposing them to the harsh consequences of this illegitimacy is fairly
high. My work draws attention to its dangers at various points in this study. The
uncomfortable fact that older entrants have official documents from Indian state agencies
has brought even greater suspicion to the indigent residents and their meagre offerings
to the officials. In such a scenario, even those presenting documents are treated with
doubt and mistrust.

My migrant respondents often spoke longingly about their natal places, contrasting those
nostalgia-laden spaces with the unpleasant surroundings in which they lived, made
worse by constant fears about imminent arrest, detention, and removal as the ‘illegal
Bangladeshis’. “My village — it is beautiful there — so lush and green. There are so many
large trees. It is not dirty and smelly like here”, a participant remarked wistfully, pointing
to the filth-strewn, improvised, narrow lanes of the slum and the open sewer located in
close proximity to their jhuggi (makeshift dwelling). One of the settlements where
interviews were conducted had a large ganda nullah or open sewer running parallel to it
carrying human waste and other effluents. Some had even spent a few days hiding in it
when the threat of arrest and deportation had escalated. Locations near the river Yamuna
represent some of the most inferior, ignored spaces of the city occupied by those who
cannot afford alternate forms of housing and shelter. The detection of the ‘illegal
Bangladeshi migrants’, has persistently concentrated on such deprived neighbourhoods
and the poorer/poorest bodies that make relatively trouble-free scapegoats. State
88

agencies are far less likely to receive strong opposition or sharp criticism and the
problematic aspects of their actions can be easily disregarded.

Many of the Bangladeshi-prone areas identified by local agencies in New Delhi in their
efforts to “detect, delete and deport” migrants represent the least desirable spaces of the
city. The popular idea that ‘illegal Bangladeshis’ were and are continuing to “flood”
many parts of India, including the privileged, core geographies of the city is now
entrenched as common sense amongst most Indians. A related belief is that most poor
neighbourhoods of squatter settlements are inundated with these migrants. An employee
of a research library, upon learning my research topic, helpfully suggested that I visit a
basti [squatter settlement] located nearby to locate my potential participants. When I
asked how he knew that its residents were really ‘Bangladeshis’, he responded: “Mujhey
nahi pata ki Bangladeshi hain ki nahin. Lekin sab log kehtey hain ki yeh log Bangladeshi hain [I
don’t know if they are Bangladeshis or not. But everyone says that these people are
Bangladeshis].” It was unclear if that location had any migrants at all. Several of my
research locations had pockets of migrants, but it could never be said that all of the
residents were informal migrants from Bangladesh.

Walking through some of these settlements means that one encounters the city’s
household garbage (and perhaps even industrial waste) in many areas, either visually or
by being forced to step on it. The collection, sorting and sale of such waste as recyclable
materials is now one of the common informal professions for the urban poor. ‘Ragpickers’ and garbage-collectors procure waste daily from nearby middle-class and other
affluent households that is brought into these neighbourhoods for sorting and nonrecyclable material is often tossed aside. This has provided new forms of livelihood and
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earnings for a wide range of actors, from the poorest ‘rag-pickers’ and sorters to those
able to graduate upwards to acting as dealers selling such materials. Bangladeshi
migrants remain present at all of these levels, but so do other indigent Indian
communities. But this occupation adds to the general conditions of neglect and messiness
in the already disregarded settlements with few formal amenities like drinking water and
toilets. Piles of sorted materials are flanked by discarded pools of non-convertible
garbage at many locations. “Majboori ki wajah sey yahan aayen hain, warna iss tarah sey kaun
rehna chahta hai [Desperation has brought us here, otherwise who would want to live in
such circumstances]” said one of my participants, pointing to the accumulating waste
and the general seediness pervading the area. It has also entrenched the rough and ready
image of the poorest rag-pickers and those in the waste recycling trade as the ‘illegal
Bangladeshi infiltrators’.

My participants may have spoken positively about their lives in Bangladesh. But, the
verdant scenery of Bangladesh’s ruralscapes have not been able to fulfill even the
essential needs of these indigent migrants. These purposive acts of mobility have
tweaked their lives to some extent, as far as their absolute economic conditions are
concerned. But the unfolding politics of anti-Muslim xenophobia in India have exposed
them to other vulnerabilities and threats, the risks of everyday lives, which they have
had to manage on a regular basis. “Videsh mein izzat nahi hai [There is no dignity and selfrespect in the foreign land]”, a female respondent remarked, while describing the
humiliations, tribulations and dangers associated with the migrant detention and
deportation exercises in the city. The assembling and growth of the contemporary politics
of exclusion at the micro and macro-spatial scales of the city and nation are the primary
focus of this study and the chapters that follow.
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CHAPTER 3
‘There are Many Bangladeshis in New Delhi, but…:
Methodological Routines and Fieldwork Anxieties
‘These are small voices, which are drowned in the noise of statist commands. That is why
we don’t hear them. That is also why it is up to us to make that extra effort, develop the
special skills and above all cultivate the disposition to hear these voices and interact with
them.’ - Ranajit Guha (1997)

3.1 Introduction
For an extended period, geographers have seriously attempted to recover the voices of
the subaltern from the cacophony of the privileged by experimenting with several
distinct methodologies. Two specialty areas within the discipline that have keenly
participated in this revisionist and inclusive mission are of particular interest here. The
first of these concerns the recent work of population geographers who have cultivated a
range of conceptual devices to secure an entrée into the unexplored dimensions of
migrants’ being and consciousness (Findlay and Graham 1991; Halfacree and Boyle 1993;
Miles and Crush 1993; Skeldon 1995). Migrants’ lives and anonymous realms of migrancy
can be better understood, it has been suggested, by capturing migrants’ stories and their
narratives (Vandsemb 1995; White and Jackson 1995; Findlay and Li 1997, 1999; Lawson
2000; McHugh 2000). The second area relates to the work of feminist geographers who
have been prominent in discussions of research with the weak and powerless. Grounding
their work in earlier debates within anthropology, feminist geographers have
championed a number of substantive and critical themes surrounding field research,
including reflexivity, positionality and situatedness (England 1994; Gilbert 1994; Katz
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1994; Kobayashi 1994; Nast 1994; Staeheli and Lawson 1994, 1995).

My own engagement with these issues comes from my strenuous efforts to collect the
narratives of elusive undocumented Muslim Bangladeshis living in New Delhi’s copious
slums and squatter settlements, known as bastis and jhuggi-jhonpris. Scholarly research
on these unauthorised immigrants in this city is virtually absent. What is clear, though,
is that from the early 1990s onwards, these immigrants have become highly conspicuous
in the heterogeneous landscape of this Indian metropolis. This hyper-visibility has been
facilitated to a great extent by the ritualised and hegemonic public scripts in which Hindu
nationalist organisations play a prominent part (see Ramachandran 1999, 2002a, 2002b).
My research examines the politicisation and troublesome labelling of these immigrants
as ‘infiltrators’ by the exclusionary rhetoric of Hindu nationalist organisations through
this time frame; its pernicious influence on the Indian State; and grim outcomes for
Bangladeshi Muslims as well as other Indian Muslim communities in New Delhi.

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to extend the ongoing debate on qualitative
methods and field research in the discipline, especially within population geography, by
exposing the extraordinary set of dilemmas and difficulties involved in researching
clandestine migrant groups. Naturally, then, my analysis is framed not only by recent
works of population and feminist geographers, but also draws extensively on nongeographical writing based on unauthorised immigrant groups. The chapter makes the
broad argument that scholars, especially geographers, have not yet seriously engaged
with the entire range of risks involved in these redemptive exercises. This is largely
because very little attention has been paid to the extent to which the current
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methodological practices in geography can, in fact, address and overcome fieldwork
anxieties experienced by the geographer during the course of research.

These new research endeavours have thus, in effect, operated as methodological
routines. In their formal consistency, the strategies introduced to document migrancy
have obscured rather than accounted for the great diversity apparent among migrants.
The linkages between these methods and actual practices in the ‘field’ through which
migrants’ narratives have been recorded have been similarly weakly articulated.
Moreover, extensive discussions of the reflexive and situated nature of research and inbetweenness of researchers have not radically transformed the manner in which the
geographer carries out field research (Gilbert 1994). Many of the practices and
procedures (using key informants, snowball sampling, interview settings, participant
observation, or even ethnographic methods among others) used to ‘do’ fieldwork, and
even gain access to willing participants – the ‘nuts and bolts’ of fieldwork – have
remained more or less as they always have. This does not, however, mean that these
ideas are not worthy impulses or do not stand critical bearing during the research
process. Indeed, subsequent sections of this chapter certainly draw strength from and
resonate with many of these considerations. Significantly though, the field process,
despite much theoretical intervention, has remained a standardised encounter in which
issues of positionality and self-reflexivity function, more or less, as cautionary caveats.

Also called into question is the ability of the researcher to grapple effectively with the
intricacies of the social situation in the uneven and less visible terrain of unauthorised
migrancy (see Rose 1997; Maxey 1999). My own account of fieldwork with unsanctioned
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Bangladeshi Muslim migrants in the marginal and ‘illegal’ worlds of New Delhi’s bastis
documents such an example of highly fragmentary social spaces, suffused with power,
but at the same time charged with ambiguities and contradictions not conspicuous to the
investigator. It demonstrates that the mystifications of power in these marginal spaces
present an enormous challenge to our comprehension of the subaltern, under-examined
by clandestine migration experts. In this “realm of masks” (Scott 1990, 28), the fieldwork
anxieties experienced by the researcher are therefore not sufficiently abolished even by
the self-reflexive and cautious methodological practices adopted by feminist
geographers.

Conducting field research in these highly-fragmented spaces then becomes a “messy
business” (Rose 1997). Scholars working with undocumented populations have
attempted to cope with this messiness by adopting a form of self-censorship (Burgers
1998). Problematical details of the field process, and the constant juggling required of the
investigator while in the field, are often excised. As a result, very broad and generalised
strategies are provided, no different from those adopted for research with other social
groups, which have been assessed critically in subsequent sections of this chapter.
Although this reticence is understandable, especially given the difficult circumstances
under which research is carried out, the exclusion of methodological detail potentially
hampers further work in the area. Scholars now face the challenging task of re- fashioning
these broad routines in order to apply them effectively to unauthorised immigrants
situated within diverse social contexts.
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3.2 ‘…They will Not Speak with You!’: Politics of Location
“There are many Bangladeshis in New Delhi” was a common refrain adopted by my
informants during the early stages of fieldwork conducted for this research. As
mentioned previously, the authoritative narrative of Hindu nationalism has underscored
the presence of undocumented Bangladeshis in the social and spatial fabric of the city of
New Delhi. The reportage of leading newspapers, including writings that have focused
on the recent campaigns for deportation of migrants, has, additionally, divulged sites
where clandestine migrants reside in substantial numbers. Not surprisingly,
Bangladeshis have treated outsiders with suspicion and hostility for fear of deportation
and further

harassment by state authorities. A significant reason for immigrants’

diffidence has been that several journalists, despite producing sympathetic accounts on
behalf of the Bangladeshis, had compromised the security of participants by disclosing
their names and addresses along with research sites in their articles. In any case, many
journalists, and even several scholars writing on clandestine migration, have not been
totally impervious to the biases within popular and political discourses (Hazarika 1993,
1994). Furthermore, articles have relied heavily on brief interviews with clandestine
migrants and other residents in Delhi’s slums. In-depth interviews with a large number
of migrants and sustained interaction over a period of time at the same locality have
rarely been conducted, and have for the most part been considered sensitive and
inadvisable.

Despite their increasing presence and symbolic prominence in elite discourses, these
migrants have been relegated to the marginal and less familiar spaces of the
impoverished in Third World cities. These are the separate, albeit numerous enclaves of
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jhuggi jhonpri clusters and bastis (slums and squatter settlements) existing at the periphery
of upper and lower middle-class localities in New Delhi. As Chandoke (1991: 2871) put
it, these are the shanty towns made of rags, paper, and tin and their inhabitants eke out a
meagre living by providing cheap labour and services for the urban rich. The cramped,
overpopulated and dirty slums and their inhabitants are increasingly viewed by the
privileged as the rapidly expanding and largely unwanted residues of urbanisation. The
composition of these settlements remains variegated, providing the narrow interstices in
which poor migrants, both internal and international, drawn from a variety of cultural,
regional and linguistic communities now exist. It is important to note here that the hidden
spaces occupied by slum dwellers are also ‘illegal spaces’, occupied rather than owned
by these residents. So, migrants, both documented and undocumented, Indians and
Bangladeshis, are living on land which they do not own and on which they do not have
permission to build (Chandoke 1991).

Clearly then, unauthorised migrants exist in urban spaces that represent, on the one level,
a challenge to the unequal social order of the city through appropriations of public space.
On another level, the continued existence of slums and clandestine migrants in these
slums owes much to the internal arrangements of power, including the patronage of
pradhans, dadas (slum lords) and local politicians, and relationships forged between slum
residents and these power brokers (Mitra and Chatterjee 1987). It is precisely this fluid
ensemble of relationships, these structures of exploitation, accommodation and
opposition in which the undocumented Bangladeshis are somewhat precariously
positioned, and which the researcher has to navigate in order to excavate the unknown
domains of unauthorised Bangladeshis.
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An additional difficulty in this scenario is that unauthorised migrants have sought, often
successfully, to conceal their origins and religious identity to resist recent endeavours by
the state machinery and Hindu nationalist organisations to expel them. Physical
similarities between Bangladeshis and Indians, along with cultural and linguistic
affinities, have certainly enabled this camouflage. Many undocumented immigrants have
also obtained documents like ration-cards, Indian passports, voter-cards, jhuggi
(dwelling) tokens, and birth certificates to claim bona fide Indian nationality. This means
that the distinction between ‘illegal’ Bangladeshi immigrants and Indian Bengalis,
especially those who have migrated from areas close to the Bangladeshi border, can often
be negligible.

This presents the preliminary predicament of fieldwork, namely, finding and gaining
access to potential respondents for this research. Scholars researching clandestine
immigrants term this the most difficult part of fieldwork among this population since the
absence of immigration authorisation and their living and working conditions often make
undocumented immigrants “wary, uncooperative and difficult to locate” (Chavez et al.
1997 89). Chavez (1998, 6) aptly described the field process with undocumented migrants
as “finding the unfindable”. Likewise, in a rare but much needed discussion of the
methodological constraints posed by the ‘illegal’ status of this group, Cornelius (1982,
381) remarked that “fieldwork [with undocumented immigrants] is likely to be complex,
difficult and time consuming”. Given the conditions outlined above, how does the
researcher search out clandestine Bangladeshi immigrants to be interviewed for this
project? While selected bastis where the immigrants reside have been made prominent by
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the Indian press, how does the researcher identify potential participants for individual
and group interviews? And once contact is established, how does the researcher persuade
clandestine immigrants to participate in the research process?

3.3 ‘Interviews as Interrogation’
In order to locate participants suitable for research, several strategies have been
commonly employed by scholars working with a fugitive migrant population. Perhaps
the easiest way of locating a random sample of undocumented immigrants for interviews
is through the police or state authorities. Clandestine immigrants have been commonly
interviewed in this manner while being detained by the police or immediately after
deportation (North and Houstoun in Chiswick 1984; Minaar and Hough 1996; Maharaj
and Rajkumar 1997). An even larger number of studies have relied on information
collected by patrol or immigration officers from undocumented immigrants arrested at
the border (Jones 1982a, 1982b; Dagodag 1984). Despite eliminating the problems of
locating suitable participants for the researcher, this approach suffers from other
substantial disadvantages. First of all, studies based on apprehended undocumented
immigrants “under suspension of deportation” are likely to focus on new migrants
caught while trying to enter the host country (Cornelius 1982, 378). As a result, these
studies may ignore ‘long-stayers’ or permanent settlers who have been residing in the
country for many years, and have not attempted to cross the border back to their places
of origin. Secondly, these studies tend to underrepresent severely those women migrants
with a lower likelihood of apprehension by immigration authorities (Cornelius 1982;
Pellegrino 1984; Papademetrious and Di Marzo 1986). Thirdly, the composition of the
sample in these studies is influenced by the strategies of detection adopted by the
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appropriate authorities (Cornelius 1982; Briggs Jr. 1984; Massey 1987).

An exclusive focus on the apprehended may thus produce significant distortions in our
understanding and reconstruction of the migration process. To put it differently, the
characteristics of the detained may not necessarily be representative of all undocumented
migrants, especially those who have eluded detection (Bustamante 1977). Rejecting these
claims, Harner (1995) argued that bias would appear in these records only if detained
migrants had some reason to provide deliberate misinformation, or lie to the authorities.
Quoting a senior INS agent in Phoenix, who told him that “he was unaware of any
detainees lying about their residence, or of any reason why they would”, he assured the
reader that most immigrants in the custody of immigration officials do, in fact, provide
accurate details (Bustamante 1977, 402). Migrants, he asserted, recognise that full
cooperation with the authorities is in their best interests.

Even though one has to agree that unauthorised migrants are generally aware of their
own interests, this author’s other assertions display a striking naïvete, if not simply a
plain disregard for the abnormal and power-saturated circumstances in which
information is secured, and migrants’ narratives recorded. In the broader context of
studies on unauthorised immigrants, the popular trend of using captured indocumentados
to grasp the furtive regimes of migrancy betrays these scholars’ extended myopia
towards highly coercive practices permeating the context or ‘field’ in which research
occurs. That is, studies on clandestine migrancy have, for the most part, neglected to pay
close attention to the confused and often indistinct relations of authority shaping the lives
and experiences of undocumented migrants.
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In this frequently adopted methodological routine of capturing migrants’ experiences by
using captive migrants, the egregious milieu of surveillance, control and fear in which
the interviews are conducted generate unsettling concerns about the role and even
complicity, albeit unintended, of the researcher in these power-laden situations. As Katz
describes it, these “fields of power” that “connect the researcher and participants, the
participants to one another, [and the] scholars in the field” deserve critical scrutiny
throughout the research process (Katz 1994: 68–9). Conducting field research in settings
that accentuate, and certainly exacerbate, the relative powerlessness of a marginalised
group can rarely establish any level of trust and rapport between the interviewer(s) and
interviewed. Consequently, although overt compliance may prevail, with respondents
enacting a suitable performance for the benefit of fieldworker and officials, such
interactions are highly unlikely to produce authentic and candid accounts from the
participants.

In his work on undocumented Bangladeshis in the Indian province of West Bengal,
Samaddar (1999), while attempting unsuccessfully to interview 37 detained migrants in
one of the province’s prisons, provided a good illustration of this dilemma. During this
process, he realised that the official eagerness to facilitate this interaction was restrained
by the continually shifting narratives of arrested Bangladeshis, until all the immigrants
recited “almost the same story”. Reflecting on the overzealousness of immigration
officials, he wrote that:
rarely were officials reluctant, indeed, they gave their time and assistance in many
ways. Security agencies . . . were eager to exchange their information with ours. It
was a zero-sum situation (Samaddar 1999, 56–7).
But the ready enthusiasm of officials was tempered by the vacillating, and eventually
fabricated, accounts produced by the migrants. Guided by these tensions, it seemed the
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migrants had sought recourse in deception, deciding to tell nothing beyond the [existing]
stereotype. The anecdote culminates in a belated recognition by the author that his
research had been appropriated by the official discourse on migration. “A study of
migration in the existing milieu had become a study on infiltration and [the migrants]
could not cooperate in such a study”, he ruminates.

Samaddar’s account deserves critical consideration here largely because it demonstrates
the perils of engaging with subaltern experiences in these exceptional circumstances.
Here, the fieldworker is subjected to a latent form of social control, constraining the
researcher’s actions and limiting her/his freedom to manoeuvre in the field. It also
reveals that the agendas of the mighty, the state, and the elite can easily commandeer the
actual and intended objectives of such scholarly research. An even more bothersome
concern here remains the manner in which dominant structures and discourses can
succeed in mutating and, to a great extent, erasing the voices the research seeks to
uncover and articulate in the first place. We cannot fail to recognise that Samaddar’s wellintentioned quest to retrieve the agency of undocumented Bangladeshis produced the
reverse effect of legitimising the ‘othering’ of these migrants as infiltrators. Above all, the
author’s dialogue with the detainees, and their duplicate performance under the
watchful eyes of prison officials, failed to challenge existing stereotypes of
undocumented Bangladeshis as ‘outsiders’ or ‘infiltrators’ conspiring to be a part of the
Indian/Hindu nation.

Within this obviously risky domain, the original democratising enterprise of recovering
the voices of the dispossessed and marginal can, moreover, be overshadowed and
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consumed by the self-interests of the opportunistic researcher. Feminist geographers
have already cautioned us against using our respondents as ‘mere mines of information’
(England 1994: 82). Interviewing undocumented immigrants while they are being held
in repatriation centres or in prisons does exhibit a disquieting tendency on the part of the
researcher to treat participants largely as objects or sources of data. Interrogative
fieldwork in conflictual situations where the respondents are subjected to constant
scrutiny and surveillance will then definitely have limited value. Adopting Coplan’s
(1994) words, it would constrict the “interviews as interrogation; informant as informer;
ethnography as espionage” (p. xiv).

These anxieties regarding the “terrible asymmetries” between the respondent and
researcher, and the “abnormal context” of the interaction can be overcome by conducting
fieldwork in the communities of origin of clandestine migrants (Cornelius 1982; Miles
and Crush 1993). A substantial number of studies have adopted this strategy
successfully by interviewing those traditionally deemed as returned migrants, including
deported migrants, and immigrants visiting their sending communities on a regular
basis (see Reichert 1981, 1982; Mines and Massey 1985; Jones and Murray 1986). In
addition, research has focused on the sending communities and families of
undocumented immigrants (Massey et al. 1987). The relative safety and security of the
surroundings in which these interviews are conducted eliminates the potential fear of
apprehension or observation, even though the strategy may over-represent certain kinds
of migrants, especially those who return frequently to their communities of origin. This
method is more likely to omit or under-represent those immigrants who have not
returned to their sending communities (see Rosenthal-Urey 1984). This strategy has also
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proved to be less effective in documenting the complex social topographies in the host
countries, circumscribing the lives of undocumented migrants (and a prominent focus
of this author’s research).

New writings on the transnational aspects of international migration have begun to
address some of these challenges by connecting through research the multiple sites that
incorporate places of origin and destination (see, for example, Mountz and Wright 1996;
Guarnizo 1997; Mahler 1999a, 1999b; Bailey 2001; Bailey et al. 2002). Two good examples
of transnational work, both with Salvadorans in the US, that disclose some details of
sequential or serial fieldwork with sending and receiving communities may be
mentioned here. In the most recent study, Bailey et al. (2002) adopted a ‘transnational
mixed methods’ format in which chain data collection was achieved through gatekeepers (community-based organisations in this case), participant observation, and
interviews at respondents’ homes and workplaces as well as at other neutral sites like
the local community centre, cafés, bars and sports facilities in New Jersey.
Approximating

somewhat

the

ethno-survey

method

adopted

for

Mexican

indocumentados in the US (Massey 1987, 2000; Massey et al. 1987), the information
obtained from research with Salvadoran immigrants in the host country was utilised to
conduct fieldwork subsequently with sending communities in San Salvador, La Union,
Santa Ana, La Libertad and Morazan.

In the second case, Mahler and her research team (1999a) engaged with the transnational
social fields by making use of her earlier fieldwork with Salvadorans in Long Island
(1995) to interview transnational migrants and their kin in northern La Union, an area
from which many immigrants originated. At the beginning of the field process, Mahler
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(1999a, 696-697) encountered numerous immigrants that she had interacted with
previously who came up and spoke to her of their own accord, facilitating effortless
entry and access to respondents.

While there is no doubt that research at various spatial sites and scales opens up new
possibilities for conducting fieldwork, other tribulations of connecting with immigrant
communities in the host country persist, some of which have already been discussed.
Hopefully, over and above the meagre paragraphs devoted to it in the methods sections
of articles, future work on transnationalism will provide detailed and critical discussions
of the minutiae of serial fieldwork with transnational and/or undocumented
immigrants.

3.4 Rights/Rites of Entry and Key Informants
In order to interview undocumented immigrants outside their country of origin,
researchers have relied most frequently on the help of key informants, also termed as
“key actors,” “local notables,” or “gatekeepers” (Cornelius 1982; Burgess 1984; Bailey
1996). Entry into the field through informants continues to be a standard prescription in
most texts on field research. But the definition of a gatekeeper can often be ambiguous
and ill-defined. Manuals on field techniques for social science research broadly define
key actors as knowledgeable individuals who can provide relevant and in-depth
information on the group or community being researched (Tremblay 1982; Burgess 1984;
Robinson 1998). In the case of undocumented immigrants, however, local notables have
acted primarily as mediators or intermediaries, providing a medium of entry into the
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larger migrant community. Key informants here have commonly included community
leaders (Cornelius 1982; Chavez 1998; Portes et al. 2002), workers or employees of
voluntary, religious or social organisations working with the population (Rodriguez
1987; King and Knights 1994; Mahler 1995; Kumari 1997), women migrants (Cornelius
1982) and on rare occasions, individuals belonging to the same ethnic community
(Grasmuck 1984).

Despite its popularity, the use of gatekeepers in order to obtain passage to a marginalised
and covert group can also prove to be limiting and intractable in several respects. The
manner in which the gatekeepers, especially community leaders, are tied to social
relationships and hierarchies existing within the bastis and migrant communities has not
been given adequate critical attention in many works, including those cited above. In
short, scholars researching covert population flows have perceived key informants as
neutral and impartial actors, somehow detached or removed from circuits of exploitation
and authority operating within the slums and migrant communities. In reality, key
informants often play a significant role in these networks. The social position of key
informants within the slum, then, becomes a crucial issue during fieldwork, especially
since it can influence and constrain the manner in which the researcher is able to interact
with basti residents and migrants.

In New Delhi’s slums, for instance, while basti pradhans (slum leaders) are familiar with
and can easily provide approach to other residents, most of them also function as local
agents of various political parties (Mitra and Chatterjee 1987). Since each slum has
several if not many pradhans representing the interests of several political groups, their
sphere of influence is restricted to a part of the slum population. The key informant in
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this case then provides entry which is limited largely to the supporters of the pradhan
instead of the larger community. Approaching undocumented immigrants through a
pradhan or selected number of pradhans also means that the researcher is likely to be
identified with the interests and politics of the pradhan by other residents. This can create
additional barriers for the researcher, especially given the contentious role of slum
leaders during the state-sponsored campaigns of deportation in New Delhi. The notion
of the “informant” takes on another sinister and pernicious meaning in this context.
During these operations of deportation in New Delhi, many slum pradhans acted as
mukhbars or informers for the local police by disclosing the whereabouts of
undocumented Bangladeshi immigrants.

The obvious implications of association with a particular pradhan became quite visible to
this researcher when, during the early stages of fieldwork, one of the residents of a large
slum cluster where many interviews were conducted circulated a rumour about the
researcher. It was insinuated that this researcher was a “spy”, working on behalf of a
pradhan who had been fairly active in naming Bangladeshi immigrants for the local
police, and was the local representative of the Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena (SS).
Consequently my contacts with another pradhan suddenly became unfriendly and were
loath to help with the introductions and interviews. What this demonstrates is the double
bind for the scholar in this situation. Key informants are necessary to penetrate these
unacknowledged domains, while at the same time, the researcher constantly faces the
danger of being easily and unwittingly drawn into the exploitative structures of
dominance active within slums.
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A possible alternative might be to favour employees of social organisations serving the
migrants and slums as gatekeepers, instead of entering the field through community
leaders. However, unlike in the US where most of the studies on undocumented
immigrants are based, few social organisations serve undocumented Bangladeshi
immigrants exclusively. In other words, agencies like immigration counselling centres,
English as a second language (ESL) classes, or organisations similar to the Chicano
Federation providing services and advice to low-income Latino immigrants deployed by
Chavez, simply do not exist in this scenario (Cornelius 1982; Chavez 1998). Government
officials with connections to slums and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are
present, but their linkages to the Bangladeshi community, as will become clear in the
following paragraphs, can be dubious and weak.

Two illustrations will demonstrate this point. In the first example, I met with and briefly
interviewed one of the chief officers of the Slum and Jhuggi-Jhonpri wing of the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi (MCD) in order to obtain a list of voluntary organisations operating
in selected slums. During the course of this meeting, the officer confided to this researcher
that his department had helped in the expulsion of Bangladeshi migrants in previous
years. He then proceeded to provide a list of his contacts, many of whom had strong
political connections. As a result, the idea of using his contacts to enter the slums had to
be abandoned.

In the second instance, my efforts to locate workers of NGOs serving slums with
undocumented Bangladeshis led me to one of the employees of a fairly established
organisation in New Delhi. Recommended by several sources, this employee, I had been
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told, had strong ties with a number of large slums. Even though this employee proved
useful during the field process by facilitating an introduction to a number of pradhans,
his connections extended to the pradhan and key workers of the pradhan, instead of the
migrant communities at large.

A third possible route for entry here can be through women migrants. Migrant women
with widespread channels of connections within the community, it has been argued, act
as informal social brokers and can provide other avenues of access to migrants
(Cornelius 1982). But it is not clear how the fieldworker can reach women migrants in
the first instance. Moreover, despite their strong social ties, women migrants clearly
remain most vulnerable among an already defenceless group of poor ‘illegal’ immigrants.
Variables of class, ethnicity and citizenship interlace with gender to shape the daily lived
realities for these women. In other words, their poverty, adherence to Islam, and
ambiguous nationality combine to put them at greater risk. Undocumented Bangladeshi
women have been routinely exposed to sexual harassment and other forms of
exploitation during this period by the state and other authorities. Therefore, any attempts
to reach out to migrant women alone through the pradhan or other connections may be
treated with suspicion.

3.5 Circuitous Routes and Sequences of Credibility
Another difficulty with the technique of entry through local notables is that the vexing
task of persuading key informants to assist in the research process is rarely considered
in literature on fieldwork and methods. It has been suggested that several meetings with
gatekeepers and repeated assurances regarding the genuine intentions and ethics of
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research would generally be sufficient to persuade them to facilitate an introduction to
the community. The integrity of the researcher will thus be established as a result of these
frequent visits. But this routine may not prove to be successful in all cases. In short, the
researcher’s words and assurances are likely to mean very little to the ‘insiders’ with
immediate links to the migrant communities. In my experience, direct and spontaneous
contact with ‘insider’ key actors did not yield positive results due to the highly
politicised and ‘sensitive’ nature of the deportations in New Delhi. These restrictions
could only be addressed by adopting a roundabout and indirect route to secure
participants for my research.

In order to penetrate the realm of undocumented Bangladeshis, a sequence of credibility
was thus established by building a chain of key informants, beginning with sympathetic
journalists, which led to other contacts both outside and inside the Bangladeshi
communities. In-depth, unstructured interviews were carried out first with a selected
number of progressive middleclass Indian journalists who had covered the migrants’
deportations humanely. Unlike the laboured task of obtaining undocumented migrants’
consent for interviews, it was fairly easy to trace these reporters through the newspapers
they worked for, and interview them at their workplace. These in-depth interviews
proved successful in two respects. Firstly, these interviews provided a preface to the
mechanisms of deportation as well as the power geometries within the slums. Secondly,
some journalists were able to direct this researcher to other contacts located both in and
outside the immigrant community, who could produce an introduction to the
Bangladeshis. The key informants placed inside the community were approached only
through the informants located outside the community. These contacts then not only
facilitated a formal introduction to the insiders, but also accompanied the researcher on
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the first few occasions to the slums where most of the interviews for this research were
conducted. An initial level of confidence was therefore secured by approaching the
‘insiders’ only through people already known to and trusted by them.

In addition to building rapport and trustworthiness with slum residents and
Bangladeshis by using the above strategy, the legitimacy of my research work was
confirmed and strengthened by fostering ties with the People’s Union for Civil Liberties
(PUCL) in New Delhi. In fact, my membership with this organisation carried far greater
weight with and significance for gatekeepers than my status as a graduate student. My
association with PUCL-Delhi during fieldwork therefore proved effective in a number
of different ways. Firstly, it permitted some ‘insider’ gate-keepers to verify the credibility
of my work and background by attending regular meetings held by PUCL. Secondly, I
was able to extend the parameters of my academic research by linking my observations
in the field with PUCL’s work with marginalised and migrant groups in New Delhi (see
People’s Union for Civil Liberties-Delhi 1998).

3.6 “A Famous Bangladeshi Actress Named Sujata”: Interviews, Interruptions, and
Intervals
The complicated task of making an entrance into the Bangladeshi community in Delhi
was also made tougher by the propensity of some ‘insider’ gatekeepers to discount the
presence and number of undocumented Bangladeshis in their area. The tally of
undocumented immigrants in the slums, they maintained, was negligible, and in any
case, they pointed out that most immigrants would be unwilling to disclose that they
were, in fact, Bangladeshis. Consequently, the language used in preliminary interviews
with local notables and the description of the research project had to be carefully
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constructed, and in certain cases, modified and rephrased over time during the
fieldwork.

In early interviews with pradhans in the first few bastis visited by the fieldworker, I asked
the pradhans to introduce me to Bangladeshi migrants. Later on, in the field, local notables
were asked to facilitate an introduction to people who had been deported on at least one
occasion, and relatives of individuals who had been classified as Bangladeshis by the
local authorities. I also indicated that a principal aim of my research was to document the
experiences of slum residents during the expulsion of the 90s. Expressing the objective of
my work in this manner proved advantageous in many other ways too. First, attention
was directed towards the arbitrary processes of deportation, shifting the uncomfortable
scrutiny and focus away from Bangladeshis. Secondly, it opened the field by expanding
the number of potential respondents, who could be interviewed for my research. Here a
substantial number of Muslims, and legitimate citizens of India, mistakenly labeled as
Bangladeshi ‘infiltrators’ and therefore threatened with deportations, were amenable to
speak with this fieldworker. Conversations with local residents of slums, both Indians
and Bangladeshis, provided additional insights into the emerging social affinities, and
tensions between Bangladeshi and other communities in these slums. A textured analysis
of these lived realities of migrants may not have been possible if I had focused my
attention entirely on undocumented Bangladeshis.

The strategic choice of emphasis on the dynamic of deportations gave the added
advantage that it gave the undocumented Bangladeshis the means to articulate the
indignities of control and harassment faced during the acts of deportation. In fact, the
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energies and passions aroused by these humiliations may have compelled many
Bangladeshi (as well as Indian) migrants to agree readily to spend time with this
researcher. Residents of several slums were, as a result, willing to hold conversations and
interviews with me. Rather than obtaining a desultory chronicle of an entire life story,
these interviews focused on specific segments of the migrants’ lives. Respondents were
asked to provide brief accounts of their lives before migrating to New Delhi, the reasons
for the migration, and, if possible, modes of entry into India. But for the most part the
interviews focused on the harsh dynamic of deportations, the key role of state agencies,
including the local police, and shifting relationships between Bangladeshis and other
residents (Indian citizens) in these slums.

This investigator also had to be satisfied with the facts volunteered by the respondents,
especially information regarding their origin. In many cases, participants claimed that
they were from “Kolkata” (formerly Calcutta in West Bengal, India) during the early
stages of interaction, while acknowledging that they were Bangladeshis in subsequent
meetings and conversations. On one such occasion, a pradhan who had maintained that
he was a Kolkatawalah astonished this researcher by asking if my name was indeed Sujata.
When I responded in the positive, he added, “we have a famous actress in Bangladesh
named Sujata!” This belated, yet somewhat tacit admission by a key informant is
suggestive of the need for a flexible format for communication between the researcher(s)
and researched in these power-laden situations. Although it may be advisable to discuss
certain topics with caution, a sequence of sustained focus and interchange in chosen
localities can yield additional discoveries for the researcher.
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But these disclosures may be hinted at or implied, instead of being offered openly and
candidly during conversations. For example, some of my respondents remarked: “it
really does not matter if one is from India or Bangladesh. For us, both India and
Bangladesh appear to be part of the same country.” Others would say: “there is no border
between India and Bangladesh,” and “being Bengali or Bangladeshi means the same
thing!” In short, many respondents chose to admit that they were from Bangladesh
indirectly, and only after a degree of familiarity had been established with the researcher.
The constraints experienced during these exchanges also extended to the manner in
which these narratives were recorded. A majority of the interviews were not recorded
with a tape-recorder. Instead, the field worker took copious notes during conversations
and interviews. This also meant that I made additional notes from my recollections
immediately after returning home from the field. It is only in the final stages of interaction
that this researcher could use a mechanical recording device. Here again participants
insisted that the tape recorder be turned off while discussing sensitive topics, especially
voting preferences, and ties between the slum pradhans and migrants, among others (see
Ramachandran, 1999).

3.7 ‘Masks of Silence’: Observer Observed, Participants Watched
In addition to the malleable organisation of field transactions, the researcher in this case
has to be sensitive to the wider context of the interviews, extending beyond the
narratives of respondents. Rather, the fieldworker also directs her focus to what is left
unsaid – the silences, interruptions and intervals during these interactions and
exchanges. As Hawthorne pointed out, we need to “dance critically at the edge of every
narrative. . . pointing out the silences, pointing out the unspoken, [and] undescribed
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others” (Hawthorne in Spivak 1990, 19). Often what appeared unexpressed and
unarticulated during conversations with

basti

residents

conveyed a lot about the

regulative mechanisms operating within slums, which ordinarily remained masked and
invisible.

These silences and stillness acquire extraordinary importance during interactions in the
public realm, and highlight, at the same time, the hitherto unexplored ties between the
social and spatial domains in fieldwork with covert groups. Most slum residents
appeared to be extremely reluctant to speak at public sites. And, as this researcher soon
discovered, insiders became uncharacteristically mute in these settings – their
conversations punctuated by long silences, hesitation, and a general air of awkwardness
that appeared inscrutable at first. This revelation may appear surprising and unusual for
two notable reasons. Firstly, researchers like Varadachar (1979) who have conducted
fieldwork in Indian slums have noted the relative ease of conducting interviews in
public settings. He writes:
Often the most valuable information about the slum was not gathered inside the
slum proper but in the cultural perimeter where . . . members relaxed: the tea stall,
the peepul platform, the community tap or pond, the defecating sites, the market
place and movie theatres. Places of litigation, caste festivals and shrines were
especially fecund sites for data gathering. (Varadachar 1979, 134)
It can be argued with conviction that it is fairly easy to gather an assembly of interested
spectators at public places in India. There is the relative safety of numbers in a crowd such
that one is likely to elicit a response readily in public spaces. Secondly, interactions in
public places, or areas where migrants socialise, has been a serviceable strategy for
working with undocumented immigrants. Mahmood’s (1998) study of Bangladeshi
clandestine foreign workers in South and East Asia is a noteworthy case. He conducted
many interviews with undocumented Bangladeshis at public places like shops and
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market places, and while travelling on buses and trains. But we have to recognise that
such impromptu encounters will necessarily be of a brief and limited duration. And
despite revealing useful information on the migration process, these meetings will none
the less divulge very little on the labyrinthine processes of differentiation and
discrimination in which these immigrant communities are involved.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the researchers’ unfamiliarity with these knotty social
contexts may lead them inadvertently to ignore the inhibiting influence of these coercive
dimensions on the ‘stories’ produced by migrants. An anecdotal example will suffice here.
As mentioned earlier, respondents who had been highly articulate and informed on
previous occasions with this researcher seemingly acquired what I call a mask of silence
or veil of ignorance at certain settings. This persistent lack of response, or for that matter
feigned ignorance to certain queries, made sense when, after a particularly limited and
frustrating exchange, I was told by my key informant that the entire exchange had been
monitored and, in effect, directed by the wife of a mukhbar (informer). The idea of
surveillance, of observation and eavesdropping, acquires a somewhat bizarre dimension
when one realises that the informer and his helpful spouse are both Bangladeshis, like
many of the other interviewees.

The outcome of this encounter, of course, is that it immediately renders problematical the
tendency to approach the undocumented migrant community as a homogeneous group,
equally vulnerable due to their unsanctioned stay in the host country. Scholars working
with indocumendatos have, more or less, produced a uniform identity for this group by
privileging the illegality of their residence. In some respects, one can concede that the
absence of proper documents, informal border crossings, and their labelling as
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‘infiltrators’ or ‘illegal’ does set the migrant communities apart from other groups in
these slums. However, we also need to consider seriously the manner in which these
fields of power intrude into the undocumented migrant groups, rather than being simply
located outside and exterior to these groups. The crisscrossing lines of these relationships
and their implications for fieldwork and research have not been charted thus far.

Once entry has been achieved into, using Scott’s (1990, 121) term, the “unauthorized
secret assemblies of subordinates”, researchers often cease to take into account the
informers and hidden patrollers monitoring them. Mahmood (1998) and Cornelius (1982)
encourage us to strike up casual conversations with persons in natural social settings
where immigrants congregate to generate initial contacts with undocumented
immigrants. Indeed, in his study of unauthorised immigrants in San Diego County in the
US, Chavez adopted a similar practice to locate willing and keen research participants.
Participants were drawn from large numbers of immigrants who attended the Catholic
Church on a regular basis in a predominantly Spanish-speaking neighbourhood near
downtown San Diego. On one such occasion, Chavez addressed the congregation about
his work and afterwards, many churchgoers enthusiastically came forward to provide
him with their addresses and telephone numbers (Chavez 1998, 7).

In my case, scrutiny and surveillance has been much more marked in public sites,
including spaces like the market place, teashops and restaurants among others, where
immigrants and other slum residents gather together. So, applying popular procedures
like addressing a large crowd of persons during religious or social gatherings may not
generate suitable participants. Consequently, interviews and dialogues were conducted
with the greatest ease and comfort in the privacy of people’s homes. Even in the case of
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interactions inside the jhuggis of participants themselves, the field-worker did not escape
scrutiny, observation, and indirect control by power holders and residents of the slums.
I will elaborate this point with an engaging episode which took place during early
interactions in a large Delhi basti. Accompanied by a trusted worker of my key informant,
I was taken to several jhuggis to interview returned deportees. No sooner had the
conversation begun when several neighbours of the interviewees arrived at the dwelling
and listened in to the narratives. The real test arrived when one of the neighbours,
claiming Indian nationality up to this point, let it slip that she was in fact a Bangladeshi.
The audience rushed to her rescue by informing me vigorously that ‘she was mistaken’.
“She is a bit slow”, my participants informed me, “and often gets confused about such
matters”.

What we confront here is that marginalised groups like the Bangladeshis do not exist
autonomously or even anonymously in such situations. They may exist outside the
scrutiny of middleclass and privileged residents of New Delhi within the slums, but they
are constantly exposed to other pressures within these marginal spaces, including those
exerted by other members of the Bangladeshi community. The case of Bangladeshis in
New Delhi also demonstrates that clandestine migrants lead exceptionally difficult lives
in host countries, negotiating a number of risks and uncertainties on an everyday basis.
Some of these risks have been included in discussions on research with such migrant
populations. Scholars have definitely considered the constant danger of deportation and
expulsion by immigration authorities. An early study (Reichert 1981, 57), for instance,
observed that because large numbers of Mexican migrants work ‘illegally’ or have
obtained their legal papers fraudulently, the fear of being discovered and reported to US
immigration authorities would prevent them from responding truthfully to questions
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asked by “any researcher – Mexican or American”.

But other “risks of everyday lives” (Ramachandran 2002b) encountered by immigrants –
especially those pertaining to internal forces and their connections with external, broader
political and social processes in host countries – keep on being disregarded. In New
Delhi’s slums, these include the presence of ‘informers’ tied to the local police and power
brokers operating there. Bangladeshi communities have attempted to mitigate these risks
by monitoring each other, the actions of local power brokers, and, finally, by controlling
the activities of outsiders such as this investigator. It is to these unacknowledged risks of
everyday lives and intricate contexts that scholars must now turn their attention in order
to successfully navigate and fully excavate the unknown domains of undocumented
immigrants.

3.8 Conclusion
Some time back, Lowe and Short (1990, 8) urged geographers to work towards a
“progressive human geography” by adopting innovative research strategies that would
allow “a range of voices to speak”. Population and feminist geographers have
contributed meaningfully to this exercise since then by grappling with a number of
distinct methodologies to “give voice” to those who have typically been excluded from
research. Notwithstanding the utility of these developments, this chapter identifies
several weaknesses in them. To begin with, it is argued that the current methodological
engagements in these specialties have downplayed the risks and uncertainties involved
in such exercises. Making the “small voice of history” (Guha 1997) audible can rarely be
an easy and straightforward activity. Rather, there are numerous challenges, dilemmas
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and real barriers to listening to and recuperating these voices, some of which remain
under-examined by geographers as well as other scholars researching undocumented
populations.

Moreover, and ironically, these intellectual developments have not fundamentally
transformed the manner in which research is carried out in the field. Research remains
‘business as usual’, relying on well-worn practices and routine procedures as always.
Scholars have rarely questioned and problematised these options, especially the manner
in which they can be applied successfully in the case of different categories of migrants.
Quite specifically, critical reflections on field research with a special category of migrants,
the clandestine migrants that exist as a secretive and unauthorised group in many social
settings, remain virtually absent within geography. Outside the discipline, scholars have
provided partial and meagre (though uncritical) accounts using their works in specific
contexts like the US. The validity of these methodological strategies has been reviewed
in this chapter using the case of undocumented Bangladeshis in New Delhi’s slums.
While making the broad argument that these directions need to be unpacked to suit
clandestine populations situated within diverse social, political and economic contexts,
the chapter has explored these continuities and discontinuities in terms of negotiating
entry, maintaining access, and resolving tensions during the field process.

Through this process, the chapter has also introduced the fluid, convoluted, and
neglected dimensions of the social and spatial contexts that crucially shape the
experiences of the field- worker. Furthermore, the researcher’s ability to be fully aware
of, or effectively deal with, the bewildering workings of power in the field context is
questioned. As my account of research with undocumented Bangladeshis in New Delhi
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demonstrates, the extraordinarily complicated set of internal and external processes and
the myriad linkages between them may not be plain even to the reflective gaze of the
researcher. I also argue that marginal groups like unauthorised migrants encounter a
wide range of dangers and difficulties, termed as risks of everyday life, that force them to
monitor the activities of insiders and the outsiders, including the activities of this field
researcher. With the exception of migrants’ fear of being exposed to immigration
authorities, scholars researching covert population flows have largely disregarded other
difficulties faced by undocumented migrants, and its constraining effects during the
course of the fieldwork.

Taking into account several methodological routines employed by scholars in order to
gain entry into the less known worlds of undocumented migrants, this chapter has
demonstrated that these are not separate and anonymous realms, as have been
previously imagined. Instead, the forces of exploitation that operate outside the bastis,
the squatters and slums where migrants exist, do in fact encroach into these ‘spaces of
marginality’. Entry into this opaque field, it is shown, cannot be achieved effortlessly or
immediately through key informants or gatekeepers, many of whom are tied to these
structures. Likewise, direct contact with insider slum dwellers or migrant groups also
prove ineffective. Instead, a circuitous and often laborious series of negotiations are
undertaken both outside and inside the slums which eventually connect up to the
migrant communities. These networks of power also continue into unauthorised
Bangladeshi migrant communities in New Delhi – where constant supervision and
surveillance by ‘informers’ further affects the autonomy of the fieldworker. Although
research over an extended period eases somewhat the restrictions placed on the
fieldworker, it does not provide a passport to unrestricted access into the Bangladeshi
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communities in New Delhi. The shadowy presence of Bangladeshi mukhbars (informers)
in these slums also provokes unresolved doubts about treating undocumented migrants
as a homogenised, equally marginal and victimised group. Finally, the chapter makes the
case for viewing the field as a negotiated set of performances through which the
fieldworker may be able to address anxiety and turn risk into return.
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CHAPTER 4
‘Operation Pushback’:
Sangh Parivar, State, Slums and Surreptitious Bangladeshis
in New Delhi

4.1 Introduction
The dramatic rise of the nationalist organisations of the Hindu Right – collectively, Sangh
Parivar – from the margins to centre stage of Indian society and politics since the mid1980s has been addressed by a fertile and burgeoning literature (Basu et al. 1993; Lele
1995; Jaffrelot 1996; Ludden 1996; Hansen 1999). During this period, the heightened
prominence and xenophobic discourses of these saffron forces (the colour after which the
Hindu Right are popularly dubbed in India) also drew appreciable attention towards the
largely unregulated population flows from neighbouring Bangladesh. Most commonly,
these undocumented immigrants were characterised as ‘infiltrators’, a visible threat to
the long-term existence of an enfeebled Hindu-Indian nation (Navlakha 1997;
Ramachandran 1999). It is noteworthy that a key member of the Rightist collective, the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is the strongest party in the present National Democratic
Alliance coalition government in India. A substantial body of Hindu chauvinist
propaganda drafted by Sangh Parivar ideologues and supporters outside the fold
chillingly outlined the supposed manifold dangers of this infiltration (BJP 1994). The
apparition of impoverished, illiterate and bigoted Muslim Bangladeshis migrating en
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masse across the shared border began to loom large as a “silent, invisible invasion”
constituting a “demographic aggression” against India (Rai 1992 1993; Joshi 1994).

An arresting feature of this new development was the fervent acceptance of the antiMuslim and highly prejudiced discourses zealously promoted by these organisations by
many respectable figures, and even the Indian state, bureaucracy and various political
parties. It would, therefore, not be an exaggeration to state that, in 1992, the situation of
undocumented Bangladeshi immigrants, particularly Muslim ones, began to deteriorate
speedily, although many of them had been living in several different parts of India as de
facto citizens for many years. It was, however, no remarkable coincidence that the central
and provincial governments’ recognition of such population flows into India materialised
exactly at a time when Sangh Parivar’s political slogan, “Infiltrators, Quit India”, gained
prominence and ideological momentum (Hindustan 1992a 1992b; Frontline 1992a). My
contention is that it is precisely this saffron surge that provided the Congress-led
government a powerful incentive to tackle the issue head-on, partly by deporting
undocumented Bangladeshis from the capital city (Times of India 1992a).

Drawing on the extensive media coverage and field interviews conducted in New Delhi,
this chapter attempts a textured chronicle of these exclusionary, albeit highly rancorous,
exercises against unauthorised immigrants. The timing of these state-sponsored activities
synchronised with a tumultuous period in recent Indian history, one inscribed by largescale communal riots in various parts of the country (Datta et al. 1990; Chakravarti et
al.1992). While the easy collusion of Sangh Parivar’s ranks in these exercises cannot be
overlooked, ‘Operation Pushback’ exemplified a hasty, haphazard attempt by the long
dominant, then ruling Congress Party to salvage its own authority in the face of the rising
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tide of what scholars interchangeably term Hindu nationalism, chauvinism or
communalism. Additionally, Operation Pushback made manifest those partisan
tendencies ordinarily camouflaged within the massive Indian bureaucracy, a narrative
which tells of the more or less willing collaboration between different agencies and
departments associated with the central and provincial governments in New Delhi and
in West Bengal, bordering Bangladesh. Ultimately, these forced evictions signified a less
than serious attempt by the state to engage with migratory flows from a neighbouring
country. A final argument being submitted here is that, in addition to political upheaval
within, activities on the other side of the border – in Bangladesh – substantially influenced
the character and duration of these evictions.

4.2 Indifference, impotence, intolerance
The appearance of undocumented Bangladeshi immigrants in New Delhi’s ‘slums’ or
shanties (bastis or jhuggis) was definitely not a new-sprung occurrence; small numbers of
these immigrants had lived in several bastis from as early as the beginning of the 1970s
(Indian Express 1992a; Paul & Lin 1995). It is also true that, for the most part, their
gradually increasing numbers continued to be tolerated by Congress-backed
powerbrokers operating through many slums. While the Foreigners’ Regional
Registration Office (FRRO) had sponsored a study of Bangladeshi settlements in the
metropolis as far back as 1988, a feature report corroborates the mostly disinterested
demeanour of the central administrative machinery (Illustrated Weekly of India 1990:55):
Apart from occasional raids on their settlements when their shacks are dismantled,
official action is rarely initiated against them. It is the FRRO and special branch of
the Delhi police that may sometimes decide to do something about the problem.
Then, a few people might be taken into custody for a while… But, generally, the
police leave them alone [emphasis added].
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The same feature quoted a sub-inspector of the Kotwali Police Station in Delhi: “We took
about 30 people who did not have passports into custody. Twelve men were sentenced
to four months’ imprisonment” (p. 57). However, such decisive and draconian action
remained fairly uncommon until much later. Also striking is that many of the
undocumented immigrants interviewed in the January 1990 feature were ‘not bothered
about their status as foreigners. Their immediate concern [at that point was] survival’ (p.
57). Nevertheless, media reports indicate a growing concern over undocumented
Bangladeshis in the late 1980s, both in government circles and even among interest
groups well known for supporting these immigrants. For example, more than three years
before the first repatriations took place and a formal strategy was instituted in 1992, Jyoti
Basu, the long-standing Chief Minister of West Bengal, had sent a letter to then Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi (which also alluded to several previous notifications from the state
to the central government) regarding the acutely large numbers of Muslim Bangladeshis
entering India through its borders (Hindustan 1989a; 1989b; Samaddar 1999). The
Congress-led government had first opted to put aside this aggravating issue, given the
immense pressures of contesting the 1989 general elections a few months later. Then, after
it was unable to obtain a majority in the Lok Sabha, the elected Lower House of the Indian
Parliament, the formation of a left and centre coalition government that included the BJP
further postponed any official decision (Malik and Singh 1994). Consequently, it was
more than a year after Basu’s missive to the Prime Minister that the National Front
government proclaimed it was going to take stern action against undocumented
Bangladeshis in West Bengal (Hindustan 1990).
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Source: Times of India, September 1992

Figure 4.1: Rao’s liberalisation and ‘Non-Indian residents’

Ultimately, it was an Indian government commanded by the Congress Party under Prime
Minister Narasimha Rao that, after 1991, initiated the harshest measures against
undocumented immigrants. Though lauded for its liberalisation of the Indian economy
and economic reforms that sought to attract the return of professional, wealthy nonresident Indians, Rao’s regime was also saddled with the uncontrolled violence
concomitant with Sangh Parivar’s Ramjanmabhumi movement in addition to the problem
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of irregular Bangladeshis which had already caused widespread consternation in
political circles – even in places far away from the border like New Delhi and Uttar
Pradesh (Patriot 1992a; Times of India 1992b; Tribune 1992a). This somewhat delayed
concern is humorously depicted in Figure 4.1, with a demoralised Rao lamenting to his
advisor that his economic reforms had only encouraged a “flood of [extremely poor]...
non-Indian residents” or “Bangla[deshi] refugees”. Even then, at least a year would lapse
before the Rao-Congress government finally launched its notorious ‘Action Plan’ against
undocumented Bangladeshis. Documentary evidence apprises us of the government’s
willingness, finally, to own up to their growing presence, while it still wavered in its
decision to firmly rein in their numbers. As a case in point, at the end of 1991, the Home
Minister Shankar Rao Chavan, candidly conceded in Parliament that it was the
exceedingly generous attitude towards undocumented immigrants rife among
provincial-level authorities that had mostly contributed to the vast increase in foreign
nationals immigrating to India (Hindustan 1991). Therefore, and because of the desperate
circumstances in India due to these immigrants, the central government had granted
provincial bureaucracies the legal authority to initiate stern proceedings against them
(National Herald 1992a). A different report seriously disputed the veracity of the Home
Minister’s pronouncements and made the government’s continuing vacillation even
more conspicuous. Published out of Indore in Madhya Pradesh, it advised that the
recently issued order to all Indian provinces to identify foreign citizens living in their
areas was proving to be a “gigantic crisis” for the government (Nai Duniya 1992):
It is widely believed that following these directives the Uttar Pradesh government
had identified 10,000 Bangladeshis in different locations and arrested them for
allegedly entering the country without passports. It is also broadly accepted that
despite repeatedly inviting input from the central government on how to deal with
these uninvited guests, a prolonged silence from this quarter had forced Uttar
Pradesh to eventually release [the detainees] after they had furnished personal
bonds [author’s translation].
127

Providing vital insights into this “silence”, a later article quoted an unidentified though
obviously disgruntled individual highly placed in government circles: “No one wanted
to rock the boat. [Earlier] there was a lot of buck-passing by government agencies.
Besides, there were vested interests – political parties wanted to use them as a vote-bank”
(Indian Express 1992b, 1992c). A subsequent editorial scathingly dubbed the reasons for
this extended inactivity in years prior as the state’s “ostrich-like policy” (Hindustan Times
1992a). I will return to this question of vote-banks shortly. Suffice it to say, for many years,
the central government and many major political parties remained deeply ambivalent
about Bangladeshi immigrants. By mid-1992, a turning point had been reached and the
largely ostentatious show of official dealings on unsanctioned immigration gave way to
brusque displays of coercion.

What emerges in this detailed elaboration of Operation Pushback and the Action Plan
against Bangladeshis in New Delhi is the burgeoning encumbrance of jingoistic
sentiments in both India and Bangladesh that had to be vigorously countered by the
respective governments. The shrill and swift backlash in Bangladesh will be examined
later, but, in India, a moderately secular state that had succumbed sporadically to ethnic
and religious tensions in the past, now completely shed its thin veneer of neutrality. Rao’s
rule marked its high point when the Indian state embraced a soft stance towards the
saffron forces of Hindu nationalism or chauvinism, which Frontline’s (1993, 9) editor
characterised as a “disgraceful and highly risky surrender to the forces of Hindu
communalism”. The sombre thought that the flaccid Congress Party and its governance
were heavily tinged with communal fervour was driven home cogently in another
cartoon (Figure 4.2) which shows a Congress worker replacing the much-favoured rose
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from the lapel of Jawaharlal Nehru’s bust with the lotus flower – in this context, the
electoral symbol of the BJP. Nehru has long been accepted by many as the architect of
modern India and a central driving force of the Congress Party in its golden era
(Goswami 1998). An indication of the disturbing trend signified by the supplanted
blossom of this ubiquitous signifier of the post-colonial Indian nation was that Indian
state rhetoric now unofficially assigned the labels ‘illegal’ immigrants or ‘infiltrators’
almost exclusively to Muslim Bangladeshi immigrants.

Source: Pioneer, September 1992

Figure 4.2: Saffronisation of the Congress Party and India

It must be reiterated that, alarmed by its considerably weakened position, the RaoCongress government suddenly swung into action by launching its Action Plan to curb
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clandestine immigration. Although efforts were to be undertaken in many parts of the
country, maximum exertions were actually expended against Bangladeshi immigrants in
New Delhi. On initial scrutiny, this focus may appear unusual: after all, even the most
questionable government estimates of 200,000-300,000 are minuscule compared to
aggregates for other places in northeastern India closer to the Bangladesh border
(Frontline 1992b). An effective and practical strategy to restrict unauthorised immigrants
surely would have converged, at least in the beginning, on geographical areas in
proximity to Bangladesh. However, favouring New Delhi was more of a tactical
calculation, not only as the capital city of India where much financial power resides but,
more importantly, as the seat of centralised political authority and headquarters of the
massive Indian administrative machinery that runs the country. Ultimately, then, it was
the Assembly elections for New Delhi held in January 1993 that would dramatically set
the stage for the unrestrained aggression towards unauthorised Bangladeshis. Previous
elections had already indicated that several prominent Congress leaders who exercised
considerable influence had experienced a noticeable decline in electoral backing, most
conspicuously, from bastis and jhuggis that had voted en masse for Congress over an
extended period – in popular parlance, its vote bank (Navbharat Times 1992a).

For our purposes, this denotes an exploitative system of patronage operating between
high-ranking Congress leaders and their agents or powerbrokers within these marginal
spaces or ranks. Since many slums are unauthorised encroachments on public space or
government lands, their permanence, plus the occasional dispensation of basic benefits
to poor urbanites, are significantly rooted in these power arrangements. The
Bangladeshis living in these bastis also enjoyed these meagre disbursements, which
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meant that most had received an identical treatment as impoverished Indians residents.
Thus, a great majority of them had been issued ration cards for obtaining subsidised food
rations under the government’s public distribution scheme, given individual
identification tokens, and, therefore, recorded in the voting registers (Independent 1992a).
The erosion of Congress power signalled that these informal though weighty
arrangements between the party’s politicians and slum residents had been unsettled. The
outcome was grave for many squatters, especially undocumented Muslim Bangladeshis
who had to forfeit the tacit support previously extended to them by Delhi-level Congress
leaders. It is precisely at this precarious juncture that the Action Plan and Operation
Pushback were commenced in the capital city.

4.3 ‘Action Plan’ of Detection, Identification, Deportation
In September 1992, shortly after Operation Pushback began, a Government of India
spokesperson confirmed the imminent expulsion of several hundred thousand
Bangladeshis living illegally in border provinces, and that the state had an established
three-step Action Plan to deal with unauthorised immigrants, namely, detection,
identification, and, finally, deportation (Patriot 1992b). Having already detected locations
where Bangladeshis existed in large numbers, the spokesperson indicated that the central
and state governments were actively involved in identifying them. Other accounts
quoting Home Ministry informants also reported that the New Delhi administration had
implemented a special Action Plan to identify undocumented Bangladeshis in that city
and was working out methods to evict them by delegating more powers to the police and
FRRO (Hindustan Times 1992b 1992c; Navbharat Times 1992b). Armed with information
provided by selected NGOs, intelligence agencies and local police, 12 areas said to
include sizeable concentrations of undocumented Bangladeshi immigrants and falling
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under the jurisdiction of five police stations were identified (Hindu 1992a; National Herald
1992b). From these localities, 2,000-2,500 undocumented Bangladeshis were to be evicted
from the city each month, including a quota of more than 400 detained immigrants held
in each of the five police stations (Hindu 1992b). Transit camps where individuals
identified as Bangladeshi citizens would be housed before being transported to the
border were correspondingly located (Hindustan Times 1992c).

Source: Compiled from Hindustan Times and Radiance Views Weekly, September 1992

Figure 4.3: ‘Bangladeshi-prone areas’ in New Delhi

Interestingly enough, all of the Bangladeshi-prone areas in New Delhi (Figure 4.3)
identified by the government and reported widely in the press were also insignificant
and marginal spaces occupied by the urban poor. Many of these were bastis and jhuggis
sited at the periphery of various upper-, middle- and lower middle-class mohallas or
neighbourhoods (National Herald 1992b, 1992c). The insignificance of these spaces is
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exposed through their descriptive characterisation, in that they derived their identity
wholly in relation to the rich mohallas they abutted, or in relation to nearby landmarks,
such as a police station or monument, or prominent land use features, such as a shamshan
ghat (cremation ground), ganda nala (open sewers) and bara pul (big bridge) – where, in
many cases, they are still situated even today. Some included ‘resettlement colonies’ for
former squatters in the outlying areas of the city. In addition to the argument that these
exertions were, as matter of course, directed at Bengali-speaking Bangladeshis practising
the Islamic religion, the location of the Bangladeshi-prone spaces also exposes the
overwhelmingly weak structural position of the displaced immigrants at the bottom of
the urban social scale.

Put differently, the subsistence-level existence of these immigrants in India made them
easy targets of the Indian state and Sangh Parivar. A non-Bangladeshi resident of a slum
pithily uncovered this link: “People do not want to eliminate poverty; they want to
eliminate the poor”. These intimate connections between class and the xenophobic
character of ‘Operations Ouster Bangladeshis’ were also rendered transparent in a
cartoon occasioned by a raging controversy surrounding the extraordinary emancipation
of Bengali-speaking and Bangladeshi deportees from Mumbai by a large mob at Uluberia
rail station in West Bengal in 1998. Entitled, tongue-in-cheek, “Business as Usual” (Indian
Express 28 July 1998), it depicted several poor people attending hospitably to a guest and,
in the foreground, a solitary policeman in radio communication with his superior: “A
scientist expelled by the U.S. is here, Sir. Says he grew up in this migrants’ slum. Shall we
deport him?” As the cartoon so eloquently sums up, in these anti-immigrant operations
the state and Sangh Parivar branded only specific categories of immigrants as
undocumented – those shaped by greatly restricted material circumstances. Tentative
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forays into immigration policy reform included guidelines for a new law that would
make it mandatory for all private or public sector employers to report the hiring of
foreign citizens, even those recruited on a casual or part-time basis – though, ultimately,
this was never formalised. In form, the proposed legislation was very similar to the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) passed in the United States during the mid1980s whereby the numbers of undesirable immigrants were to be regulated
simultaneously within and at borders, especially inside its spatial and territorial domains.
But unlike the IRCA, a main feature of which was the sanctions or penalties for
knowingly hiring unauthorised workers, under the intended plan employers would act
as ‘spies’ for the local police and administration (Mahler 1995).

Owners of factories, businesses and heads of households would be asked to furnish the
police with photographs and details of their employees, including their native place and
duration of employment (Hindu 1992a). It is unclear why this intended strategy was not
legalised, though it is likely that the very real prospect of it being opposed by other
political parties might have dissuaded the Congress-led government. It is equally
probable that the continuous accretion of Bangladeshis into the informal sector of the
urban economy, together with the unending desire of well-to-do urban dwellers for
cheap (immigrant) servants and casual labourers also had some bearing. To begin with,
the unconventional organisation of this vast and diffuse segment of the Indian economy
does not lend itself to effective regulation by the state, and tightening restraints on this
highly nebulous set of economic practices would have been anticipated by the already
beleaguered Delhi bureaucracy as an administrative nightmare. However, in the few
weeks before the Action Plan was formally launched, the Election Commission issued a
nationwide directive to revise electoral rolls and disenfranchise undocumented
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immigrants, apparently after receiving several complaints about the inclusion of
Bangladeshis in the voters’ lists (National Herald 1992d). Chief electoral officers of the
states and Union Territories were asked to catalogue areas with large numbers of foreign
nationals and take steps to prevent their enrolment as voters (Hindustan Times 1992d). In
effect, electoral enumerators would not merely reform voter lists but create new sets of
names by beginning from a clean slate and abandoning all previous records (Hindustan
Times 1992b). A vital part of this registration exercise naturally involved inquiries into
voters’ citizenship status, which local police and enumerators would then verify,
particularly of those in bastis already identified as dominated by Bangladeshi immigrants.

There is ample evidence that the detection and apprehension of undocumented
Bangladeshis took place in many parts of India (Hindu 1992c; Hindustan 1992c; Rashtriya
Sahara 1992). What remained vague, however, was the requisite documentary proof to
establish Indian nationality. Home Ministry officials asserted that mere possession of
ration cards, as for that matter registration in previous electoral rolls, did not in itself
constitute “automatic Indian citizenship” but could be counted as evidence (Hindustan
Times 1992b). Up till this point, ration cards issued through the government’s public
distribution system had served as the principal means to establish the domiciled status
of Indians, particularly those who did not have the resources or need to procure any other
documents. Until very recently, documents such as passports were meant largely for
those who could travel outside the country and the system of issuing birth certificates
remained rather rudimentary and spotty, operating largely in urban areas. Likewise,
while any person who held or once owned land in their native place could provide
documents such as property deeds, this would not be the case for those who existed as
landless peasants before migrating to big cities. With the exception of ration cards, jhuggi
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tokens and names on voters’ lists, the vast ranks of the urban poor in India had neither
been issued nor ever been in need of additional certification until these verification
drives. In the absence of standardised criteria for identifying Indians, this ambiguity
surrounding the citizenship status of the extremely large numbers of residents in
numerous slums and resettlement colonies, before long, came to haunt successive Indian
governments. It is in this maelstrom of activity a few weeks after the initial evictions that
then Home Minister S.B. Chavan presided over the Chief Ministers’ special conference
on illegal migration from Bangladesh (Hindu 1992d; Patriot 1992c; Tribune 1992b).
Ministers of nearly all the provinces in close proximity to the eastern boundary
participated in this crucial meeting which resolved to take ‘firm action’ against
unauthorised immigrants (National Herald 1992e; Jansatta 1992).

In his opening remarks, Chavan observed that the massive immigration of Bangladeshis,
beginning in Assam, then affecting West Bengal, Bihar, other northeastern states and,
lately, the capital city, had resulted in many social and political upheavals (Hindustan
Times 1992e). While confirming that accurate estimates on ‘illegal’ migration were not
available, the Minister underscored that this “problem” had acquired severe dimensions
(Aaj 1992a): “Whatever may be the compelling motive or cause for the migration, the
continuous flow is a matter of serious concern for all of us” (Indian Express 1992a; Patriot
1992d). M.M. Jacob, then Minister of State for Home Affairs, proposed the establishment
of monitoring groups that would periodically review the activities undertaken by
provinces and government bodies to check irregular migration (Hindustan Times 1992e).
A number of other regulatory measures, including barbed wire fencing along the
boundary with Bangladesh and using retail ration outlets under the public distribution
system to keep track of fresh migrant arrivals, were similarly considered. Finally, the
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Chief Ministers endorsed a scheme for issuing Identity Cards to Indian citizens living in
the border districts, provided it was implemented through approved legislation
(Hindustan 1992d; Statesman 1992a; Times of India 1992c, 1992d).

Yet, in a fate similar to the previous proposal for the compulsory reporting of
unauthorised immigrants by employers, the scheme was not executed. A caricature
(Figure 4.4) of the Chief Ministers’ special conference and the bellicose stance of a feeble
Indian state shows the participants – and, by suggestion, the geographical spaces
occupied by India – nearly submerged under a rushing deluge of Bangladeshi
immigrants. In the midst of this, as Home Minister Chavan rises above the rest, vowing
fervently to turn back the inundating tide, the spectacle of weak governance is made
complete by the presence of a small bucket touting the ‘Identity Cards Idea’ (Patriot 1992b;
Observer of Business and Politics 1992a; Hindustan Times 1998). Like Operation Pushback,
the Chief Ministers’ workshop betrayed the resort to drastic action of a government
increasingly confronted by the steady erosion of its own legitimacy. An op-ed piece in
Aaj (1992b) pointedly insinuated:
The [critical] question above all here is, what desperate need motivated the central
government to unexpectedly reveal anxiety about, and pursue answers to the
problem of Bangladeshi infiltration by organising the meeting of Chief Ministers
from West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura and Mizoram and
representatives from Meghalaya, Manipur and Nagaland on September 27? After
all, political developments of the past forty-five years have shown that the
Congress Party’s position on these infiltrators has been undesirably soft from the
very beginning [author’s translation; emphasis added].
Another article (Hindu 1992d) observed more boldly:
It is difficult to avoid the impression that the decision to summon a special meeting
in Delhi of Chief Ministers… specifically to discuss the problem of illegal influx
from Bangladesh into this country has been influenced by calculations having a
close bearing on the politics of Delhi than the more real apprehensions about the
long-term impact of such influx in areas in the neighbourhood of Bangladesh.
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Source: Times of India, September 1992
Figure 4.4 Chief Ministers’ Meeting, September 1992

4.4 ‘Operation Pushback’: Aggrandisement and Aggression
Plainly, the Indian government’s inflated endeavors to tackle the question of irregular
Bangladeshis proved ineffective from the very beginning; equally so was the aggressive
campaign to deport undocumented Bangladeshis from the capital city, fittingly termed
Operation Pushback, which began with an initial round of forced evictions on 9
September 1992. In this highly-publicised endeavour, a group of 132 persons (87 men, 23
women and 22 children) identified as Bangladeshi nationals were roughly removed from
New Seemapuri, a large resettlement colony in east Delhi, by officers from the Seemapuri
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Police Station and taken to the Old Delhi Railway Station (National Herald 1992b). Fifteen
officers, including two females from the Delhi Armed Police (DAP), escorted the
deportees on a 90-seat coach on the Sealdah Express during their 36-hour journey to
Sealdah in West Bengal. There, they were handed over to an FRRO advance party and
delivered by two Border Security Force (BSF) army trucks and a Calcutta police bus to
the Haridaspur check post, then sent across the border. An FRRO official explained this
elaborate procedure: “We have already informed the Border Security Force. These chaps
would be deported by the push back system” (Indian Express 1992d).

Rather astonishingly, in the beginning, the local administration vehemently denied that
Operation Pushback was being coerced upon the helpless immigrants. In fact, in an
interview in the Indian Express (1992d), Seemapuri Police Station House Officer Rathi,
who had accompanied the deportees to the railway station, avowed that the deportees
were enthusiastic to return to their country: “They are here because they want to go, all
of them are volunteers”. But, in the same report, an unidentified officer from the same
station let it slip that the police had forcibly rounded up people for three days and held
them under detention for deportation: “There is no section under the Indian Penal Code
to arrest such individuals. They are detained under Section 3C of the Foreigners’ Act and
served Quit India Notices” (Hindustan Times 1992f).

By the same token, all the unfortunate deportees testified to the involuntary nature of
‘Operation Pushback’, as in the case of Khalid, a kabadiwala (rag-picker): “I am being
forced to go. I am the only one from my family who is being sent away. My two kids and
wife are still here” (Radiance Views Weekly 1992a: 11). Another deportee, Shamsuddin,
divulged: “Given a chance, I [will] return…I am going [to Bangladesh] because I was
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unlucky to be on the road when the police came looking [for us]” (Indian Express 1992d).
It appeared that Khalid and Shamsuddin were not the only deportees to leave behind
their immediate families. Reportedly, more than three-quarters of those evicted still had
close relatives in the same basti, and many also claimed that they possessed ration cards
and had exercised their votes in previous elections.

The fundamental objective of Operation Pushback, to deter new ‘infiltrators’ and
intimidate the ones remaining behind, was made repugnant by the ritualised scripting of
the first 1992 evictions to coincide with the Islamic Prophet Mohammed’s birthday
(Frontline 1992c). And, as if the symbolic nature of these repatriations was not already
self-evident, the (almost entirely) Muslim deportees had their heads shaved and their
meagre belongings burnt in front of them before being cast out of Indian territory through
the North 24 Parganas district of West Bengal (Hindustan Times 1992g). In a report in
Calcutta’s Bengali newspaper Ananda Bazar Patrika, when asked why their few clothes,
bedding and even utensils were being destroyed, a BSF officer responded: “So that they
can tell people there that nothing can be brought back. We are even burning their money
[emphasis added]” (Indian Express 1992e). Over and above this, the officer informed that
the deportees were to be soundly thrashed before the final shove. Geographical locations
in close proximity to the actual border provided the appropriate sites for this unnecessary
brutality and humiliation, the officer explained, as they would be in plain view of
Bangladeshi citizens across the border and discourage them from entering India at any
future date (Patriot 1992a). Ultimately though, the ceremonious tonsuring, while
humiliating and degrading its victims, exemplified the purging of Indian soil from the
insidious effects of ‘infiltration’ through the purification of the unclean bodies of these
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Muslim immigrants. The raw rejoinder of the requiting Indian state was forcefully
written upon the physical frames of its transgressors.

Notably, and with remarkable haste, the authorities concerned took great pains to
establish that these expulsions were not a fresh happening, stoutly insisting that
Operation Pushback had begun more than a year before, on 1 September 1991 (Indian
Express 1992f; Times of India 1992e). Accounts that small groups of undocumented
immigrants had been deported previously under this scheme, based on information
furnished by local authorities, suggested that more than 700 unauthorised Bangladeshis
had been banished from the city in preceding months (Hindu 1992a, 1992b; National Herald
1992f).8 What is inexplicable is how those earlier ‘pushbacks’ could have escaped the
attention of the Indian press. if even the secrecy surrounding the 1992 evictions had not
prevented their widespread, albeit not entirely unfavourable, coverage in Indian
newspapers and magazines. Consequently, these claims by the central government and
Delhi administration had an unconvincing and untruthful ring. Equally flimsy was the
revelation provided a day after the evictions by New Delhi Police Commissioner Kaushal
that the families of deportees had not been returned along with them because they were
widely dispersed in various parts of the city and simply could not be located. As a hardhitting commentary caustically put it: “The whereabouts of their families could have been
found out from [the deportees]…They would have been forthcoming… no one wants to
leave one’s wife and children behind in a country from which one is being expelled”
(Indian Express 1992e).

An earlier editorial (Indian Express 1992g) had also questioned the rather crudely worked
out method of detecting Bangladeshis:
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It is not difficult to imagine what can happen to their wives and children who
remain here. The question arises, why were their families, whose whereabouts
could easily have been found out from them, not sent back as well? The absence
of a plausible explanation will only reinforce the impression one gathers from
reports on the deportation that people had been picked up at random.
Government agencies were not entirely insensitive to such swift and sharp criticisms of
the highly suspect and ruthless nature of this entire Operation, though the strongest
opposition to this fateful exercise was yet to materialise. Disapproval over the treatment
meted out to deportees ranged from the mild censuring of the depilatories as an
“embarrassment” (Telegraph 1992a) to more strongly-worded condemnations, such as
carried in the Telegraph newspaper (1992b): ‘As a part of Operation Pushback or perhaps
a prelude to it, the government demonstrated its irresponsible impetuosity by forcibly
deporting 132 migrants whose heads were tonsured on the birthday of Prophet
Mohammed’ (PUCL Bulletin 1992; Tribune 1992c). Likewise, a rare newspaper editorial
(Pioneer 1992a) opposing this “inhumane and unjust’” method of deportation firmly
declared: “This is not the remedy”; another (Indian Express 1992g) deemed that 132-odd
deportees “packed like sardines” into a small compartment meant to hold only 90
persons, and that too for a long journey, was unfair and excessive. The journal, Radiance
Views Weekly (1992b), challenged the context and underlying motives of the central
government: “Is it also accidental that soon after the BJP passed a resolution to this effect
at its Bhopal meeting, the deportation of illegal immigrants, most of whom happen to be
Muslims started?”

In an unexpected twist, the CPI-M government in West Bengal registered its displeasure
with the actions of the BSF and central government, requesting that future repatriations
of Bangladeshis be conducted through border areas outside their province (Frontline
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1992d). State intelligence agencies divulged that, in a tense meeting, Chief Minister Basu
had severely admonished BSF officials for sullying the West Bengal government’s
humanitarian reputation by tonsuring the hapless deportees (Pioneer 27 October 1992b).
Basu not only demanded assurances from the BSF that such inhumane incidents not be
repeated again but also protested against the province being used as a principal conduit
for these expulsions. But, while a satisfied Basu informed the media that the BSF had
agreed to comply with his requests, anonymous BSF sources reportedly criticised the
West Bengal government for undermining their painstaking efforts and appearing to be
far more concerned with the welfare of non-citizen immigrants than providing
constructive solutions to this “serious crisis” (Times of India 1992f).

The Chief Minister’s stand on Operation Pushback, in fact, singularly contradicted the
one taken at an earlier interview during which he had advised the BSF to strengthen their
patrols along the border (Observer of Business and Politics 1992b), as well as the resolution
taken by his party in mid-September when it had backed the central governmentsponsored Action Plan to check clandestine migration (Statesman 1992b). Like CPI-M, the
protracted inconstancy of many major Indian political parties towards Bangladeshi
immigrants would render the process of deportation and its outcome even more chaotic,
particularly in succeeding campaigns (National Herald 1992g; Statesman 1992c).

4.5 ‘Operation Push-in’: Repudiation and retaliation
Even though the evictions of 1992 were conducted on a very small scale, the Indian
government had to immediately grapple with their troubling, albeit unintended,
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consequences. Though meant to characterise a robust state firmly in command of its
geography, Operation Pushback quite literally involved forcibly pushing small numbers
of undocumented immigrants back into Bangladesh, in this instance, without the
cooperation of its government. Previously, immigrants apprehended at the border by the
BSF were simply delivered to their counterpart, the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) (Hindustan
Times 1992h). Worse was yet to follow with the news stories circulating from Dhaka,
Bangladesh, that their immigration officials had decided to detain around 35 deportees
sent from New Delhi at the Benapole immigration office (Economic Times 1992).

In a report from the Bangladeshi Daily Star (Hindustan Times 1992i), Manzurul Karim, then
the Bangladesh Home Secretary, explained: “We are trying to verify who they really are.
We are awaiting details. They must be Indian Bengalis”. The underlying reasoning, as
much as the certitude that a higher-level authority had issued the summons, was
confirmed when Foreign Minister Mustafizur Rahman clarified: “We will not accept [the
deportees] unless the Indian authorities provide documents that they are our citizens”
(Hindustan Times 1992j). Still, Khaleda Zia, then Bangladesh’s Prime Minister, added to
this controversial posture with the stark proclamation: “They are not our headache since
they are not Bangladeshis” (Economic Times 1992; Tribune 1992d). Thus, just as the
immigrants’ grinding poverty made them an easy casualty of Sangh Parivar’s and the
Indian state’s machinations, the government in Bangladesh would also forsake them. It
also emerged that a delegation of immigrants who had desperately sought the
intervention of the Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi had been disregarded on
the grounds that, as many of them had been registered as voters in India and possessed
ration cards, they would not be considered Bangladeshi citizens – “as good as saying we
don’t want you back” (Indian Express Sunday Magazine 1992).
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Even though successive governments in Bangladesh since then have embraced a similar
attitude towards undocumented immigrants detained on the suspicion of being
Bangladeshis – that is, not acknowledging them as citizens and conveniently making
them expendable – one of my respondents justified her home government’s amnesia thus:
“They know we exist here [in New Delhi] in large numbers. But they don’t acknowledge
our presence because it embarrasses them. It shames them that they have not been able
to take care of their own who are now forced to seek a home elsewhere.”

The diplomatic and hostile responses to the 1992 Indian evictions further violated the
terms of an agreement reached between the BSF and BDR in the previous year, by which
Bangladesh had consented to take back all those who were repatriated through judicial
process (Times of India 1992e; Pioneer 1992c). As a quasi-judicial authority, Delhi’s FRRO
had been deemed the agency to repatriate these immigrants and, by way of a final
stipulation, deportees were to be questioned jointly by both states’ agencies and their
status satisfactorily established before they were accepted into Bangladesh as its citizens.
As to their belligerence over Operation Pushback, Indian government sources let it be
known that, after initially accepting small groups of deportees, Bangladesh had refused
to receive any more, claiming that their citizenship could not be verified – objections, it
was admitted, that were not wholly unsubstantiated. After all, India had all but accepted
these immigrants as quasi-citizens, issuing them ration cards and even the right to
participate in the nation’s electoral process, privileges usually reserved for citizens.

In Bangladesh, official repudiation worked in unison with the outrage in the media over
the evictions as a “brutal and inhuman” episode (Hindu 1992e; Pioneer 1992d). In an
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unanimously passed resolution of 14 September 1992, the Bangladesh Parliament
condemned India’s action as “yet another design” against the country, one which was
“unilateral, illegal, unfortunate, and against all international laws” (Statesman 1992d). Ten
days later, the government formally lodged a strong protest against the deportations with
the Indian High Commissioner in Bangladesh (Hindu 1992f, 1992g; Hindustan Times
1992k, 1992m). Three days later, Foreign Minister Rahman denied in Parliament that large
numbers of citizens were living in India (Independent 1992b), but admitted to a two-way
flow of persons across the common border over several decades due to religious, cultural
and historical reasons (Hindu 1992e). An irate Bangladeshi government renamed the
operation “Operation Push-In” and accused the Indian government of trying to get rid of
its own rejected citizens (Hindustan Times 1992n 1992o; Pioneer 1992e).

Bangladesh’s verbal rebuttals to ‘Operation Pushback’, occurring in a somewhat
comparable context as the Indian government’s capitulation to the xenophobic and
grating demands of the Sangh Parivar, were precipitated by sharply intensified antiHindu and anti-Indian sentiments. In the midst of a steady growth in the fundamentalist
forces of the Islamic Jamaat in Bangladesh (Feldman 1999), Prime Minister Zia’s
government was under enormous internal pressure to harden its attitude towards its
dominant neighbour (Independent 1992c). The unwarranted display of cruelty towards the
first group of deportees had only strengthened this (Indian Express 1992h). Thus, the
compulsions and constraints imposed by extremist politics had proved overwhelming
for both governments, but with far more critical consequences for the Indian state, where
other cracks and discordant notes had manifest themselves in a “badly divided house”,
this time between two different ministries. In the absence of a coordinated approach, it
seems that the Ministry of External Affairs was pretty sore over the timing of the Home
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Ministry’s Operation Pushback, inauspiciously following considerable efforts to improve
Indo-Bangla relations. The Home Ministry neither notified nor invited them to attend
several inter-ministerial meetings on it, an anonymous senior ministry official grumbled
(Statesman 1992e):
It began the Operation without building a national consensus. The meeting of the
seven Chief Ministers was held three weeks after the operation started. Had the
pushback operation been kept in abeyance for some time we could have used it as
a lever in countering Bangladesh’s offensive.
To this charge, the Home Ministry officials countered: “Our Foreign Secretary during his
visit to Dhaka last June had conveyed India’s tough stand on infiltration” (Statesman
1992e). Clearly, though, the sentiment that echoed was that high-ranking bureaucrats in
the Home Ministry had launched a “highly sensitive and risky operation” without any
meaningful nor obligatory domestic and diplomatic consultations (Pioneer 1992f).

4.6 Bravado and Contraction
For a short while, the Congress-led central government was undeterred by these
mounting criticisms, and the Delhi administration bravely proceeded to send small
groups of Bangladeshis to the border (Independent 1992d). These deportations were
carried out very quietly as the authorities, fearing additional opposition to its modus
operandi, increasingly desisted from broadcasting their endeavours through the press.
Government sources now insisted that the highly sensitive nature of Pushback should do
without a “publicity blitzkrieg” (Hindustan Times 1992l). Despite being kept under wraps,
however, the continued implementation and effectiveness of Pushback were in question,
with widely reported accounts of sporadic violence in slums objecting to these evictions
(Indian Express 1992h; National Herald 1992h; Patriot 1992e; Pioneer 1992g; Times of India
1992g). Hostile residents resisting deportation pelted stones at the local police, who in
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turn resorted to violence (Hindustan Times 1992m). Shamshad, a migrant, explained their
difficult position: “We have been living here for twelve years and now suddenly the local
police want us to leave” (Statesman 1992f).

Another major frustration for the government was that many of the deportees, before
long, returned to their squatter settlement in the vast spaces of slums in New Delhi
(Navbharat Times 1992c; Ramachandran 1999). An unidentified senior official responsible
for Operation Pushback confirmed: “We are actually providing them with a free holiday,
even better than a travel leave allowance. Most of them stay in Bangladesh for a couple
of months and then come back” (Statesman 1992g) – the ambitious plan to “push back”
unauthorised Bangladeshis, at considerable financial expense, was proving to be an
acutely “half-baked one”. Equally embarrassing, Prime Minister Zia’s government in
Bangladesh, ever more compelled to affirm a militant stance against an increasingly
partial, weakening Indian state, directed the BDR to block the entry of the deportees
(Hindustan 1992e; Patriot 1992f). The outcome, in mid-October, a mere month after the
initial deportations, was that some 150 persons, who had been sent from New Delhi in
separate groups and expelled by the BSF, were instantly driven back. Since the BSF
refused to let them set foot back into India and the BDR vehemently insisted that they
were not Bangladeshi nationals, many of these “stateless persons” were to be seen
squatting defencelessly on the zero line between the two territories at Haridaspur in
North 24 Parganas district of West Bengal (Frontline 1992e; Independent 1992e).

Tension rapidly built up at this stretch of the border as angry Bangladeshi civilians hurled
stones and other objects at residents on the Indian side, causing them to abandon their
borderline villages to escape the rampant threat of violence (Hindustan Times 1992g;
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Pioneer 1992h). Even as the BSF fleetingly considered pushing back undocumented
immigrants through the western border into Pakistan instead (Statesman 1992h), the level
of the opposition to the deportation campaign and representations on behalf of the
undocumented immigrants by several religious and voluntary organisations and NGOs,
including Amnesty International (National Herald 1992i; Times of India 1992h), forced BSF
officials to admit their blunder. A senior BSF official privately termed the cruelties
inflicted on the deportees a “silly act” that had jeopardised diplomatic ties between the
two countries (Independent 1992f). Meanwhile, fuelled by the real need for their loyalty in
the approaching New Delhi Assembly elections, Congress politicians readily consented
to mediate on the immigrants’ behalf, while influential Delhi level Congress leaders
agitated for an end to Operation Pushback. Scanty evidence suggests that, perhaps,
having been exposed to the threat of large-scale deportations, the Bangladeshi
immigrants in New Delhi had shifted their support back to the Congress (Statesman
1992h).

Consequently, in the wake of mounting international and internal pressure, Operation
Pushback was suspended in early November 1992, as abruptly as it had been inaugurated
(Times of India 1992e). Though no official circular was issued to the effect, hardly any cases
of deportation were reported for the rest of that month (Statesman 1992i; Independent,
1992d), though sporadic deportations of Bangladeshis continued over the next few years,
for instance, under “Operation Flush Out” in 1993. In these subsequent expulsions, the
direct involvement and complicity of Sangh Parivar activists and slum leaders would
become more apparent.
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4.7 Conclusion
Sangh Parivar’s relentless quest in the early 1990s for political legitimacy and authority
or hegemony had, in the first instance, much to do with a sudden hypervisibility of
undocumented Bangladeshis in India. Crucially, several major Indian political parties
long recognised for their largesse towards the immigrants, also aligned themselves with
the tide of xenophobic and anti-Muslim rhetoric. Prominent among them was the ruling
(and now dissipated) Congress Party that, with great fanfare, implemented a hastily
prepared Action Plan to “detect, identify and deport” unauthorised Bangladeshis.
Operation Pushback, the accompanying government sponsored campaign, singled out
Muslim Bangladeshi immigrants who occupied the insignificant spaces of slums in
India’s capital city, New Delhi. Randomly picked up by the local police, the initial groups
of deportees were subjected to the coercive and communal impulses of the Indian state
and bureaucracy. What surfaces in a scrutiny of the campaign is the intimate relationship
between the xenophobic practices adopted by the Indian state and other social and
political processes in the capital city, arising both from the disquieting partnership of
various political actors outside the Hindu nationalist fold and the significances of the
connections between class, language, religion and citizenship. Also exposed are the
hidden geographies of these exclusionary exercises, structured as they were by the new
imagined geographies of Hindu nationalism and the retaliatory acts of a weakened
secular state coming to terms with its own loss of leadership. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, for the poverty-stricken Bangladeshi immigrants, this strategy of expulsion
signalled a new sobering phase of their already fragile existence in India. A detailed
account of their changing social and political realities is, however, yet to be composed.
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CHAPTER 5
Capricious Citizenship:
Identity, Identification, and Banglo-Indians
5.1 Introduction
The absolute value of citizenship status to people’s lives and their daily existence does
not need to be underscored. When the citizenship of individuals or groups is questioned,
certain rights and obligations granted to them are automatically weakened, undermining
their social position. When these rights are routinely violated, they may find their
existence to be degraded and invisible. Several recent works have documented the many
hardships particular groups and individuals face when they are not accepted as citizens
(Baer 2015, O’Nions 2015), do not hold formal citizenship of a state where they ordinarily
and extra-ordinarily reside (Hiemstra and Mountz 2015, McLaughlin and Hennebry 2015,
Uddin 2015), or when these rights are not extended to them (Bhabha and Matache 2015).

Although generally associated with inclusion, of defining personhood through rights and
agency, the old and new histories of citizenship are as much about exclusion as about
inclusion (Kabir 2002: 1). Two related aspects of citizenship come into play here:
citizenship as status and citizenship as identity (Yuval-Davis 2011). In order to access the
entitlements of citizenship and have legal standing, official documents provided by the
state, are key. The formal identification of individuals through these documents—their
citizenship status—establishes their belonging to a national collectivity—their citizenship
identity. Citizenship is therefore not only about passive affiliation with a particular state:
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it is inextricably tied to political projects of belonging in which nation-states are crucially
implicated (Yuval-Davis 2011). The identification of legitimate citizens and Others is
essential to upholding the myth that a unified national identity exists, and identity
documents confirm membership in this imaginary national community (Lyon 2009). The
processes of citizenship identity and identification both inevitably involve the regular
demarcation of ‘Us,’ those who belong, and ‘Them,’ those who do not.

But what happens when borders of citizenship identity and identification are indistinct,
and are combined in an unstable manner with unchecked unease over the presence of
undesirable Others? Through the example of ‘Banglo-Indians,’ transnational migrants
who unsettle limits of national identity and Indian citizenship, I provide a case study of
the Indian state’s efforts to manage these tensions through the contemporary
transformation of citizenship governance in India. In so doing I follow Bigo’s (2008)
analysis of the governmentality of unease. I begin by outlining the contours of what I
characterize as capricious citizenship and its significance for Banglo-Indians and other
marginal Indian residents whose citizenship status is at stake in these emerging
processes. The next section briefly highlights broad aspects of these insecurities,
especially new anxieties over terrorism and national security with its uncritical links to
cross-border migration. I also analyze some latest attempts at managing these anxieties
through new modes of citizenship and security mechanisms. These include the unfolding
of integrated national identification systems and identity cards in which a central registry
of citizens and residents actually entails multiple forms of surveillance of resident
populations. With the help of examples, I identify some tendencies associated with these
latest modes of citizenship, namely, enclosure, expulsion, classification and exclusion.
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5.2 ‘Irregular’ Migrants and Citizenship Slippages
On July 23, 1998, a small group of individuals apprehended by Mumbai (formerly
Bombay) police as ‘illegal Bangladeshi’ migrants and being transported by train to the
Paschimbanga (erstwhile West Bengal) border for deportation, were liberated in an
unusual set of circumstances (Chaudhuri 1998). A large crowd led by a Forward Bloc
politician (then part of the Left Front coalition government in the state of Paschimbanga)
halted the train at Uluberia (outside Kolkata/Calcutta) demanding the release of the
deportees, asserting that they were Bengali-speaking Muslims and, more importantly,
citizens of India (Times of India, 1998). The deportees, six women and twenty-eight men,
were indigent migrants from Paschimbanga employed in Mumbai’s textile industry.
They complained that the Maharashtra police had arrested and labeled them as
‘infiltrators’ because they spoke Bengali (also spoken in Bangladesh) and were Muslims
(Chaudhuri 1998).

The district administration reportedly later confirmed that the deportees were really
Indian citizens who had migrated from various districts of Paschimbanga (Times of India
1998). The controversy only deepened when the Paschimbanga government described
the deportations as “inhuman and barbaric,” accusing the anti-Muslim xenophobic BJPShiv Sena parties then ruling Maharashtra of harassing genuine citizens, blocking further
deportations (Indian Express 1998). A few days later, several major parties staged a
walkout from the Lok Sabha protesting against the forcible expulsion of Indian citizens
(Statesman 1998).

This extraordinary episode is illustrative of long-standing uncertainties surrounding the
identity and identification of irregular Bangladeshi migrants in India. Although generally
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perceived to be a homogeneous group on the basis of what is characterized as ‘illegal’
entry and unsanctioned residence within the national territory of India, it remains a
fuzzy, intricate category due to a variety of factors and circumstances. I have tried to
convey these nuances in previous writings through the concepts of capricious citizenship
and Banglo-Indians (Ramachandran 2005, 2011).

At the centre of the strident debate on citizenship and enclosure in India are
transmigrants, the Banglo-Indians, whose status, existence and future are linked to two
neighboring states, and who are rejected by both of them. One can well say the same
about transmigrants in other geographical and national contexts, especially where
marginal groups such as irregular migrants and refugees are concerned. Here,
Bangladesh’s steady denial of flows into India, and India’s deepening anti-immigrant
stance have fatefully organized this duality. So has the fact that for an extended period
India accepted these migrants, albeit in varying degrees depending on location. They
were treated as citizens and liberally granted entitlements ordinarily meant for citizens,
including state subsidies (such as food rations) and voting rights. The categorical
difference between the citizen and resident was dissolved: in effect, the two categories
became identical.

Border enforcement and deportations were weakly exercised. Poorly demarcated, and
largely open, borders between the two countries woven with lengthy histories of largescale migrations tied to colonial and post-colonial nation-building processes, have lent
enormous density to irregular migration in this region. Bangladeshi migrants’ sociocultural integration and ethno-cultural similarities with Indians has fundamentally
challenged the state’s ability to firmly differentiate legitimate residents or citizens.
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In his work on irregular migration in Malaysia and India, Sadiq (2009, 101-102) discusses
“blurred membership” in developing countries, where efforts to differentiate between
citizen and foreigner are undermined by absence of standardized documentation for
citizenship confirmation, and where many “illegal’ migrants” have “fraudulently”
acquired multiple documents reserved for citizens. He characterizes them as “paper
citizens” and the process of claiming nationality through these documents as
“documentary citizenship” (p. 72). He implies that these migrants are not really
legitimate citizens of India because they were not entitled to these documents in the first
place. While it is true that documents may sometimes be acquired through unorthodox
means, including bribery, I argue that they were not obtained unlawfully. Before the
Indian state began to discriminate against them, migrants received documents through
the same mechanisms as other residents. One can perhaps even go so far as to claim that
by permitting them to acquire these documents, the Indian state actually naturalized the
migrants, turning them into de facto citizens. Unsurprisingly, transmigrants also claim
Indian citizens’ identity for themselves.

I invoke the term ‘slippery citizenship’ here to evoke the ambiguities, unpredictability,
and lack of consistency attached to the citizenship status of residents of India, at least
some of whom are now perceived to be non-citizens and unwanted residents, yet hold
official documents that can only be issued to citizens. The concept of capricious
citizenship denotes this dynamic and outlines how it comes into play for irregular
Bangladeshis. The demarcation lines between citizens and non-citizens, particularly
those who are now seen as a threat to the nation-state’s wellbeing, are highly
indistinguishable.
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After the High Court of Delhi rejected the Indian government’s plea in mid-2005 to revise
the prescribed Action Plan of deporting one hundred irregular Bangladeshis per day
from the capital city under a Public Interest Litigation/PIL judgment, an unidentified
official complained about these identification difficulties:
…It is virtually impossible to separate Bangladeshis from the lot
belonging to Bengal, Bihar and Assam. Most of them have changed
their identities. They have Hindu names and have even got ration
cards. Many of them have picked up Bihari and dialects of West
Bengal and some of them do not even speak their language at all.
Finding them is like finding a needle in a haystack (Kumar 2005).
The PIL had proposed substantial increase in migrant deportations on the grounds that
migrants were depriving legitimate citizens of public services (Outlook India 2005). The
official’s statement laments the physical and cultural resemblances of transmigrants and
Indians, and migrants’ assimilation into areas where they settle. It is also not clear if these
migrants were ‘documented’ in Bangladesh; thus, if any records even exist of their birth
and residence there.

So, the category of the Indian citizen is not stable and slippages with the ‘illegal
Bangladeshi migrant’ are pronounced. They are particularly acute for indigent urban
migrants who do not carry many forms of identification, and especially for those who
share cultural affinities with Bangladeshis (such as religion and language). Class-based
preferences attached to uneven, often arbitrary processes of identity confirmation mean
that many poor Indians own few official documents that can conclusively substantiate
their nationality. Documents that confirm identity, origin, and history of residence or
domicile like Permanent Account Number (PAN) cards (for income tax payers), driving
licenses, credit cards, land registration deeds, telephone bills, electricity bills, employee
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ID cards, student ID cards, bank accounts, passports etc., are all stacked unfavorably
against vulnerable populations.

Feeble birth registration systems augment this uncertainty. Close to half of all children in
urban areas in South Asia are unregistered (UNICEF 2011). Rural rates are even lower,
due to poor registration facilities (Mony et al. 2011; UNICEF 2009). Studies have revealed
the dismal rates of official credentials held by poor urban households and weak access to
documents that give legitimacy to their residence (CURE 2011; Plan India and Chetna
n.d.). Yet at the same time, two commonly held documents, ration-cards and voter-cards,
have been liberally issued to transmigrants. As the episode recounted earlier
demonstrates, in such contexts the risk of falsely characterizing actual Indian citizens as
‘illegal’ migrants remain extremely high.

5.3 Transmigrants and Politics of (In)Security
In the last few years the easy relationship between territory, residence, and rights has
become unsettled. The belief that the presence of large numbers of migrants inside
national boundaries signifies the weakness of the Indian nation-state is now even more
firmly entrenched in the public imagination. The Indian Supreme Court’s repeal of the
Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunals (IMDT) Act, which had addressed the
ambiguities of citizen vs. non-citizen status through autonomous courts in the state of
Assam, operates from this restrictive logic (Roy 2010). Recent connections
indiscriminately drawn between terrorism and Bangladeshis after the high-profile
attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, and more recent explosions in New Delhi and
Jaipur have also shored up such xenophobic and anti-Muslim antipathies (Indian Express
2009; PIB 2006). India, is in a current state of high anxiety over migrant flows across its
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eastern border. A quote from the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Annual Report for 2004-5
illustrates these worries:
The problem of illegal migration is more acute [with] respect [to]
Bangladeshi nationals. Such migrants not only tax the civic and other
services available to Indian citizens but also pose a security threat as foreign
agencies inimical to the interest of India may use such elements for antiIndia activities (MHA 2005).
Because these unchallenged fears have continued to heighten, they have amplified
pressures on the Indian state to identify and categorize ‘residents’ on the basis of those
attributes that relate to belonging.

Nevertheless, it would be naive to assume that the raison d’être of these new modes of
citizenship is no more than the latest forms of insecurity based on terrorism, the latest
“state of unease” (Bigo 2008, 6). Hiemstra and Mountz’s chapter on undocumented
migrants in the US reveals how historical projects of exclusion such as those rooted in
racism continue to structure current dynamics and their pervasive effects on citizenship
rights. In India, a long history of xenophobia shapes these insecurities and marginal
populations acutely feel its cumulative effects (Crush and Ramachandran 2009). Moodie’s
analysis of bomb blasts in Jaipur documents the manner in which previous “demographic
anxieties” over these flows, and their insertion into the politics of the Hindu right, have
converged with newer concerns over safety and security (Moodie 2010). Jones (2012 a;
2009b) demonstrates how new border enforcement practices have re-inscribed religious
conflicts through the global war on terror.

Elements of Bigo’s (2008) perceptive analysis of (in)security is useful here. He argues that
the Banopticon dispotif, an assemblage of practices and mechanisms for management of
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unease, has transformed security concerns to in(security). In(security) has at least three
meanings here: the production of fear to justify such practices; renewed vulnerability of
marginal populations subjected to its surveillance; and an eroded concept of security.
With its myopic fixation on “coercion acting”, security becomes a void, detached from
legitimate concerns of “human, legal and social guarantees and protection of individuals”
(Bigo 2008, 12). The discourse on insecurity has an added poignant dimension: the
absolute insecurity of survival that compels transmigrants to enter India (Ramachandran
2011).

Brown (2010) provides a different perspective on this “state of unease.” She argues that
the waning of state sovereignty through intensifying transnational processes like
migration has led to the emergence of “walled states”, where fortification of geographical
boundaries also symbolizes the production of reactionary national imaginaries. These
hyper-visible walls (she confines her analysis to border fences), function theatrically to
convey the fantasy of an absolute, enforceable distinction between inside and outside, as
an effort to counteract the “slippery sovereignty” exercised by it. She refers to the “crude”
emerging fence at the Indo-Bangladesh border as one such wall (Brown 2010, 8). Though
Brown deems the decline in state sovereignty to be global, the contextual specificities of
the Indian case must be highlighted.

I use the term “slippery sovereignty” to convey the lack of absolute control exerted over
its territory by the Indian nation-state, of which incomplete information about its subjects
is a formative aspect. Waning sovereignty in the context of border and interior
enforcement does not imply that the Indian state ever exerted total control. Rather, this
control is seen to be increasingly slippery, sliding further away from the state.
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Nevertheless, this does not mean that the state ceases to exert a durable influence on
residents’ lives. Also, the Indian state is centrally involved in perpetuation of irregular
migration that it renders ‘illegal’ or unlawful, and subsequently produces risk in
manifold ways, through what Lyon terms “categorical suspicion” (Lyon cited in Ball and
Webster 2003).

More importantly, the insecurity associated with these informal flows does not end with
the securitization of borders (Yuval-Davis 2011). These real and symbolic walls are not
only created at the nation-state’s blurred geographical edges, they are also maintained in
other, far-reaching and often less noticeable ways. Needless to say, many of these new
mechanisms have and will affect, in momentous ways, the construction of citizenship and
its boundaries. The acceleration of fence construction at the Bangladesh border is the most
conspicuous element, though it is not the only “walls” and other divides operating here
(Brown 2010). Other examples are less visible. Besides the fortification and enclosure of
geographical boundaries and concomitantly of nationhood, separation, expulsion, sorting
and exclusion are other tendencies. The normalization of surveillance through tagging and
labeling along with policing of populations at several levels, from ordinary residents in
marginal locations where migrants reside and through sophisticated systems using the
latest technologies, are defining traits of governance defined by security imperatives.

5.3.1 Enclosure and Separation
An unusual manifestation of nationalist hyper-anxiety and its reaction to slippery
sovereignty is identity documents for Indian cows near border areas. Introduced in
2007to limit cattle ‘smuggling’ to Bangladesh, it was seen as a novel solution to check the
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migration of cattle across the border. Residents of West Bengal’s Murshidabad, Nadia
and South 24 Parganas districts were told by the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) to
have theirs cows photographed in order to obtain special cattle cards; conveying,
incredibly, that even cows have nationalities (Times of India 2001; Bhaumik 2007). Since
cow slaughter is illegal in many parts of India due to the cultural practices of Hindus,
ageing cattle are traded to Bangladesh, where similar restrictions do not apply
(Chaudhuri 2007). Valid for two years, these photo cards displayed the animal and its
owner’s picture, along with information such as color, height, sex, length of horns, and
identifying features like “horn missing” or “half tail lost” (Rahman 2007). In
Murshidabad alone, more than 5,000 such cards were distributed. Variations of the
program were apparently being considered as early as 2001 (Times of India 2001). The
“cattle ID card” exercise may appear absurd, but it is an effective illustration of how the
state amplifies border anxieties to justify its governance methods, however costly and
ineffective such bureaucratic schemes may be. It heightens the vulnerability of Indian
space to intrusion while exaggerating the differences, especially cultural ones, between
the two countries. The demarcation of national identity linked to religion and religious
practices lends special significance to this sharp emphasis on cattle trading.

5.3.2 Surveillance and Expulsion
Elsewhere, the Indian state has sought to manage these anxieties and indistinctness
through surveillance and expulsion. In early 2008, Razia Begum and her family
challenged a deportation order to send them to Bangladesh by producing documentation
validating their citizenship status (Delhi High Court 2008). They supplied ration cards
and voter identity cards, asserting that as entitlements tied to citizenship they confirmed
their Indian nationality. Razia also held an Indian passport. The Foreigners’ Regional
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Registration Offices (FRROs), the primary Indian agency regulating the entry, movement
and length of residence of non-citizens, refuted their claim. It maintained that Razia and
her husband had migrated ‘illegally’ during the 90s and at some point, managed to obtain
these documents. Court transcripts indicate that Razia was not able to provide any other
evidence backing her claim of having being born in India or having resided in south
Delhi. She had also been unable to furnish proof of birth for her children.

There are crucial aspects of this case. Local authorities had relied on “secret information”
that her family had entered India ‘illegally,’ for which the Deportation Cell had detained
her (Delhi High Court 2008, 1). The Deportation Cell refers to the latest specialized police
units, the ‘Bangladeshi Cells’ whose main task is to locate, detain, and deport migrants
(Delhi Police 2007). The details of this information and its reliability were neither
divulged nor questioned. Given the modus operandi through which they would have been
identified in Delhi, Razia and her family had very likely been detained after being
branded as ‘illegal Bangladeshi’ migrants by mukhbars (informants) tied to the police
(CCPD 2008). Here, surveillance operates as a panopticon where other slum residents,
often transmigrants themselves, collude with police and local-level powerbrokers in
migrants’ identification (Mattelart 2010). The judge upheld the deportation order, ruling
that because the available documents were obtained through “fraudulent means” and
other evidence was absent, Razia and her family had “miserably failed” to prove that
they were citizens of India (Delhi High Court 2008, 4). Legal counsel for the Indian state
had argued that she had obtained the passport through deceptive means in three separate
attempts (with varying dates of birth, mother’s name and addresses) even though at the
final attempt, she was actually issued a passport. Razia’s grandchildren, born after the
new citizenship rules came into effect (eliminating jus soli rights for migrants’ progeny),
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were also to be treated as “foreign nationals” (Delhi High Court 2008, 3). Re-affirming the
dominant narrative, Judge Bhayana concluded predictably that the “influx of
Bangladeshi nationals who have illegally migrated poses a threat to the integrity and
security of India,” underscoring the need for stringent controls (Delhi High Court 2008,
4). He added: “the order of deportation is not punishment but a method of ensuring
return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions” of state
entry and residence (Delhi High Court 2008, 4).

Even knowing the details of her case, it is not possible to conclusively determine if Razia
Begum had actually migrated from Bangladesh, and if originally from there, she had
lived in India for at least ten years before being singled out for expulsion. Remarkably,
hardening citizenship limits, particularly exclusion of birth-based rights for
transmigrants’ children, were endorsed under the same set of rules that provided greater
entrée to overseas Indians and descendants of Indian emigrants (Rygiel and WaltonRoberts 2015). The shifting boundaries of citizenship inclusion and exclusion have
operated simultaneously, with a growing focus on ethnicity and descent (Roy 2010). Of
course, these are highly disputed concepts in the Indian subcontinent given its common
history, and conveniently overlooks that such affinities also extend to the transmigrants.

5.3.3 National Identification Systems and Social Sorting
Identification systems, surveillance experts have argued, should be treated as a form of
governance, for identity cards issued through such structures are often the only obvious
evidence of complicated and covert forms of identification with strong social
consequences attached to them (Amoore 2008; Bennett and Lyon 2008). Lyon asserts that
although ID cards are seen as “identity cards,” it would be more accurate to characterize
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them as “identification cards” (Lyon 2009, 8). The propensity for “social sorting” based
on selected qualities is strongly present in these seemingly benign systems (Lyon 2009,
39-62; Monahan 2010).

The rapid proliferation of such systems suggests that identification and citizenship
function as aggregated entities in these “times of insecurity” (Monahan 2010). New
citizenship practices are therefore really about the exclusion of undesirable elements,
contrasting sharply with the welfare function of previous systems (Lyon 2009). New
aspects associated with these systems, such as biometrics, enable officials to make these
discriminatory judgments with much less recourse to flexibility and bureaucratic
discretion (Lyon 2009, 41). Despite their popularity, it is not clear how effective these
systems are in addressing the concerns that justify their existence and high costs
(Breckenridge 2008; Ramakumar 2011c, Ramanathan 2011).

I briefly examine two national-level identification systems currently in process in India
that address aspects of capricious citizenship. While a detailed assessment of these
systems is not possible, what is noteworthy is their commonality in terms of function and
structure. These include their reliance on biometric information, sharing of data, their
unstated mutual overlaps, their similar historical origins and continuities, and the
powerful implications they hold for resident populations.

The first of these latest mechanisms that attempts to address ambiguous citizenship
identities is the Unique Identification Project and Aadhaar. This highly publicized
undertaking by the Unique Identification Authority of India/UIDAI, initiated in
February 2009, aims to assign every resident of India a twelve-digit individual
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identification number on behalf of the Indian state (UIDAI 2012a). Aadhaar (meaning
foundation or support in Hindi) numbers will be assigned to persons after they submit
their demographic (name, age, gender, address, name of parent/guardian for children
below five years) and biometric information (picture, fingerprints, iris scan) to any
Aadhaar enrolment center. Collected information will be integrated into a centralized
database containing the numbers with corresponding demographic and biometric
information. By 2013, over 254 million residents of India have enrolled and some 400
million are expected to register during the second phase (UIDAI 2013).

Aadhaar’s primary purpose is to create ‘a universal identity infrastructure’ which will
serve as the foundation for issuing identity-based official documentation like ration-cards
and passports. It will also support public or private programs or services that depend on
unique identification, provide secure access, and equally importantly reduce existing
mismanagement in programs such as food subsidies (UIDAI 2012b). Accordingly, it
would allow residents to prove their identity and service providers to confirm to which
residents they have to provide benefits. The socially inclusive dimensions of Aadhaar,
namely, its value to vulnerable residents, have been repeatedly emphasized. The UIDAI
highlights the “debilitating exclusion” of the poor from resources such as bank accounts.
In a supporting paper, the Deputy Director-General of Aadhaar explains that for many
people absence of documentation to confirm identity “condemns them to remain in a
vicious circle of poverty” because it acts as a formidable barrier to accessing public
benefits and subsidies (Khachi 2012, 3). He adds: “inclusion of vulnerable groups [is] the
summumbonum [highest good] and metaphorically speaking the heart and soul of the
Aadhaar project” (Khachi 2012, 3). The UIDAI stresses that its mandate is to take special
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measures to ensure that Aadhaar is available to poor and marginalized sections of society
(UIDAI 2012c).

During the first phase of enrolment, the principle of inclusiveness appeared to be at play.
Large numbers of documents were accepted as proof of address or identity, and even
when supporting documentation was not available, enrollees were generously allowed
to make use of multiple Introducers or guarantors for identity confirmation (UIDAI
2012d). After complaints from many quarters over the easy inclusion of ‘illegal residents,’
including a Parliamentary Standing Committee review, the second phase is more
stringent with stronger document checks (Standing Committee on Finance 2011). The
Introducer system has been scaled back substantially, undermining the supposed goal of
the scheme, that is, enrolment of poor residents with weak or negligible proof of identity
and address (Suneja 2012). While Aadhaar registration is voluntary, public and private
structures are being aggressively linked to the UID card, without which access to services,
including education, will be adversely affected (Times of India 2012). So, Aadhaar already
functions as a de facto Identity Card (Ramakumar 2011c).

Remarkably, Aadhaar’s development has paralleled the gradual emergence of another,
markedly similar structure for systematic enumeration and identification of Indian
citizens. While less hyped or conspicuous than Aadhaar, the National Population
Register (NPR), a database of usual residents above the age of five, is being created
through the Census (Office of Registrar-General & Census Commissioner of India 2012).
Changes to the Citizenship Act under the Hindu nationalist BJP-led coalition government
in 2003 inserted mandatory provisions (termed Citizenship Rules, 2003), for the creation
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of the National Population Register/NPR and eventually the Citizens Register/NRC of
all Indian citizens and the distribution of National Identity Cards (NICs) (MHA 2003).

Like Aadhaar, this edifice relies on biometric information, and for some time such details
were being documented twice, by NPR and Aadhaar. Now, NPR biometric information
is being linked to Aadhaar and individuals’ UID numbers are being attached to various
existing databases. Each individual must provide supporting evidence to confirm their
citizenship status for the NPR, which is examined by a verification team (Mehmood
2008). Citizenship will be deemed suspect unless proved otherwise. For documented
residents, lists containing their biographic information, photograph and UID/Aadhaar
number will be printed and displayed in the local area to “invite claims and objections
from the public at large” (Office of Registrar-General & Census Commissioner of India
2012). The dubious role of local residents in identifying ‘illegal’ residents and helping to
organize the NPR through residents’ classification is a strategic element here. Monahan’s
(2010) observation that the social construction of fear helps people to shape their
identities and locate themselves in relation to others, through acts and discourses of
exclusion, becomes palpable here.

Available information suggests that the Unique Identification Project emerged from a
smaller exercise in 2006 to provide identity documents to households eligible for the
Below the Poverty Line program (UIDAI 2012e). Later, the government decided to collate
the Aadhaar/UID project and the NPR. Even though broadly addressing crucial aspects
of identity and identification, the tensions apparent in divergent objectives of these two
colossal exercises, the one inclusive (to broaden access to resources through identity
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confirmation) and the other exclusive (identification and categorization by citizenship
status), have not been adequately resolved.

It is also not yet clear how these two parallel systems will eventually integrate and
function jointly. Former Intelligence Bureau AK Doval has highlighted the UID Project’s
less benevolent objectives: “It was intended to wash out the aliens and unauthorized
people! But the focus seems to be shifting. Now, it is being projected as more
development-oriented lest it ruffle any feathers” (Anon 2012). Critics like economist Jean
Drèze, who has worked extensively on poverty and social access, describe Aadhaar as a
“national security project in the garb of a social policy initiative” (Halarnkar 2012). Other
comments correspondingly attach it to the Indian state’s new defense agendas,
characterizing Aadhaar and proposed NIDAI measures as mammoth surveillance
projects, with extensive and yet unacknowledged implications for tracking and tagging
residents and their activities (Bidwai 2010; Citizens’ Forum for Civil Liberties 2012;
Ramanathan 2010; Mehmood 2012). Special provisions such as use of Aadhaar data for
national security purposes outlined in the NIDAI Bill and its integration with other
emerging measures such as NATGRID (national intelligence information-sharing
network, developed after the Mumbai attacks), have been identified as areas of grave
concern (Kak and Malik 2010; Nayak 2012; Ramakumar 2011a, 2011b). With
transmigrants featuring intensely in this “state of insecurity”, these systems will function
though “marginalizing surveillance” (Monahan 2010, 10) likely applied excessively to
track the activities of weaker residents, those who appear to be ‘illegal’ Bangladeshi
migrants, and others who become undesirable or dangerous in the eyes of the state.
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Since these measures are in their formative stages, just how those who possess limited
documents and are unable to prove their citizenship will be treated under these two
systems remains to be seen. Mehmood’s (2008) captivating account of the preliminary
stages of NPR enrolment suggests the creation of a continuum of residents, from those
who are deemed “very Indian” to those seen as “less Indian”. I argue that the long-term
implications of these national identification systems, as currently organized, are
dangerous for those who are unable to secure their citizenship identity through the NPR
or Aadhaar. At best, they will become invisible to the state, unacknowledged, deprived
of dwindling social welfare programs, and ultimately neglected. Equally disturbing, and
further along the spectrum of social inequality and segregation, they will face constant
scrutiny and risk expulsion as ‘illegal’ migrants.

A different, albeit alarming, scenario is that armed with biometric information on all
residents, legitimate or otherwise, the state will not only be able to track them, it will
permanently disable access to rights and services for suspected residents. This will
achieve a longstanding goal in which migrants are allowed to remain in India, but with
all rights eliminated. With few measures at present to really address the dilemma of
unreliable documentation, there are sound reasons to assume that a very large number
of residents will eventually be facing unpleasant realities. The social exclusion of
marginal residents on a number of fronts is an inescapable feature of these new systems.
The slipperiness attached to citizenship rights therefore is only likely to intensify in the
future. In an extreme situation, those excluded by these systems or flagged for being
‘illegal’ may find themselves stateless, existing in the shadows of two states, but devoid
of citizenship in either.
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5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has called attention to the contemporary governance of citizenship in India
and predicaments of citizenship identity and recognition of residents’ citizenship status.
The former generous accommodation of transmigrants as de facto citizens coupled with
weak access to official documents for indigent residents, creates the conditions for
capricious citizenship, which now results in distorting citizens and residents’
dissimilarities. A key attribute of this form of slippery citizenship, where citizenship is
blurred through erratic endorsements of citizens’ identity, is the presence of
transmigrants, or Banglo-Indians. Comfortably assimilated into the social fabric of areas
where they settled and ‘Indianized,’ they maintain Indian citizenship identity for
themselves. New discourses of insecurity that incorporate previous concerns about
migrants’ growing numbers and religious differences have fused with contemporary
anxieties over terrorism. This transforms the Banglo-Indian into a figure of fear in India.
The remarkable irony is that the smooth incorporation of Banglo-Indians into Indian
society has become a principal source of discomfort, which sits in marked contrast to
debates over limited migrant integration in Western Europe (Geschiere 2009). In this
securitized vision of sovereign territoriality, the existential insecurity of deprivation that
drives Bangladeshis to India is completely obscured, as are their deep cultural and
religious commonalities with Indians.

With partial knowledge about its own residents blending precariously with the BangloIndians, the slippery sovereignty exercised by the Indian state combines detection of
transmigrants with their isolation from its real citizenry. With some 1.3 billion or more
residents to account for within its territories, the mammoth task of sorting out citizens
and non-citizen residents is a formidable and perhaps near impossible undertaking. The
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slippery sovereignty rationalizes this securitized insecurity through new modes of
citizenship, some of which are in early stages of inception. Several manifestations of this
management are identified, where citizens’ identification works simultaneously to
redraw boundaries of citizenship identity and national inclusiveness. The unexpected use
of cattle ID cards to magnify the borders of geographical-national-religious belonging are
an indicator, however peculiar, of insecurity-driven governance, as is the escalating
border fence emblematically enclosing national territories. The barring of jus soli rights
for migrants’ progeny and the use of community surveillance to detect migrants feature
as its other troubling modes.

Surveillance figures strongly too in the emerging national-level methods of citizens’
identification through Aadhaar and NPR. In these expanding systems, Sadiq’s (2009)
notion of “documentary citizenship” acquires a completely different meaning. These new
developments show how much importance official documents carry for lives of
insignificant residents, as without them they may find themselves not only bereft of
citizenship rights and access to services, but may also be vulnerable to deportation and
possibly statelessness, the final act of exclusion from national belonging. Perhaps the
most striking incongruity is that these systems do not really address the problem of
uneven documentation; rather they magnify its insidious effects by focusing
disproportionately on exclusion of the Banglo-Indian. With the Aadhaar and NPR
enrolment proceeding uninterrupted at the time of writing, the future acceptance of
transmigrants in India appears rather bleak, but their insecurity will likely extend to
many Indian residents as well.
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CHAPTER 6
Detention Deportation Dispensation:
Crimmigration Control and ‘Irregular Bangladeshis’ in India

6.1 Introduction
Following several failed submissions to the local police, Moyna, a 22-year-old detainee,
petitioned the Karnataka High Court (2013, 2) in mid-2013 seeking its intervention to
“immediately deport her to her homeland, Bangladesh.” She had been a resident for over
a year and a half at Bangalore’s Reception Center, a state-run shelter to temporarily house
destitute women, when she sought the Courts direction for her return to her country of
birth and citizenship (V. Kumar 2013a). Arrested in January of 2011 for entering India
without a valid passport or visa, she had been charge-sheeted (formally charged through
record of offense at local police-station) for these infractions. She was found responsible
in April for “breaching” Indian immigration regulations, and sentenced to a prison term
of 107 days, which was offset against her detention whilst awaiting trial. The Bangalore
city police had transported her in October to a Border Security Forces/BSF camp for
deportation. However, Bangladesh’s Border Guards declined to accept her as a citizen by
issuing a ‘No Objection Certificate’. Consequently, she was returned to Bangalore where
she had been originally detained.

During the hearing, she informed the court that she had arrived in India without “bad
intention” (Hindu 2013b). Lacking any knowledge about immigration procedures and
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requirements, she had crossed the border informally to assist a relative in poor health.
Isolated from her family and nervous about her uncertain fate, she had to be treated for
depression at a local hospital shortly before her hearing (Hindu 2013a). Mozibur Morul,
her father traveled in the interim from their village of Koikhali in Satkhira district, Khulna
subdivision to Bangalore to seek her release, but was unsuccessful. After the Court issued
notices to the state and central governments, Bangalore police, and local Foreigners
Registration Office to expedite her expulsion and submit a follow-up report, Moyna was
finally, after 41 days, released and deported (V. Kumar 2013b). Some 31 months, or 931
days, had elapsed from her preliminary arrest to her eventual return to Bangladesh.

The details of Moyna’s case — the long-drawn-out detention and delayed deportation
she endured — are not unusual in any respect, both in India and other contexts. With the
escalation of immigration controls by many receiving states, this general pattern is being
recorded in various parts of the world. Scholars have begun to increasingly examine the
manner in which the processes of detention and deportation are being deployed by
nation-states to regulate the presence of undesirable migrants (Coutin 2015; Miller 2012;
Weber 2015). The publication of Stumpfs (2006) influential concept of crimmigration has
brought particular attention to the judicial systems, including laws, legal structures and
enforcement mechanisms, in shaping these processes and heightening their disciplinary
tendencies. With very few exceptions (Galvin 2015; Vigneswaran 2013; Hedman 2008),
however, this burgeoning discussion has centered almost entirely on the global North.

This chapter makes a preliminary effort to map the distinctive configurations of
crimmigration control in India, and, in particular, its preoccupation with unwanted
migrants from neighboring Bangladesh. The analysis draws on multiple, under-utilised
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primary materials ranging from immigration regulations; Ministry of Home Affairs
(department responsible for immigration-related matters) documents, including annual
reports and statements to MPs queries in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha (Lower and
Upper Houses of Parliament); National Crime Records Bureau/NCRB statistics; selected
case law; Public Interest Litigation/PIL court judgments; which have been supplemented
with key informant interviews. Through the analysis, an attempt has been made to
broaden the ongoing discussion on crimmigration to the South-South migrations and
their contemporary governance. A close reading of the principal immigration law, the
Foreigners Act, has been provided to draw attention to its indispensable function in
propping up India’s crimmigration system. The workings of crimmigration through the
existing legal and bureaucratic systems in India is discussed, posing additional hurdles
for detainees, many of whom are marginal residents. It is shown that the securitization
of unwanted migrations carries with it a veil of secrecy regarding its management, with
significant gaps in publicly available information on these processes. The relentless
influence exerted by the Hindu right-wing political forces on such processes through the
strategic manipulation of migrants’ identities is underscored.

6.2 Crimmigration and Immcarceration
The marked intersection of immigration and criminal legislation as well as enforcement
in migrant-receiving states as the criminalization of migration, has been highlighted by
critical scholarship. Contemporary immigration enforcement practices in many countries
have extended detention to criminal incarceration or, applying Stumpf’s term (2006,
2015), as crimmigration. As Kalhan (2010: 43) describes it, the system of crimmigration
law, with its excessive immigration control procedures, has emerged as a quasi-punitive
system of immcarceration. Analyzing the evolution of this “crimmigration crisis” in the
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US, Stumpf (2006) contends that the crimmigration merger has occurred in three
important ways. First, the substance of immigration and criminal law have increasingly
blended into each other. Immigration enforcement has begun to mimic criminal law
enforcement, and finally, procedural aspects of prosecuting immigration violations have
acquired traits of criminal trials. In a more recent assessment, she shows how this
amalgamation has expanded crimmigration. The complicated processes used to regulate
non-citizens function such that in the procedural web shaped by crimmigration, “process
has become punishment” (Stumpf 2013: 73). The growing convergence between criminal
enforcement and immigration controls has been highlighted, in a related vein, as border
criminology, where the judicial system has been significantly adjusted towards matters
of citizenship (Bosworth 2017). Others have drawn attention to the marked intertwining
of crime controls and border controls (Pickering, Bosworth and Aas 2015).

Writing about the United Kingdom and other Western countries, Bowling and Westenra
(2015) argue that as a result of these latest developments, what is being witnessed is not
just the unequal, differential treatment of unwanted, ‘risky’ migrants, but also the
emergence of an independent, specialised penal system. This “crimmigration control
system” incorporates a set of elements geared towards transnational social control.
“Authorised by a unique panoply of crimmigration laws, the system harnesses all the
elements of the crime control industry: physical defenses; mechanisms for intelligence
gathering and surveillance; policing and law enforcement; a specialised legal process,
courts and tribunals; and a secure estate of detention centres” (p. 1).

Various manifestations of “crimmigration”, “immcarceration”, and this “punitive bent”
are being researched for different countries (Bosworth and Kaufman 2011; Cote-Boucher
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2015; Di Martino et al. 2013; Guia, van der Woude and van der Leun 2013; Moran, Conlon
and Gill 2013). Aliverti’s (2014) study of the “crimes of mobility” in Britain analyses the
evolution of a hybrid system between administrative and criminal law in which 84 new
categories of immigration-related offences have been added, along with their more
systematic application by enforcing authorities. The passage of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigration Control Act/IIRICA during the mid-1990s forged a large-scale
program of mass returns to Central America from the US (Kasun 2017). New localised
programs tethering criminal and immigration enforcement have enhanced state power
to punish those deemed as offenders (Beckett and Evans 2015). Crime and punishment
have become the preferred means for governing the undocumented (Aas 2013; Bowling
2013; Chacon 2009; Inda and Dowling 2013). The criminalization of irregular entry and
stay combined with the exclusion of unwanted or “risky” persons is a key aspect of such
developments (De Genova 2002; Golash-Boza 2010; Kanstroom 2010; Pickering, Bosworth
and Aas 2015).

Detention and deportation are important mechanisms through which this ‘crisis’ is
operating (Stumpf 2006; Rosenblum and Meissner 2014). Studies have revealed the
growing, often unrestrained use of such practices that were selectively applied earlier,
and expansion of facilitating structures that enable such strict management (Bosworth
and Turnbull 2015b; Chacon 2014; Garcia-Hernandez 2014; Mountz et al. 2012; Gibney
2008). Through them, several countries have expelled staggering numbers of unwanted
residents (Golash-Boza 2015; Kanstroom 2012). The human rights of non-citizens have
been seriously undermined, and new vulnerabilities forged through these control
practices (Bosworth and Turnbull 2015a; Bosworth 2014; Drotbohm and Hasselberg 2015;
Schuster and Majidi 2015; Hagan, Rodriguez and Castro 2011). Immigration detention is
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not considered as “legal punishment” in the UK, but an administrative mechanism to
expel unwanted residents (Bosworth and Turnbull 2015b). Even so, most detainees
experience this process as punishment in institutions operating like prisons, where the
denial of liberty is compounded by lack of limits on its duration (Bosworth 2014).
Likewise, deportation is treated as “civil penalty” for persons in the United States who
lack the legal right to remain within the national territories. And yet, such migrants are
deprived of due process safeguards and can expect fewer constitutional protections than
suspected American criminals (Golash-Boza 2010).

Of course, the rapid removal of non-citizens in several Western countries, often for minor,
non-violent offenses, itself is suggestive that the stringent enforcement of immigration
rules provides a partial explanation of these occurrences. Some newer writings have
sought to broaden the contours of crimmigration beyond the legal, judicial aspects and
their enforcement in newer directions centering on the social control of expendable,
unwanted residents (Bowling and Sheptycki 2015; Garner 2015). The hidden
relationships between crimmigration controls and well-entrenched or newly-forged
processes of social marginalization and/or exclusion are slowly being uncovered.
Attempts have been made to grasp the deeper, underlying strains animating such current
tendencies. For Kanstroom (2010: 5), deportation is an important component of the
American immigration management system and simultaneously, a “powerful tool of
discretionary social control, a key feature of the national security state, and a most
tangible component of the recurrent episodes of xenophobia” that have beleaguered this
country. Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo (2013) highlight the disproportionate
targeting of Latino working class men, delineating these “mass deportations” as a
“gendered and racialised removal program”. Vazquez (2015) shows how crimmigration’s
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complex workings bolster white hegemony through processes generally seen to be “postracial” or seemingly neutral to racialised and class-based differences. Still, as Bosworth
(2017) has noted in a latest work, weaker interest exists in these enduring relationships
between newer tactics of immigration controls and broader projects of xenophobic
stratification.

These selected insights into the workings of “crimmigration” and “immcarceration,”
from mostly Western contexts, raise some important questions with reference to the
South-South migrations. To what extent are these aspects applicable and relevant for
receiving countries there? Are the operations of crimmigration and their decisive aspects
uniform across these contexts or do significant differences exist in their emergence,
unfolding and development? And if there are obvious divergences, why do they exist? It
may seem as if these states are also inexorably moving towards the inhibiting stance of
their Western counterparts. The Global Detention Project/GDP (2018) reveals the
growing use of migrant detention and deportation practices by countries whose marginal
citizens have borne the constant brunt of accelerating enforcement in Western countries.
Even smaller countries like Angola, with lengthy histories of mass forced displacements,
have adopted such stringent modes of border controls. These developments appear to
reaffirm the ascendancy of citizenship in territorially-bound modern nation-states. Very
little is, however, researched for countries in the global South. It is revealing that many
relevant details for India were missing from the GDPs website when this chapter was
written. By concretely situating such tendencies within specific, diverse national and local
configurations, especially those within the global South, the multiple under-examined
dimensions and complexities associated with crimmigration, both within and beyond
control strategies and enforcement structures, will emerge. The particular political forces
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propelling such tendencies will also be identified. While attempting to engage with these
continuities and discontinuities across Western and non-Western contexts, some
prominent aspects of such developments for India are discussed next.

6.3 Contours of Crimmigration Control in India
6.3.1 Regulatory Frameworks
Existing immigration laws and their enforcement for the management of unwanted
migrants are central defining elements of crimmigration control. In a development,
similar to that witnessed in many other contexts, immigration-related infractions are
increasingly being treated as criminal offenses in India through punitive sanctions and
additional negative repercussions for apprehended migrants. Somewhat unusually
though, legal provisions for arresting and severely disciplining undesirable foreigners or
non-citizens always existed under old legislation in effect for many decades, including
the Foreigners Act (1946), Registration of Foreigners Act (1939), and Passport (Entry into
India) Act (1920). In this regard, the criminalization of undesirable foreigners and their
stringent management have been constitutive elements of immigration management
since well before the formation of post-colonial nation-states in the Indian subcontinent
in 1947.

The preservation of a legal terrain conceived originally by the imperial powers, and its
application for regulating mobility in the post-colonial context, is responsible for this
particular attribute of crimmigration control. Most important Indian immigration laws
are “acts of Empire” (Banerjee 2003: 89). This includes the Foreigners Act which will be
assessed in-depth later. In their original design and intent, all of these laws were intended
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to strictly control the mobility of its colonised subjects across the various colonies and
Dominions, and through it, restrict their ability to migrate into privileged geographies of
the colonizing powers (Banerjee 2010). An even older statute, the Passport Act, was
introduced in 1920 to deny “trouble-makers” of Indian origin access to India and preserve
the interests of the colonialists (Chatterji 2013). This specific requirement for passports
was also deployed to limit the entry of Indians into other Dominions, like Canada,
reserved exclusively for white settlers (Singha 2013). The narrow, racist agenda of the
Empire was paramount concerns in the creation of these migration laws, affecting both
the emigration and immigration of persons. The post-colonial state of India (along with
Pakistan and Bangladesh) opted to retain such antiquated, illiberal, and discriminatory
laws for the governance of immigration. As Mongia’s (2003) well-accepted analysis of the
passport requirements has established, even if forged out of concrete endeavors to restrict
mobility along national lines that were “raced” in character and intent, the territorial
boundedness of the national space was naturalised through this process. In contemporary
times, the routinised execution of the global passport regime by implementing states
reproduces these differences anchored in nationality/citizenship.

But, as my analysis goes on to show, beyond the specific passport requirement, other key
provisions in these inherited draconian legal arrangements have also reified these and
other discriminatory proclivities. In particular, it addresses the informal border-crossings
positioned largely outside of the international mobility regulatory system of passport and
visa requirements. To this end, the various provisions of the Foreigners Act and its
enforcement constitute another core feature of crimmigration control in India. The
principal immigration legislation, its inception is tied to the emergency measures
undertaken by the colonial powers around the time of World War II (Acharya 2004).
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Enacted in 1946, a year or so before the Indian subcontinent ceased to be part of the British
empire, both Bangladesh and Pakistan have retained this stringent legislation, as has
India. Strikingly, this law has often been applied by the Indian state to discipline
undesirable migrants from these two neighboring countries. As will soon be shown,
Bangladeshi migrants now dominate attention on a regular basis. Created for the benefit
of the colonial authorities and to buttress their authority over their colonised subjects,
this particular law is positioned outside the tenets of liberal jurisprudence and
undermines due process safeguards. It carries little regard for and offers few spaces to
accommodate the human rights of individuals against whom it is applied.

As its title implies, it focuses on foreigners at large and does not differentiate between
various categories of foreigner or non-citizens (Zutshi et al. 2011). Nevertheless, it
upholds the powers of state authorities by granting them extended liberties and very few
restraints in the treatment of foreigners. The retention of this archaic legislation some
seventy years after the emergency circumstances of war, it has been argued, can only be
explained as “the government’s desire to retain almost absolute powers to deal with
foreigners” (Acharya 2004: 2). These unlimited rights granted to authorities and the states
“absolute sovereign power” over all non-citizens within its territorial boundaries have
been upheld by Indian courts, which generally favor domestic immigration legislation
over international standards. This is especially true as far as the undesirable migrants,
the so-called ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’ migrants are concerned. The Supreme Court has
previously endorsed the unrestrained authority of the state regarding deportation:
…the power of the Government in India to expel foreigners is absolute and
unlimited and there is no provision in the Constitution fettering this
discretion…the executive government has unrestricted right to expel a foreigner
(Louis de Raedt v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1886 cited in Chimni 2005).
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In terms of determination of nationality and “burden of proof” provisions for
ascertaining the citizenship of detained persons, the Act again favors the enforcing state.
In addition, the Indian state is allowed to detain and confine foreigners or non-citizens
for an unspecified period, without any temporal limits on confinement.

This law’s provisions can be applied in combination with other policies, like the Passports
Act, which bolsters its abrasive influence even further. The latter legislation allows police
officers to arrest persons believed to be contravening its terms without a warrant or court
order. A MHA (2012) directive, currently in place, asks all states to “take strict action”
against “foreign nationals found to be staying illegally”. Police officers of sub-inspectors
rank or higher can “arrest without warrant any person” disobeying such rules or “against
whom a reasonable suspicion” exists, treating immigration-related breaches as
cognizable offenses. This category of offences involves serious violations of law,
including grave crimes like murder and rape, for which prison terms are generally
lengthy for offenders (Chu 2011). By treating immigration-related breaches at same level
with dangerous criminal activities, its seriousness has been underscored.

The Indian government is allowed to issue extra instructions for specific groups of
foreigners or a particular foreigner for their presence in the country. That is, certain
migrants can be singled out for exceptional treatment and control by state authorities. A
detailed set of guidelines for the identification, detention, and deportation of ‘irregular
Bangladeshis’ has been in effect for many years, its origins traced as far back as 1997
(Gujarat High Court 2011). These “special instructions” have been repeatedly mentioned
in responses to MPs queries about the management of unwanted migrations. The Rajya
Sabha (2014) was provided with this standard statement citing these guidelines:
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A number of foreign nationals, including those from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and
Pakistan who came to India on valid travel documents have been found to be
overstaying after expiry of their visa…Detection and deportation of such illegal
migrants is a continuous process. A revised procedure for detection and
deportation of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants has been set out and circulated to
state governments…in November 2009, partially modified in February 2011 and
further modified in February 2013.
The marked reference to “over-stayers” from neighboring countries and the singling out
of the “illegal Bangladeshi migrants” is noteworthy.

Specific details regarding these “procedures” and “instructions” for this group have not
publicly disclosed in their entirety. During the proceedings of a Public Interest
Litigation/PIL at the Gujarat High Court (2011) a few years ago challenging the
troublesome modus operandi of detaining ‘irregular Bangladeshis’ by local police in
Ahmedabad city, the Indian government stated that an “order” with detailed guidelines
regarding the “investigation of illegal stay of Bangladeshi nationals and for their
deportation” had been issued to state-level administrations. The guidelines were
presented to the judge but not to the petitioner because it was made apparent that its
contents were to remain confidential as a “secret document” (p. 6). The Home Affairs
Ministry had previously claimed that it a “classified document”, all details of which could
not be divulged because “disclosure of the policy could prejudice the security of the
[Indian] state and its relations with foreign states” (Sethi 2010). By embedding such flows
within national security considerations, the Indian state has evaded its responsibility of
full disclosure for such governance mechanisms and, thereby, easily masked various
problems associated with such latest modes of control.
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6.3.2 Decolonization, Nation-State Formation and Informal Mobilities
The preceding discussion regarding the contemporary regulatory frameworks for
crimmigration shows that the Indian subcontinents past association with the colonial
Empire has forged its inflexible legal foundations for India, skewed excessively in favor
of enforcing authorities. A different consideration that has crucially shaped such controls,
its specific targets in the main, is again related to its historical linkages with the West. It
is the difficult, messy, and in the case of the Indian subcontinent, protracted processes of
detachment from it, which shaped the territorial and symbolic boundaries of nationstates in South Asia, and identified Others whose presence became tenuous.
Decolonization and violent nation-state formation in this region, of India and the divided
state of (West and East) Pakistan (1947), and subsequent liberation of an independent
Bangladesh (1971), triggered massive flows of forced migrants, entrenched the contours
of belonging tied to religious identities, while setting apart migrant bodies (Alexander,
Chatterji and Jalais 2016; Zamindar 2010). Since the largest documented exodus of
refugees in recent global history occurred then, it is not unexpected that these large-scale
older flows laid the vexed foundations for the present-day construction of the
undesirable, illegitimate migrants, the principal objects of crimmigration control
(Murshid 2014; Datta 2013). Nuanced historical accounts confirm that India (and
Pakistan) moved speedily to stem these forced mobilities by imposing a series of
extraordinary legal measures involving special travel permits, passport requirements,
and control over properties of those who moved, even if, temporarily. Its undisguised
goals were to end newer refugee flows and block possibilities of return for those who had
fled the recurring sectarian riots (Chatterji 2012; Zamindar 2010).
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As a result of these changes, the position of religious minorities weakened significantly
across the three nation-states, in India too, even with its overtly secular orientation. It
further constricted the mobility of those wanting to migrate via formal channels by
acquiring official documents like passports and visas. But, the extent to which informal
mobilities across porous borders outside this passport regime could be fully controlled
remains uncertain (Kalir, Sur and Schendel 2012; Sur 2012; Jones 2012b; Schendel 2005;
Samaddar 1999). After all, concerted efforts to securitise Indias eastern border with
Bangladesh through the lengthening border fence (McDuie-ra 2014; Jones 2012a) and
violence targeting informal border-crossers (SAFHR, 2011, 2010; Ramachandran 2011;
Banerjee 2010) did not materialise in any significant manner well until the early 2000s.
Even so, the momentous consequences of those past events resonate up to this day. And,
they acquire particular significance in the contemporary crimmigration regime in
multiple ways, even beyond the boundaries of Indian territories. Bangladesh has been
disciplining such arrivals lately from its dominant neighbor, as a retaliatory measure
against India’s zealous efforts to arrest, incarcerate, and expel the ‘illegal Bangladeshi
migrants.’ Some of those detained are prosecuted under the Control of Entry Act of 1952,
originally conceived by Pakistan to stem the arrival of the Partition-era refugees from
India. Interestingly, this particular law also pre-dates its own existence as an independent
nation-state distinct from the divided state of (West and East) Pakistan. A high-profile
recent case concerned the lengthy detention exceeding twelve months of four-year-old
Ariful from Behrampore village in Murshidabad, West Bengal with his grandparents for
crossing the border without passports (PRI 2013). They were locked up for ten months in
Bangladesh’s Kushtia prison in blatant disregard of the original sentence imposed on
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them. Even after making payment of fines, Takas 500 each (approx. USD 6), they were
jailed to serve out the default sentence of two months.

Schendels (2005) study of the “Bengal borderland” highlights that the official narrative of
hospitality for the Partition refugees in India, of “homecoming”, was seamlessly replaced
by the hostile discourse of “infiltration” rejecting permanent settlement by cross-border
migrants. This negative, xenophobic strain was amplified further by succeeding events
associated with the formation of Bangladesh, in particular, the “great exodus” of some
ten million refugees (Datta 2013). In Indian provinces located in geographical proximity
to Bangladesh, ethnic (linguistic and cultural) differences between refugees and local
residents produced sharp resentment against their growing presence. Most of these later
arrivals returned to the newly formed nation-state of Bangladesh. In spite of that, the
historical memory of accommodating these various flows, even if temporarily, generated
deep, festering anxieties about migration per se and its seemingly adverse consequences
in India’s north-east, prominently Assam (Baruah 2015).

As is now amply evident, both the recent past and the geographical neighborhood
acquire special importance in crimmigration control processes in India and Indian
subcontinent at large. So, while the selective aim of Western regimes is the rigid
management of unwanted marginal migrants/residents from non-Western countries, in
the global South it is the informal movement of insignificant, low-wage migrants across
spatially contiguous states and within the region that have preoccupied authorities
greatly.
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6.3.4 ‘Infiltration’ and the Hindu Right
It is this unabated unease, especially in India’s north-east region, regarding the perceived
mass cross-border flows, that has been deployed as an effective tactic by the Hindu rightwing political forces in recent decades. The latter’s spectacular shift to mainstream Indian
politics during the 1990s is inextricably entangled with the attenuation of these various
mobilities as ‘irregular migrations.’ Equally importantly, these localised anxieties were
magnified into a “national crisis”, both in terms of exigency and adversely-affected
Indian geographical areas, involving a further separation based on the migrants’ religious
character. Reworking the older narrative of “infiltration”, attention was drawn to the
growing presence of migrants from neighboring ‘Islamic states’ into Indian territories,
prominently from Bangladesh, and their manifold dangers to the insecure Hindu-Indian
nation-state (Gillan 2002; Navlakha 1997). The Hindu right’s increasing prominence
vitiated public and political discourses on such migrants, unleashing a virulent form of
unrestrained xenophobia targeting this national group, which has seldom been
challenged (Ramachandran 2015). It also brought sharp scrutiny to the well-entrenched
patterns of informal mobilities outside of the passports and visa regimes across India’s
eastern borders (Kapur 2010; Moodie 2010). This selective bias centering on this specific
group continues actively, as will be evident in the next section on the operations of
crimmigration and its negative effects.

Bolstering India’s crimmigration regime, several significant forms of intensified
governance of unwanted mobilities active currently can be linked to the Hindu right
forces, insofar as their origins and intensification are concerned. Some of these involve
highly-visible, spectacular tactics ranging from the massive enlargement of the border187

fence separating India from neighboring Bangladesh to the mammoth undertaking of the
National Citizens Register, to conclusively differentiate legitimate citizens from
unwanted, ‘illegal’ migrants (Roy 2016). Another aspect relates to the regulatory
frameworks for crimmigration. A coalition government headed by the Hindu nationalist
Bharatiya Janata Party/BJP bolstered the disciplinary aspects attached to the Foreigners
Act during the early 2000s. An enhanced range of punitive and deterrent measures to
enable the stricter management of unwanted mobilities was added to this already tough
law (GOI 2003).

These newer provisions imposed an elevated combination of

incarceration and fines for immigration-related infractions converting such breaches into
medium-level offenses, at par with dangerous criminal activities (e.g. attempted robbery)
(GOI 2018). Strict sanctions were incorporated for abetment and these infractions began
to be treated as non-bailable offenses and serious crimes. Persons detained for such
infractions would not be released. Mandatory detention, thus, became the norm for those
arrested under these rules. These changes, along with other related occurrences, enabled
the increased detention of unwanted migrants.

6.4 Crimmigration Effect
The previous section attempted to chart some principal constituting elements of the
contemporary crimmigration regime in India. Some of its operations along with the
calculated and unanticipated harsh outcomes for undesirable migrants are discussed
next, as crimmigration effect. Migrants detained for immigration-related infringements
now face several adverse consequences: summary arrests without ‘warrants’/court order
by police and border security personnel; lengthy detention of unspecified periods in
police custody, Border Security forces/BSF camps, and detention facilities; prison
sentences combined with monetary fines imposed by courts; and finally, expulsion. With
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growing enforcement, the number of detained non-citizens has risen. Statistics extracted
from the National Crime Records Bureau/NCRB, the main institution maintaining such
records and affiliated with the Home Affairs Ministry, shows a six-fold increase in noncitizens’ detention over time. The number of detainees shifted upwards from 1,064 in
1998 to 6,562 migrants by 2012-end (Table 6.1). A similar pattern is noticeable in the two
categories of under-trial/pre-trial detainees and convicted non-citizens.

Table 6.1
Pre-trial Detainees and Convicted Migrants in India,
1998-2012
Year
UnderConvicted In Police
Total
trials/Pretrial migrants
Custody
detainees
1998
701
363
Not available 1064
1999
1486
665
Not available 2151
2000
1673
752
Not available 2425
2001
1453
712
69
2234
2002
2057
613
119
2789
2003
1490
585
124
2199
2004
1602
785
145
2532
2005
2342
1390
106
3838
2006
2772
676
110
3558
2007
3366
1088
96
4550
2008
3142
1847
102
5091
2009
2896
2042
109
5047
2010
2884
1715
136
4735
2011
3601
2020
137
5758
2012
3984
2483
95
6562
Source: NCRB, 1999-2012 Prison Statistics
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Table 6.2
Foreigners Arrests and Deportation by Citizenship, 2006-2008
Country of
Number of Arrests by Year
Number of Deportations by
Citizenship
Year
2006
2007
2008
2006
2007
2008
Bangladesh
10,723 12,080
6,816
13,692
12,135
12,625
Nigeria
76
66
104
69
37
169
Sri Lanka
55
46
105
20
13
145
Pakistan
34
42
45
100
24
19
Source: Lok Sabha, 2010b

Given the heightened focus on the ‘irregular Bangladeshis’, they also lead by a huge
margin in the available detention and deportation figures. Between 2005 and 2008, more
than 90 percent of all deportees from India were returned to this eastern neighbor (Table
6.2). Even with a decline in the deportees’ overall numbers over the past few years,
Bangladesh has prevailed as the principal destination country for India (Table 6.3). That
is, at least eight out of ten expelled persons were sent to this country. According to latest
data, there were 3,795 non-citizens being held in Indian prisons as pretrial detainees, and
another 2,253 migrants were serving sentences after having been convicted by 2015-end
(Table 6.4) (NCRB 2016). Of these, Bangladeshis constituted 70 percent and 64 percent of
the total pre-trial detainees and convicted persons, respectively. The politics of
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xenophobia in India and its particular contours has had a profound effect on the policing
of unwanted migrants from this country.

Table 6.3
Deportations to Bangladesh, 2005-2011
Year
Number of
Total deportations of
Share of
Bangladeshis
foreigners from India
total
deported
deportations
(%)
2005
14,916
16,350
91.22
2006
13,692
14,933
91.68
2007
12,135
13,348
90.91
2008
12,625
13,995
90.21
2009
10,602
12,147
87.28
2010
6,270
7,248
86.52
2011
6,761
7,840
86.23
Source: Lok Sabha, 2013, 2010a
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Table 6.4
Migrant Pre-Trial Detainees and Convicted NonCitizens in Indian Prisons, 2015
Country of citizenship
Number of
Number of
migrant
Convicted
pretrial
Migrants
detainees
Bangladesh
2,579
1,493
Nepal
361
228
Nigeria
340
59
Various African
177
18
countries
Pakistan
113
97
Myanmar
41
376
Total (all-India)
3,795
2,353
Source: NCRB, 2016

The punitive outcomes are especially acute for migrants from this particular
neighbouring state. Bangladeshis apprehended for entering and remaining in India
without passports and visas or overstaying after the expiry of their visas face tough
disciplinary consequences. Those held for informal cross-border trading, a longstanding
feature of regional migration patterns in postcolonial states, are also likely to be arrested
and disciplined. The punishment is extra severe for persons, even citizens, held legally
responsible for assisting such migrants. The consequences of these various infractions
involve a combination of incarceration (often “rigorous imprisonment” involving prison
labour) and monetary fines, ranging from two to eight years and Rupees 10,000 to 50,000
(approx. USD 154 to 771). The minimum amounts may be close to or exceed the average
monthly earnings of low-wage detainees. When indigent migrants and citizens are
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unable to forfeit these steep charges imposed on them, as is often the case, the
incarceration period is extended.

Below, I provide a few examples using recent court judgments from West Bengal. A
province/state with strong cultural and ethnic affinities with Bangladesh (its residents
speak the same Bengali language), it now leads many other areas in detaining and
disciplining unwanted Bangladeshi migrants. 1513 convicted persons and 1768 ‘undertrials’/pretrial detainees held in its prisons on 1 April 2016 were Bangladeshis (West
Bengal Correctional Services, 2018). 142 children, likely below 7 years of age, considered
too young to be separated from their mothers, were being detained along with their
parents.
Purna Chandra and Ganga Mondal were apprehended in Balurghat, South
Dinajpur district for having arrived without “any valid passport or visa” (CHC
2012a). They were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and
forfeit a penalty of Rupees 10,000 (approx. USD 154). Failure to pay the fine would
result in additional incarceration of one month. The petitioners appeal against the
“excessive sentence” was rejected on the grounds that the Foreigners Act imposes
a minimum sentence of two years for “illegal entry.”
The Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) detained Bangladeshi citizen Dukhu Mian
in February of 2008 for attempting to take cattle across the border (CHC 2012b).
He was convicted to serve the maximum punishment for this offense, eight years
rigorous imprisonment, later reduced to four years for pleading guilty. Dukhu
was also asked to pay a fine of Rupees 50,000 (approx. USD 771) and faced extra
time in a West Bengal prison for an added year if unable to arrange for this large
payment.
Indian citizen Bishu Mahiruddin Khan’s bail application was rejected. He had
been arrested for abetment by providing migrants shelter at his house located in
proximity to the Indo-Bangladesh border. The presiding judge contended that the
case was serious and Khans actions posed a “serious threat to national security”
(CHC, 2013b).
Mahibur Rahaman challenged his judgment at the Calcutta High Courts Appellate
Division (2013a) while he remained incarcerated at the Berhampore Central
Correctional Home in Murshidabad city in northern West Bengal. Found to be
“moving suspiciously”, local police had booked him in early 2008 and he was later
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asked to serve seven years for unlawful entry into India. Mahiburs refusal to
accept culpability very likely adversely affected the outcome of his original trial.
In his new submission, he requested the court to show leniency as he was the only
earning member of his family and had already served nearly five years. However,
the Court rejected his appeal by citing the “nature and gravity of the offense”,
indicating that it would not “be safe to reduce the sentence to the period already
gone” (p. 2).
Besides the disciplinary intent, which is unmistakably evident from these selected cases,
presiding judges have, on occasion, coalesced immigration-related infringements with
acute risks to national and social security. This is evident in both Bishu and Mahibur’s
cases. The direct associations drawn between these detainees and security is especially
troubling since none of them had engaged in any seditious activities that could be
understood as affecting India’s defense and security, including extreme acts of terrorism.
Yet, court rulings involving this group reify such connections to social dangers and
national security through repeated emphasis on the “seriousness” of informal entry and
‘irregularity.’ In another case, the bail application of Fakir Ali was refused after his arrest
for infringing immigration rules (CHC 2013c). Like the previous case, the court’s decision
reasserted the “gravity of the offense” and linked informal entry to the general wellbeing
of the country: “These kinds of offenses [informal border crossings] are at a rise, posing
serious threat to the national safety [emphasis mine]” (p. 2). In addition to the draconian
immigration regulations treating such acts as criminal deeds and more recently, as grave
offences, their enforcement through the court system and beyond have reproduced and
reinforced the criminalization and securitization of the undesirable migrants.

If the existing regulatory system for crimmigration sanctions this dispensation through
mandatory detention of such migrants with the ultimate objective of expelling them, then
its execution buttress this control through its lagging pace and palpable unconcern (Rajan
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2012). Low-wage earning, often less educated, and sometimes illiterate, migrant
detainees are routinely trapped in a rigid crimmigration system that is greatly indifferent
to their circumstances. Arrested under various immigration rules and refused bail
pending trial, these migrants are held as under-trials or pre-trial detainees for extended
periods in many areas before their cases are presented before a magistrate. As evident in
Moyna’s case, courts routinely commute sentences to offset the long period of pre-trial
detention. But this does not reduce the tediousness of the multiple formalities associated
with the ensuing deportation process. Requiring the sustained involvement and
cooperation between the Home and External Affairs Ministries of the Indian and
Bangladeshi governments, along with the local administration of areas in India where the
migrants were apprehended (Supreme Court of India 2014), such migrants are too
insignificant to matter, unless it is to reinforce jingoistic sentiments on both sides of the
border. As a result, they can be easily lost within the system, staying confined,
immobilised, and unreleased far beyond the date of completion of their sentences.

Moyna received a brief incarceration term, a little over three months, at the presiding
judge’s discretion, in comparison with Mahibur and others. Despite that leniency in
sentencing, she continued to be confined for well over two and half years. Even if the first
aborted attempt at deporting her had been successful, she still would have spent nine
months in detention, six months over the term initially imposed on her. This long-drawnout detention and considerable delays in expulsion place migrants like Moyna in an
extended state of limbo, facing persistent uncertainty and enormous anxiety over their
future. This vexed configuration, in turn, amplifies the corrective aspects of control.
Moyna’s case had simply been forgotten by authorities until lawyers providing pro bono
assistance at the Women’s Home where she was being held petitioned the Karnataka
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High Court contesting this indefinite detention and overdue deportation. It was Justice
Bopanna’s directive that persuaded the various enforcing agencies to belatedly finalise
the procedural requirements for her repatriation.

6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, some principal dimensions of the crimmigration control regime in India
and its operations have been discussed, and its linkages with such noticeable trends in
the West, addressed. Among its central constitutive elements are dated immigration
regulations fashioned to endorse the powers of the colonial state to strictly monitor the
movement of the colonised subjects across the Dominions and colonies. Paradoxically,
legal tools of containment developed by the imperial powers to immobilise colonised
subjects within these less-privileged geographies are now being applied by India to
control the presence of undesirable Others from neighboring states, especially
Bangladesh. Instead of being continuously revised to boost their punitive aspects, as has
been documented in some contexts, these old laws have been retained and many of their
original provisions and arrangements left undisturbed. Given the specific circumstances
of their formation, these illiberal laws grant exceptional liberties to state authorities in the
strict management of unwanted migrants. Rather than being framed as civil infractions
and later converted to criminal sanctions as in some Western settings, punitive provisions
for disciplining and criminalizing unwanted mobilities existed from its very beginning.
The Foreigners Act has been assessed in detail to highlight important ways that it has
facilitated these controls.
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The Chapter also briefly reveals the workings of this system and its problematic outcomes
as crimmigration effect. The preponderance of unwanted Bangladeshis at this system’s
receiving end is exposed. Moreover, in a crimmigration control system that is highly
securitised and criminalising unwanted migrants, several vital details of such control
processes remain shrouded in secrecy. Marginal migrants make easy targets of control
mechanisms in a system indifferent to precarious residents/entrants and they can be
easily shut in indefinitely by it, as was the case with Moyna. Even though unintended in
some respects, the disciplinary tendency and punitive strain is saturated throughout the
drawn-out process, extending from migrants arrest up to their expulsion, and perhaps
even beyond it. Stumpf’s (2013) insightful, new observation about crimmigration for the
United States holds clear validity in this setting. In that, the minutiae of this prevailing
system shore up the severe control of its targets, far past the deliberative, punitive
exercises of incarcerating and expelling unwanted migrants. A further incongruity is that
indigent persons like Moyna, Mahibur, and others facing the brunt of the harsh
crimmigration system in India (and, lately, Bangladesh) would not be able to easily
acquire the immigration documents required for safe travel across national borders,
passports as well as visas. The marginal status of these informal border-crossers impedes
their real access to the formal mobilities regime of passports and visas.

Connecting these developments to such tendencies in the West, two additional points of
contrast have been made. The regional neighborhood and bordering states acquire
particular prominence here, involving undesirable migrants who are both ethnically
similar to citizens in certain respects and different in others. The other argument is that
the lengthy, fraught events of decolonization, the Indian subcontinents uncoupling from
the colonial Empire, have forged the troublesome contours of unwanted Others from
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nearby states, a difficult mix of older refugees and newer informal migrants. Postcolonial
nation-state formation rooted in dominant religious identities has enabled newer
xenophobic proclivities, tied to the ascendancy of the Hindu right in India. The
construction of the modern nation-state in South Asia configured through territoriality
and citizenship has strong ethnic dimensions embedded within it, molding particular
nuclei of crimmigration controls.

Crimmigration laws have been enforced more regularly in India from the late 1990s
onwards when special, classified instructions to state/provincial-level governments
crafted the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ as exceptional targets of such control. This trend
was deepened subsequently under the revised Foreigners Act, when penalties for various
immigration-related infractions were augmented. These changes have also occurred due
to the growing Hinduization of the Indian nation-space and marginalization of religious
minorities, principally Muslims, within it (P. Kumar 2013; Chatterji 2009). Connecting my
work to latest ideas regarding crimmigration, the relationships between immigration
control, social control, and xenophobic proclivities has been accentuated. A latest
development along this trajectory is the new Passport (Entry into India) Amendment
Rules (India Gazette 2015) introduced by the Hindu-right BJP government. Formed
through the exemption clause contained in the Passport Act (1920) permitting the central
government or Government of India to release any individual or class of persons from
the passport regime, these new directives have solidified the objects of crimmigration
even further. Migrants who entered Indian territories without valid passports and visas
or overstayed the terms of such documents, yet were from religious minority
communities in Bangladesh and Pakistan may now be able to escape such punitive
mechanisms. With this policy, the Modi-led government is executing its established
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political tactic and fulfilling its latest electoral promise to accommodate Hindus from
neighboring “Islamic” countries as refugees in a Hinduised nation-state, the “natural
home for persecuted Hindus” (Tripathi 2016). By accommodating other religious groups,
these modifications have been made less blatantly biased. Even so, it concretely
formalises what for many years have been informal and formal control practices focusing
overly on unwanted Muslim entrants from neighboring states (Jayal 2013; Jones 2009;
CCPD 2008). The expansive provisions of these colonial-era crimmigration laws have
legitimised this drastic change with ease through the newly formed rules, exempting
them from the burdensome requirement of gaining the consent of the governed through
Parliamentary/legislative approval.

In these contemporary control processes then, not all informal mobilities are “crimes”,
only specific ones. Some migrations occurring outside of the requisite modalities of
passports and visas are being exempted from such processes. These discriminatory
tendencies are being deepened through such solid regulatory frameworks and newer
enforcement practices. The number of detainees and deportees overall continues to be
limited for India, when assessed against the United States. It is also low when measured
against prominent receiving states in the global South like South Africa and Malaysia,
which routinely detain and deport very large numbers of unwanted migrants (Low and
Mokhtar 2017; Crush and Ramachandran 2015; Garces-Mascarenas 2012). The role of
private actors is virtually negligible, at least thus far. Despite that, the criminalization and
securitization of informal, cross-border mobilities, a longstanding form of migration in
the global South, is an inevitable and lasting outcome of such developments. The
criminalization and securitization of insignificant migrants belonging to a specific faith
has evolved in a synchronised fashion.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion

In March 2015 in a vicious act of vigilante justice, Syed Sarifuddin Khan was fatally
assaulted by a large mob of 7,000-8,000 persons (Kashyap 2015c). This incident occurred
at Dimapur town located in Nagaland state in northeastern India. Sarifuddin (named as
Sarif Uddin, Sharif or Farid Khan in some news reports) was targeted shortly after he was
accused of raping a young indigenous Naga woman from the Sumi tribal group and
branded as an ‘IBI’ (Faleiro 2015). IBI or IBIS are popular local acronyms to refer to ‘illegal
Bangladeshi immigrant(s)’ (Nagaland Post 2015; Nurumi 2015). The accuser also
happened to be his wife’s relative, both of whom are Naga women and, thereby,
considered to be legitimate insiders in this locale. The circumstances of his death were
gruesome and inhumane in all accounts. The Dimapur Central Jail where he had been
detained for ten days was stormed on March 5 and Sarifuddin alone was singled out
when other similarly accused persons were being held inside the prison. He was stripped
naked, shoved outside the prison, beaten with sticks, and stones were then hurled at him.
Afterwards, he was tied to a motorbike and dragged wounded and bleeding for a
considerable distance to the town’s center where his body was suspended from the Clock
Tower for all to witness (Vajpeyi 2015; Iyenger 2015). Sarifuddin died from all his injuries
at some point during this violent paroxysm.
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Disturbing images and video footage of this ferocious public spectacle and Sarifuddin’s
bloody, disfigured body were captured by perpetrators, onlookers and others and were
circulated in unrestrained fashion on the internet and by the Indian media. Several
pictures on various news sites shows participants and spectators smiling with satisfaction
while taking pictures on their cell phones next to the battered lifeless, strung Sarifuddin,
as if documenting their aggressive actions for posterity. Despite a heavily militarized
milieu, owing to the area’s troubled history of insurrection, the unwillingness of police
and security personnel to intervene on the victim’s behalf is highly troubling, as is the
fact that calls for public protest against this alleged rape had been issued well in advance
by some groups (Pandey 2015). Local police later claimed that the presence of women
and school children prevented them from restraining the frenzied crowd and rescuing
Sarifuddin (Kashyap 2015b).

This violent incident occurred during the politically and emotionally charged public
debate over escalating sexual violence against women in India following the vicious gang
rape of Jyoti Singh Pandey in New Delhi in 2012. Its timing coincided with the Indian
government’s ban of the BBC documentary on her fatal assault (Express News Service
2015). It is true that the unnamed rape victim publicly accused Sarifuddin of sexual
assault both before and after the lynching and also of attempting to buy her silence.
Sarifuddin’s poor treatment of his wife and previous weak moral conduct had also been
highlighted (Mitra 2015). However, some accounts mentioned the CCTV footage showing
his accuser accompanying him willingly to the hotel where the incident occurred (Bhutia
2015; S. Hussain 2015). Contradictory findings from the medical examination of the rape
victim were reported and the complete facts surrounding this case may never be fully
known (Hindustan Times 2015a; Kalita 2015; PTI and Singh 2015; Times News Network
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2015). But even if guilty of the charges, Sarifuddin was clearly deprived of justice under
the rule of law through which his alleged crime should have been handled. A sympathetic
insider commentary has suggested that the culture of impunity and structural violence
tied to the longstanding “disturbed areas” Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in
Nagaland and insurgent movements (preceding and) against it, have normalized
aggression and the use of brute force. Weak confidence in state institutions has resulted
in violence becoming the preferred method for resolving difficult, intractable issues
(Kikon 2015). Several progressive Naga citizens and civil society groups criticized this
egregious episode and openly expressed remorse over the mob’s cruel actions
(Laithangbam 2015).

The vital detail that Sarifuddin was not, in fact, an ‘irregular migrant’ from neighbouring
Bangladesh flouting Indian immigration laws was soon disclosed. He was a genuine
citizen of India who had migrated to Nagaland from a neighbouring province. His
parents and siblings continued to reside in their village of Bosla in Karimganj district in
southern Assam (Hindustan Times 2015b). And, if contributing to the armed forces may
be treated as a measure of belonging to any country, then by that index, he and his family
were very Indian. Two of his brothers were working with the army’s Assam Regiment
and another had lost his life during service to the Regiment. His father had retired after
extended employment with the Military Engineering Services. “We are sons of the soil.
We can’t be Bangladeshis just because we are Bengali Muslims” (FirstPost 2015). “We are
not Bangladeshi infiltrators [emphasis mine]. We come from a family of patriots”, was how
his brother tersely worded it (Kashyap 2015a). Nevertheless, in a context of unchecked
hyper-anxieties over ‘irregular migrants’, a perfect storm was created by false rumours
about his status, marked physical and cultural resemblances between unwanted migrants
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and genuine citizens, along with the prevailing stereotype of the IBI as Muslim and
Bengali-speaking residents/entrants (Dutta 2015; Faleiro 2015; B. Hussain 2015). The
result was the deadly, brutal actions of the enraged mob.

IBI/IBIS seems like an innocuous, seemingly neutral marker for a brand or label for a
consumer product. In this Indian province/state, however, it is a loaded shorthand
reference to ‘irregular Bangladeshi immigrants.’ Other terms have been frequently
applied in India to describe such migrants. Some are familiar and others specific to local
contexts,

but

negative,

disparaging

associations

characterize

all

of

them:

ghuspaithiyey/infiltrators, illegal immigrants, illegal foreigners, illegal aliens, illegal refugees,
dhur, bahiragat, Mymensinghias, miya, and miya log. The last four terms refer to those seen
as illegitimate and ‘migrant outsiders’ in the northeastern areas such as Assam and
Nagaland, while dhur is used in West Bengal (Ghosh 2011; Schendel 2005). Sarifuddin’s
brutal death demonstrates that there is a specific, enduring fixation with one national
group, those who have migrated from neighbouring Bangladesh. Some of these popular
monikers, particularly the last few, are also linked to particular religious identities. Miya
and miya log are pejorative terms in Assam and Nagaland to refer to the Muslim
‘outsiders’ and ‘illegal migrants’. These characterizations are highly murky and vexed,
carrying severe risks for migrants and citizens branded this way who are on the receiving
end of unchecked public hostility and escalating state controls.

This dissertation has provided a critical examination of the growing preoccupation in
India with the so-called ‘irregular Bangladeshi migrants’ over the last two decades or so
and its management by state-based actors. My study has connected this so-called ‘crisis
of migration’ and its governance by state authorities to the continuous amplification of
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xenophobic tendencies tied to Hindu right-wing forces. Attention has also been drawn to
the protracted histories of cross-border mobilities that remain entangled in these politics
and their taxing role in the contemporary constructions of the undesirable, ‘illegal
migrant’. In various chapters, a critical assessment was provided of particular strategies
and regulatory changes deployed by successive governments since the early 1990s to fix
this perceived “unabated, national crisis”. Through the analysis of various forms of
immigration governance and border controls, the ‘governmentality of unease’ has been
charted and its effects on vulnerable residents, both citizens and non-citizens, examined.
As the details of Sarifuddin’s lynching and other episodes highlighted in this dissertation
convey, another core feature of the study is its effort to unpack and disentangle this
seemingly stable, yet undesirable, immigration class.

There are compelling reasons for undertaking such work. In India, studies on the ‘illegal
Bangladeshi migrants’ lack a critical perspective, to a very great extent. Many works have
comfortably reproduced existing biases and stereotypes about the ‘illegal Bangladeshi
migrants’, inevitably underscoring the many short-term and long-term dangers these
unwanted mobilities represent for the safety and security of India and its legitimate
citizens (Ahmad 2012; Bezbaruah 2006; Bhuyan 2006; Chandra 2006; Gill 2006; Hazarika
2006; Madhab 2006; Pramanik 2006; Saha 2006; Saikia 2006; Nandy 2005). For example,
the introductory chapter of an edited collection on ‘illegal migration’ outlines the serious
consequences of such mobilities:
The implications of large-scale immigration from Bangladesh to this country are
going be very grave. It is adversely affecting our economy and social environment,
creating law and order problem whenever they are present in sizeable number.
The illegal immigrants have become bold enough to commit robbery, even in Delhi
[contraction for New Delhi] (Kumar 2006, 2).
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Pejorative terms like ghuspaithiyey or ‘infiltrators’ are popularized through dominant
discourses and freely used, without questioning their deeper significance (Ghosh 2016;
Ray 2011; Sarkar 2010; Gill 2006; Joshi 1994). Academic writings have simply restated
such notions without attempting to analyze them carefully. Repetitive use of such
monikers has entrenched such value-laden terms as acceptable. While some scholars and
researchers strenuously oppose the anti-Muslim politics of the Hindu right, the complex
relationships between religion, mobilities and citizenship has not been carefully plotted.
For example, in a well-known work on Assam, the Hindu right’s differentiation of the
‘irregular’ migrants on the basis of religion was questioned along with the rejection of all
those who have breached Indian immigration rules (Hazarika 2000). The illegitimacy
attached to the ‘illegal migrant’ in their deliberate flouting of state regulations was
emphasized:
The BJP calls them refugees. In my view, an immigrant who comes in illegally
without following the proper procedures remains an illegal immigrant [emphasis mine].
The color of his skin, or the faith he/she proclaims is not material, although those
who have fled religious rioting have a better right to settlement than those who
have just sneaked over (Hazarika 2000, 216).
Interestingly, the author then goes on to contradict his initial statement by suggesting
that those who have taken flight from religious persecution have a higher claim to be
accepted, indirectly endorsing the position of the Hindu right. Many scholarly works on
migrants and migrations have comfortably replicated ideas circulating through public
discourses and ended up strengthening this pervasive rhetoric (Kumar 2006). Pejorative
terms such as ‘illegal migrants’ and ‘infiltrators’ have also been freely used to describe
such residents and entrants (Ghosh 2016; Sarkar 2010). My work has sought to unsettle
academic and non-academic biases and stereotypes related to the migrants and
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underscored the glaring problems associated with the construction of the so-called ‘illegal
Bangladeshi migrants’.

A newer body of writings on the borderlands and associated flows of goods and people
across national borders within South Asia have acted as an important corrective (Gellner
2013; Sur 2013; Kalir and Sur 2013; Samaddar 2012; Jones 2012a; Banerjee and Basu Ray
Chaudhury 2011; Begum 2012; Banerjee 2010). They have shown that informal mobilities
through the border zones were and continue to be the part and parcel of the landscape,
as the regular order of business tied to social and economic processes. They are not the
dangerous, disorderly aberrations they are increasingly being made out to be. In many
parts of this region, even with the drawing of national postcolonial borders, deep ethnic
affinities and established social and economic linkages persisted (Ghosh 2017, 2011;
Samaddar 2012, 1999). The extended detention of Ariful and his grandparents by
Bangladesh (discussed in Chapter 6) shows that these flows have long existed in both
directions and are not new processes. Progressive research on borders and borderlands
in the Indian subcontinent is still limited and what is available has focused
disproportionately on the geographical margins of nation-states. Likewise, less attention
has been given to the important stakeholders and turning points that have decisively
moulded contemporary anxieties over borders and flows in India. It is these aspects that
my work addresses through the analysis of anti-migrant politics and shaping of the
national crisis of ‘irregular migration’.

By linking my work to the latest writings on immigration controls in other contexts
(Conlon, Hiemstra and Mountz 2017; Hennebry and Walton-Roberts 2014; Mountz and
Rempin 2014; Mountz et al. 2012; Johnson et al. 2011), albeit mostly Western ones, this
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dissertation has shown that the border itself has shifted and multiplied to various spatial
locales both inside and outside the receiving state. The multifarious spatialities and their
expansion implicated in this crisis of migration (both transnational and those operating
at various scales), have been mapped in this study. It is clear that the spaces seemingly
threatened and adversely touched by the presence of these unwanted migrants and their
unceasing flows have expanded from selected locations, such as privileged core areas and
border zones at the margins of the nation-state, to encompass all of the geographies
within Indian territories. Concomitantly, governance strategies to exert greater sway over
the unwanted migrants have been extended to many more spatial locations and at
various geographical scales to encompass the entire nation-space recognized as India.
Moyna’s arrest and detention in the southern city of Bangalore in Karnataka state, much
further away from the Indo-Bangladesh border than the capital city of New Delhi,
discussed in Chapter 6, is clearly indicative of this shift. Similarly, the province of West
Bengal which shares strong ethnic and cultural affinities and the largest border with
neighbouring Bangladesh (2217 of 4096 km) now detains the highest number of migrants.
Sarifuddin’s lynching occurred in Nagaland state in the north-eastern region of India.
While it is positioned near Bangladesh as are several north-eastern states, it does not
share a common border with the former. Anxieties about the presence of migrants and
robust efforts to manage them by the state and non-state actors now pervade all of the
geographical territories known as India and even beyond it.

These changes have unsettled India’s largely cordial relationship with Bangladesh, once
comfortably perceived as its political supporter (unlike Pakistan). Over time, this
disruption has become increasingly acute, and commensurate with that long posed by
the neighbouring state on its west, Pakistan. The perceived differences between the states
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on its west and east have disappeared, both equally reshaped as ‘dangerous geographies.’
Political developments in other parts of the world, momentous events like 9/11, and
justified concerns about cross-border terrorism have boosted such anxieties (Jones 2012a,
2009). Bangladesh has been seamlessly converted from a poor neighbour on India’s
eastern side into a ‘risky geography’ and embedded within the growing Indian
preoccupation with national security, despite remaining its political ally in South Asia.
Attention has become fixated on the informal mobilities across this border that were
previously tolerated and even assimilated into the national fold.

As this study shows, since the early 1990s, immigration and border controls have been
bolstered in various ways. Edifices and regulatory structures have been constructed and
reshaped for the efficient and increasingly draconian management of undesirable
foreigners in India. Deportation campaigns undertaken in the large metropolis of New
Delhi represented a marked rupture from previous years, when attention was centred on
certain border locations. By the end of the decade, a coalition government led by the
Bharatiya Janata Party/BJP, a core member of the Hindu right, made numerous
important adjustments to enable the stricter governmentality of unwanted migrations.
These far-reaching shifts and their broader impact have been discussed in the Chapters 5
and 6 of this dissertation. Significant revisions to the citizenship law occurred and
foundations were laid for new nation-level management systems to facilitate the constant
control and surveillance over all residents and the benefits they could access. While not
yet complete, these projects are actively under construction through to this day.
Prominent among these is the National Register of Citizens/NRC. Participation in this
particular exercise became mandatory for all residents. The category of the ‘illegal
migrant’ has been permanently excluded from naturalization and assimilation as Indian
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citizens by the revised provisions of the Citizenship Act during the early part of the last
decade. Birthright citizenship was eliminated for the progeny, as well as successive
generations, of persons branded as the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’.

Chapter 6 examined immigration enforcement in greater detail through the processes of
migrant detention and deportation along with the delineations of the Foreigners Act, the
main policy governing the entry, movement and residence of non-citizens or ‘foreigners’
in India. An in-depth review of its provisions exposes the tough dispensation inherited
from colonial times which has granted the Indian state and its authorized agents
enormous powers in the punitive treatment of undesirable non-citizens and foreigners.
The criminalization of unwanted migrations was an important element of this Act from
its very inception. My analysis discloses that the main focus of these practices has been
the so-called ‘irregular Bangladeshi migrants.’ Their exceptional management has
involved a special set of “secret” instructions which have been issued by successive
governments since 1997. A commensurate growth in the number of incarcerated noncitizens has been witnessed, especially since the early 2000s, when penalties for
immigration-related

infringements

were

augmented.

The

criminalization

and

securitization of such unwanted migrants in public discourses has been reinforced
through these enforcement practices and the judicial system.

‘Irregular Bangladeshi migrants’ have constituted the majority of detainees and
deportees, even though it is unclear if all of them are definitively citizens of this
neighbouring country. Monetary fines and prison sentences imposed by courts often
exceed the meagre wages of detainees, prolonging their indefinite detention and
exacerbating the disciplinary tendencies inherent in these new modes of control. The
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weak socio-economic status or class position of the targeted groups, their religious
identity and its intersecting effects are important in shaping and reshaping ‘irregularity’
and its constructions in India. Another important finding emerging from this study is
that the securitization of migrant flows has conveniently allowed state authorities to keep
many vital details regarding the practices of migrant detection, detention and deportation
outside public scrutiny, obscuring the various problems associated with such control
tactics. As the concluding section of Chapter 6 outlined, the flexible dispensation
provided by the harsh Indian immigration laws has been easily used by the current
regime ruling India to bend the delineation of the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrant’ even
closer to that of the Muslim migrant/resident.

Yet, as this analysis shows, the scale of migrant detention and deportation have remained
at levels lower than seen in other enforcing states. The comparable figures for prominent
receiving states in the global South with escalated anti-migrant biases and immigration
controls, especially South Africa and Malaysia have been considerably higher (Crush and
Ramachandran 2015b; Garces-Mascarenas 2012). This is an apparent anomaly in a
receiving country with unchecked xenophobia directed at the figure of the so-called
‘illegal Bangladeshi migrant’ and the Muslim resident. However, lower detention and
deportation figures should not be treated as a limitation or failure of such strategies for
several reasons. First, since official figures on detention rely largely on prison statistics
collected by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), they may not necessarily
include those held at detention centers outside the state-level and local correction
systems, particularly in urban areas like New Delhi. It is known that migrant detainees
are not housed in prisons at these and several other locations. Second, it is not clear if
deportation figures account for those apprehended at border locations by border security
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personnel. If they have been excluded. which is quite likely, then the total detention and
expulsion figures are much higher than generally believed or provided through
government statistics. Third, other, invisible exploitative practices unleashed by
xenophobic politics and exclusionary exercises need to be taken into consideration.

Many of these opaque practices have not been studied or documented to date. During
episodes of migrant apprehension, police personnel routinely destroy official documents
such as ration cards or voter-cards presented by targeted individuals, weakening their
claims to be Indian citizens and exposing the difficulties of replacing such papers. Some
of my respondents indicated that they were able to evade apprehension and deportation
by bribing police personnel and slum-level power-brokers on a regular basis. Indeed,
local leaders tied to various political parties acknowledged their own complicity in both
enabling and limiting the processes of migrant apprehension and expulsion in order to
establish and deepen their authority over these residents. And, while such informal
practices may deflate overall figures of deportees, they nevertheless expose targeted
groups to other coercive cycles of exploitation, deepening their vulnerability (Percot 2018;
CCPD 2008; Sachar and Kapur 2008). Poor individuals with very limited means were,
and likely to this day are, being compelled to hand over considerable sums of money to
escape arrest, detention, and expulsion, eroding their already meagre earnings.

Although not explicitly discussed in this dissertation, my field research showed that these
specific campaigns of deportation in India’s capital city fragment low-waged
communities where narrow self-interest collides with and dangerously erodes collective
ones. A brief discussion of these opaque dynamics operating in the marginal spaces of
New Delhi’s slums and squatter settlements where research was conducted was
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provided in Chapter 3 and its impact on the field research process assessed. The ‘insiders’
at these locations, both migrants and non-migrants, actively collude with enforcement
agencies to victimize other residents so as to ensure their personal and family’s safety
from expulsion or to materially benefit from these exclusionary exercises. They ended up
appropriating the properties including the meagre material possessions and the homes
of those who were taken away by police for deportation. Some of the mukhbars or
informers of local police who regularly disclosed the whereabouts of ‘illegal migrants’
were themselves Bangladeshi migrants holding tenuous immigration status in India.
New forms of social fragmentation and exploitation tied with, and emerging out of, the
coercive practices of migrant detention and deportation combined with the contentious
aiding and abetting role assumed by non-state actors have still to be documented. It must
be emphasized, however, that these invisible and informal processes distort neat
distinctions between so-called state and non-state/private actors generally ascribed by
contemporary studies on migrant detention and deportation (Martin 2017; Conlon and
Hiemstra 2014). Arguing for a deeper engagement with migrant detention processes,
Flynn (2017, 15) has observed that the “deprivation of liberty of migrants and asylum
seekers often takes place in venues that occupy a grey area of state authority”.

Several of New Delhi’s marginal settlements where my research was conducted have
been dismantled over the years by local authorities, using the claim that they were
‘illegal’ or unlawful encroachments on public lands (Bhan 2016; Roy 2010; Menon-Sen
and Bhan 2008; Dupont 2008; Menon-Sen 2006, 2010). Displaced residents of these
demolished slums are generally eligible for alternate, albeit less-desirable, housing on the
outskirts of the city. However, residents deemed to be the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’
have also been excluded from access to alternate plots of land. Low-income locations
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perceived to be the residential areas of such migrants, the “Bangladeshi-prone spaces”
and their “hiding holes”, as a senior official from the department responsible for slums
and jhuggi-jhonpris characterized them, will no longer be allowed to exist for extended
periods. A similar pattern is likely developing at other locations in India, such as the
recent forced evictions of ‘Bengali Muslims’ from the periphery of the Kaziranga National
Park in Assam (Mukhtiar, Nath and Deka 2018). In this respect too, the precariousness
experienced by these targeted weaker groups is increasing, even as it has become more
difficult to assimilate into local communities (Kirmani 2013; Bhaduri 2011). The risks of
everyday lives discussed briefly in Chapter 3 is now an established reality for these
migrants. They may not always be subjected to apprehension and removal from Indian
territories. But they face a repeated cycle of forced mobility reinforced through the
persistent threat of arrest, detention and deportation. Both mobility and immobility may
not correspond neatly with or, for that matter, represent freedom and choice or its
inverse. De Genova’s (2002) notion of deportability is certainly relevant in this context.

A

latest

empirical

study

with

migrants

and

deportees

from

Bangladesh’s

Morrelgunj/Moralgunj region has underscored the perpetual fear of being deported and
the precariousness it produces for their fragile existence in New Delhi and Bangalore
(Percot 2018). Their self-image as “useful workers” and “culturally-close individuals” to
Indians contrasted sharply with the stigmatization and xenophobia they encountered.
The insecurity experienced by such groups is growing. Exclusion from services and
resources commensurate with their economic standing are an added consequence. The
threefold agenda of the Action Plan’ devised by the authorities in the early 1990s, to
detect, delete and deport such unwanted ‘illegal Bangladeshis’ by identifying their
locations, undoing their inclusion by taking away their rights such as voting privileges
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and other entitlements, and finally, expulsion from India is carrying on (Hindustan Times
1992d). Efforts were made to identify the ‘D’ or ‘Dubious Citizens’ to disqualify suspected
‘illegal migrants’ from voting rights and through it, diminish their value as supposed
‘vote-banks’ for certain political parties (Hindustan Times 1992b; Roy 2012). Serious
consideration was given to a national program of multi-purpose identity-cards for Indian
citizens in order to differentiate them from the unwanted migrants (Law Commission of
India 2000; Hindustan Times 1992d; Statesman 1992a). More recent strategies draw on these
core objectives and rationale of the older schemes and extend this exclusion further.

Bangladesh’s stance has moved from outright denial and rejection of the migrant
detainees as its citizens. This denialism, persisting for much of the 1990s and the early
2000s, was discussed in Chapter 4. It affected the formal expulsion of the detainees and
entrenched ‘pushback’ as the common mode of forced removals, using the threat of
violence, of the unwanted residents from Indian territories. Bangladesh also actively
blocked these ‘pushbacks’ which affected both the volume and modes of removal from
Indian territories. In a highly-publicized episode that occurred in 2003, the two countries
squabbled over the fate of a small group of persons stranded in ‘no-man’s land’ by
characterizing them as each other’s citizens (Ramachandran 2005). While Bangladesh
may not want to accept India’s unwanted residents without conclusive evidence of who
they are from the Indian government, it has begun regularly arresting small numbers of
its own citizens as they attempt to cross the shared border into Indian territories. This
noticeable change has occurred since the passage of a shared strategy of transnational
deterrence, the Coordinated Border Management Plan (CBMP) signed by the border
enforcement agencies of both countries (Government of Bangladesh 2011; Habib 2011).
Ariful’s extended incarceration with his grandparents in Bangladesh, discussed in
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Chapter 6, provides additional evidence of the transnational, reciprocal effects of
escalated controls and rising xenophobia by individual states. Finally, the impact of
border control mechanisms, like migrant detention and deportation, needs to be gauged
in relation to other evolving processes of Aadhaar and the National Register for Citizens,
with far-reaching implications for vulnerable groups.

Another important point highlighted in this study is that mobility outside the passports
and visa regime defines the boundaries of ‘irregularity’, though not fully. ‘Irregularity’
and undesirability do share common characteristics and the entry of those who have
arrived without documents has certainly been criminalized and securitized through
public discourses and escalating border controls, but not entirely. Religion and ethnic
bases have whittled historical and contemporary constructions of the ‘irregular
Bangladeshi migrant’ in significant ways and so, too, have class-based disadvantages.
More troublingly, commonalities of religion and ethnicity beyond national borders, have
entrenched particular images about persons who can be perceived to be the unlawful
outsiders. My own research in New Delhi’s marginal spaces found that local police
focused on Muslim-populated areas and remained choosy in detaining this group to a
very large extent. Migrant respondents were constrained to camouflage two distinctive
aspects of their identity — their birth and/or origin in neighbouring Bangladesh and their
faith-based characteristics. Migrant participants repeatedly claimed that it was their
religious background, as Muslims, that had rendered their existence in India illegitimate,
not their informal modes of border-crossing. This opinion was shared by insignificant
citizens with the same faith whose presence, even if lawful, was also rendered dubious
through these shored up prejudices and limitations for confirming citizenship status. In
other words, religion has become a prominent marker of illegitimacy. The contours of
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xenophobia have thus been shaped in significant ways by the robust Islamophobic strains
of the Hindu’s right nationalism in India and its growth.

My migrant respondents often emphasized the shared past of the adjacent, demarcated
territories of India and Bangladesh (and Pakistan) and the overlapping socio-cultural
systems across national borders. “There is really no difference between us. Indians and
Bangladeshis are the same”, one participant claimed. “It is just a line on a map. It really
does not really mean anything”, argued a more well-informed, relatively well-educated,
migrant key informant in a poorer neighbourhood. But, other developments have made
it plain that these differences of nationality and place of birth increasingly matter in the
case of certain mobile bodies and their presence within India. In the mixed localities
where they reside, ethnic commonalities have played a vital, negative role in drawing
attention to particular locations and their specific residents. Migrant evasions are less
visible and, for that matter, less successful here. The presence of other Muslim and
Bengali bodies, even Indian ones, are sufficient incentive to bring negative attention, even
when there are no ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants.’ Crude ideas drawing on the shared
traits have driven the fraught identification of the ‘Bangladeshi-prone spaces’. Moreover,
the residents of these areas, the ‘insiders’ so to speak, are familiar with their neighbours
and newcomers that may appear on the scene.

As the concluding section of the previous chapter briefly discussed, the current BJP
regime ruling India has proceeded to consolidate these xenophobic tendencies even
further. Two new announcements steer these biases in favour of Hindu migrants even
more securely. Through them, the Hindutva forces are seeking to fulfill their longstanding
intention to assimilate this group from neighbouring countries as rightful members of the
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Hinduized nation-state of India. At a public rally at Silchar, Assam, during election
campaigning in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had rationalized his party’s
unconcealed intention:
We have a responsibility towards Hindus who are harassed and suffer in other
countries. Where will they go? India is the only place for them…We will have to
accommodate them here…As soon as we come to power…detention camps
housing Hindu migrants from Bangladesh will be done away with (PTI 2014).
To make this plan more palatable to the north-east provinces, who are opposed to all
migrants irrespective of their religious identity and date of entry, newer arrivals would
be dispersed in various parts of India, he added (Ghosh 2014). As previously pledged,
these changes release Hindu migrants from neighbouring countries from the onerous
requirements of immigration regulations and fast-track their formal inclusion through
relaxed access to citizenship rights.

These selective proposals have been made less overt through the deliberate addition of
other religious minorities. Aside from the Hindus, identified beneficiaries now include
Sikhs, Jains, Parsis and Christians from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, but
glaringly omits Muslims (Government of India 2016). The first of these proposals is the
Citizenship Amendment Bill (Government of India 2016) which aims to codify into law
largely informal (and some official) practices skewed in favor of Hindus and others who
have migrated to India without visas and remained in India as ‘over-stayers’ (Kumar
2018; Gauba and Singh 2017). As Jayal (2017) notes, these proposed changes reveal
unambiguously the majoritarian and exclusionary tendencies long underway in the
conception of Indian citizenship. It will be easier for such groups to naturalize as Indians
by selectively shortening the required waiting period to apply for citizenship status from
eleven to six years (Hindu, 2016). As anticipated, these planned changes have not been
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welcomed by many states of north-east India that shun all those with non-localized
identities as unwanted, illegitimate migrants, irrespective of their religious identities,
citizenship status and even longstanding presence (Barooah 2016). This Bill has already
received legal challenge through Public Interest Litigations (PILs) by groups from Assam.
In the latest parliamentary discussions over these proposed revisions, other political
parties have opposed these changes, some suggesting the exclusion of Bangladesh from
these exceptions (Chatterji 2018). The issue has not yet been settled.

Even if these revisions are not endorsed by the Court and MPs, changes to immigration
regulations in late 2015 through the Passport (Entry into India) Amendment Rules and
Foreigners Rules have already legally entrenched this faith-based differentiation
(Government of India 2015). At the end of Chapter 6, this momentous shift was briefly
discussed. Similar to the Citizenship Amendment Bill, it exempts all of the identified
religious minorities from these neighbouring countries “who were compelled to seek
shelter in India due to religious persecution or fear of religious persecution and entered
India before the 31st of December 2014” from visa and passport rules (p. 3). These groups
can continue to remain in India and will not be prosecuted under the severe terms of the
Foreigners Act, even if they entered without valid documents such as passports and visas
or continued to remain in India after the expiry of such documents. Remarkably, this
means that legally only Muslim migrants deemed to have entered India before the end of
2014 would be considered as ‘irregular migrants’. In effect, the figure of the ‘irregular
migrant’ has merged even more robustly with the figure of the Muslim resident and/or
entrant. Even if north-eastern provinces, especially Assam, ignore such religion-based
differentiation in enforcement, affected individuals can legally challenge their
deportation orders.
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Given the ascendancy of dominant religious identities in the regional neighbourhood of
South Asia and associated violent proclivities targeting minorities on a transnational
scale, there is a certain plausibility in accommodating these persecuted individuals. But,
there is little doubt that this agenda has long been driven by xenophobic politics and
influenced minimally by humanitarian ideals. For these right-wing forces, their
established goal of projecting India as the rightful ‘homeland’ for Hindus and boosting
Hindu numbers has strategically driven these new schemes. In yet another calculated
tactic, and by generously adding other groups, it exaggerates the rigid nature of Islam
and its seemingly regressive, fundamentalist tendencies active in neighbouring countries,
while downplaying its own faith-based bigotries and its violent, exclusionary proclivities.
Unfortunately, these latest discriminatory qualities are being deeply entrenched in
multiple formal and informal ways in a national setting where the general insecurity
experienced by religious minorities, prominently Muslims, has witnessed a sharp
upward curve. Grounded in empirical research, several newer studies have pointed to
the growing socio-spatial segregation, ghettoization and continued economic and
political marginalization of this group, confirming their weakening position in India since
well before the establishment of the current political dispensation that is anchored
securely within the Hindutva agenda (Mukhtiar et al. 2018; Shaban 2018; Chatterjee 2015,
2017; Contractor 2012; Gayer and Jeffrey 2012a, 2012b; Jaffrelot and Thomas 2012).

Localities or neighbourhoods with large concentrations of Muslims are increasingly
referred to as the ‘chotta Pakistan’ or ‘mini-Pakistans’ (Shaban 2018; Punyani 2018;
Kirmani 2013; Raman 2007), locating their supposed rightful ‘place’ in the adjacent ‘risky
geographies’. It deterritorializes such spaces and denationalizes their occupants as the
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enemies, aggressors and traitors (Shaban 2018). A new study on the normalization of antiMuslim biases among Indian schoolchildren discusses the overt displays of bullying,
negativity and stereotyping aimed at the Muslim students, who are commonly branded
as ‘terrorists’ and repeatedly represented as social and security threats (Erum 2017).
Muslim children from less privileged backgrounds are pejoratively termed as
‘Bangladeshis’, while others are identified as ‘Pakistanis’. These new forms of prejudicedriven tagging and classification question the legitimacy of the Indian Muslims’ presence
in India, by recasting them as the unwanted and ‘illegal migrants’. To this extent, the
politics of the Hindu right has had a powerful role in the reconstitution of Indian-ness
and belonging for an extended period, even during years when they were not part of the
ruling dispensation.

Since mid-2014, when a BJP-led government came to power, these xenophobic and antiMuslim tendencies have been sharpened even further. The proliferation of newer groups
attached to the Hindu right, at least some of whom unhesitatingly employ forceful means
to achieve their exclusionary goals, is yet another disturbing aspect. Prominent among
these are the self-styled vigilante groups of gau rakhshaks or cow saviours/protectors
zealously engaging in unprovoked attacks on Muslims and others seen to be denigrating
Hindu religious practices. Often, unproven rumours have been sufficient provocation for
these vicious episodes of aggression, resulting in the brutal lynching of targeted
individuals. The transformation of India into a homogenized Hinduized nation-space
with deepening social (and associated economic) hierarchies and vulnerabilities related
to religious identities is proceeding apace. In Chapter 5, using the unusual example of
cattle (read cows) identity documents to prevent their cross-border ‘smuggling’ to
Bangladesh, it was contended that it is not the informal nature of flows across the
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country’s borders outside the formal passport-visa regimes and state sanction that
arouses enormous unease and anxiety, but the particular meanings ascribed to them. In
the Hindu right’s version of Hinduism, cows are treated as sacred animals and the
cultural practices of the dominant group is to define acceptable social behaviour over and
above national belonging. Unsurprisingly, the current government has declared its
intention to issue identity-cards along the lines of Aadhaar for Indian cows along with its
human citizens to protect them from various internal and external threats (Haq 2018;
Mahapatra 2017).

These broad strategies of control are particular, and sometimes peculiar, manifestations
of the governmentality of unease in a context where the differences between ‘us’ and
‘them’, the rightful insiders and the unlawful, threatening outsiders correspondingly are
highly fuzzy and indistinct and such anxieties have heightened over time. But, the extent
to which such massive, highly sophisticated and extremely costly exercises actually
address existing concerns or even alleviate these fears continue to be largely doubtful. As
recent writings have observed (Brown 2010; Andreas 2009), such practices operate as
“spectacles of control” and emphasize the sovereign power of the state in an era of
eroding state authority. They prop up the desired, and much-needed, image of the state
robustly engaged in tackling complicated, often unmanageable, but well-entrenched
processes. At the same time, and as my work shows, these control strategies often
exacerbate such anxieties and produce newer fears and challenges to the detriment of
vulnerable populations. As gargantuan exercises involving the participation of many
millions, and not just the undesirable ones carrying heavy financial costs, they have also
presented new, formidable hurdles for the Indian state.
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The heightening preoccupation with the ‘IBIS’, the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ and
other particular configurations have produced newer unfavorable outcomes for other
migrant groups, in particular, asylum-seekers seeking a safe haven from persecution and
human rights violations. The escalation of immigration controls against unwanted ‘illegal
migrants’ in recent years and the lack of exemptions for asylum-seekers and refugees
from inflexible immigration rules, such as the Foreigners Act, has made such entrants
vulnerable to arrest, imprisonment and forcible expulsion as ‘illegal migrants’ (Zutshi et
al. 2011). India is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention on Refugees and its 1967
Protocol (Murshid 2014). Besides, there is no national legislation governing the
humanitarian protection of persecuted persons or, for that matter, a concrete framework
requiring or even obligating the acceptance of asylum-seekers (Sarker 2017). The crude
but pervasive representation of the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrant’ as insignificant Muslim
residents also comes into play here, adding to the insecurity of certain groups of forced
migrants. Another country to whom larger numbers of migrants have been expelled in
recent years is Myanmar (Rajya Sabha 2012, 2010). The deportees are believed to have
consisted largely of Rohingya refugees who have been increasingly marginalized by the
Buddhist majority in Myanmar. Faced with growing hostility and rejection by
Bangladesh as by other regional states, these refugees routinely enter India without
documents via this country’s borders and may easily be mistakenly branded as ‘IBIS’
(Ghosh 2016). The Indian government had declared its intention to deport the 40,000 or
so Rohingya refugees living in various parts of this country last year and more recently
reiterated this plan to the Supreme Court (Scroll.in 2018; Johari 2017; Jain 2017; Kumar
2017).
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Since anti-Muslim antipathies are a staple feature of the Hindu right’s politics, the
attention now being given to these refugee arrivals is not unexpected. Here again,
migrants’ religious identity and unverified fears about the potential threats they
seemingly pose to national security through radicalization and active support for extreme
Islamist terrorist groups are directing action. Other far right groups tied to the Sangh
Parivar, especially the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) or the World Council of Hindus
have vociferously opposed asylum for these refugees in India, characterizing them as
“security threats” and attributing their presence to sinister intentions rather than ethnic
persecution (Tribune 2016). For example, recent episodes of terrorist violence, specifically,
the attacks on army bases in the Nagrota and Samba area of Jammu and Kashmir state in
November of last year have been blamed on the refugees, even though little evidence
exists of the Rohingyas’ involvement (A. Sharma 2017). The decline of longstanding
voluntary modes of refugee assistance by the Indian state and accumulating
“discretionary humanitarianism” (Fassin 2011) beyond the established international
asylum norms is another damaging consequence of the particular delineations of
‘irregularity’ tied to religious identities and escalating immigration and border controls.

My research findings show that poverty and deprivation have recently brought many
more migrants to India, but not with the sinister intentions commonly attributed to them.
Always unprompted, many of my migrant research participants openly expressed their
deep gratitude to Indians for readily accepting them and assimilating them as citizens.
“How can we harm this country and its people when it gave us shelter when we arrived
with nothing and included us as one of their own.” “We want to be accepted as Indians”,
they repeatedly articulated. While their appreciation was heartfelt, one could not fail to
register the profound sense of incongruity as they occupied some of the worst and most
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neglected urban spaces. The risky act of mobility, which would become dangerous once
the border was securitized, had elevated the migrants’ existence, to some extent, from the
bare, subsistence level. Yet, it is this socio-spatial marginality in which they are embedded
that has marked them out as easy targets of xenophobia. Many would also ask why after
having been integrated as de jure citizens and allowed to reestablish their lives in India,
they were being rejected and forcibly removed. This vital query carries deep resonance
even today.

Given the specific circumstances, discussed here as capricious citizenship, the clear-cut
differences between legitimate citizens and illegitimate ‘foreigners’ have been obscured
to a great extent. This has produced unresolved and deep-seated misgivings about the
country’s residents, especially those following a particular religion as well as the lowwaged, insignificant residents. As Sarifuddin’s tragic death shows, when xenophobic
tendencies escalate in an unchecked manner, sketchy understandings of who constitutes
a non-citizen outsider can inform extreme and egregious actions. The narrative accounts
of Moyna, Sarifuddin and others presented in this work confirm that the tag of the
illegitimate resident and/or entrant is highly damaging and risk-laden in many ways. It
permits a wide range of violent, extreme actions by hostile citizens and enforcing
authorities against those branded as illegitimate, even as it minimizes any recourse for
challenging such punitive actions. Sarifuddin’s deadly lynching and other episodes
discussed in this dissertation illustrate that the label of the ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrant’
or ‘IBI’ is both difficult and dangerous for its recipients. From arrest by police and border
security personnel, prolonged detention of indefinite span and incarceration in various
prison-like institutions, such recipients will face a range of conducts targeting their
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presence. Indigent migrants whose mobilities occurred outside the passport regime can
be easily trapped by a crimmigration regime apathetic to their plight.

The possibilities of misidentification are also very high. Those believed to be
unauthorized outsiders are not accepted, even if they assimilate fully through the
adoption of local languages, socio-cultural norms, and even spousal relationships with
indigenous persons and no matter how long they have lived as model residents of India.
In Sarifuddin’s case, even his marriage to a local Naga woman from the Sumi tribe and
young daughter who could claim insider status through birth and partly through
indigeneity, could not overcome his false branding as an unlawful ‘IBI’ and the
considerable hazards his perceived identity carried. In this respect, the Hindu right’s
tactical deployment of ‘infiltration’ has been a triumphant achievement, for it has
achieved exactly what it intended to. It has transformed two groups, migrant and citizen
Muslims, into illegitimate or ‘illegal’ and threatening outsiders. In a context of
unrestrained xenophobia, the difficult tag of the ‘illegal migrant’ has widespread potency
which is rarely questioned or carefully examined.

Other recent developments suggest that the boundaries of ‘irregularity’ remain contested
and unresolved, especially in India’s north-east. Legal petitions are pending with the
Supreme Court seeking to recede the date of acceptance of refugees in Assam nearer the
Partition (by undoing the current cutoff point of 24 March 1971 around the formation of
Bangladesh) (Saikia 2017). Broadly speaking, these claims contend that the acceptance of
refugees who arrived from the former East Pakistan, and lax border controls to curb
subsequent ‘illegal migrant’ arrivals, have been discriminatory to the Constitutional
rights, security and survival of indigenous and ethnic groups of Assam (Supreme Court
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2014). A five-member Constitution Bench is to begin hearings on the issue (Mustafa 2018).
If this demand is accepted, then a larger swathe of residents in Assam state will be
declared as ‘illegal Bangladeshis’ (Kashyap 2017). An obvious incongruity is that
Bangladesh itself did not come into being some two decades after this chosen date. As
my analysis has shown, the term ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ is a glaring misnomer in
several key respects in this fraught scenario, merging different migrant and non-migrant
groups together. There is a constant slippage between its formal contours through the
law and the straightforward association in public opinion of those who arrived at various
times from territories now recognized as Bangladesh. It delineations through existing
policies and legislation is also being challenged in courts and manipulated in other ways.

In Chapter 6, it was shown that the heated issue of the ‘irregular migrant’ has acquired
renewed significance in the present-day with the unfolding massive projects of the
National Citizens’ Register (NRC) and Aadhaar. These are national databases with very
similar objectives, also relying on biometric information of residents, expected to
converge at some point. As of the end of January of 2017, over 111 crore or 1.11 billion
Aadhaar cards had been issued to residents (UIDAI 2017). Troubling questions linger
about its operational effectiveness, especially with regards to the privacy of individual
data and its potential misuse, persistent technical problems, and equally importantly,
inclusion of marginal groups. The Supreme Court previously ruled that Aadhaar could
not be imposed as a mandatory requirement for residents. Despite that, state authorities
at national, provincial and localized levels have been actively linking just about any and
all services and entitlements to this database, including bank accounts, school and
university enrolment and even cooking gas connections. It is evident that exclusion will
bring great difficulties to those denied access to such cards. Empirical research with
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vulnerable groups will reveal the extent to which marginal communities have been
accommodated by this exercise, though early indications are not positive (Bhatnagar
2017).

The Census Office, or the Office of the Registrar-General & Census Commissioner is
currently working on the National Population Register (NPR), a comprehensive archive
of usual residents, out of which the National Register of Citizens (NRC) is to be fashioned.
Given its intent, it will only list citizens and entry into this catalogue would be the final,
conclusive confirmation of Indian citizenship. The data for the Population Register was
collected during 2010 and 2011 through the course of the regular decadal census
operations, which was updated in 2015 through door-to-door surveys (Office of the
Registrar-General & Census Commissioner 2017a). This collective information is now
being digitized and the process has already been concluded or is near completion in many
provinces (Office of the Registrar-General & Census Commissioner 2017b). The sole
exception is the province of Assam with a long history of xenophobic, ‘anti-foreigner’
tendencies where the actual Register of Citizens is being created since 2014, and through
it an in-depth inventory of legitimate citizens being carried out by the state-level
administration. This significant undertaking was imposed by India’s Supreme Court
(2014) in its shared judgment for several different Public Interest Litigations/PILs
involving the ‘irregular Bangladeshis’, their presence in Assam and its governance by
authorities. Since then, this two-member bench led by Justices Nariman and Gogoi has
been monitoring and decisively steering the NRC process for Assam and its unfolding.

It is also no coincidence that this exercise has been approved and is being conducted by
central and state governments headed by the anti-immigrant Hindu right Bharatiya
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Janata Party. Its execution proceeded more briskly after a new BJP regime was elected in
Assam in 2016. Sarbananda Sonowal, Assam’s Chief Minister who quit the Asom Gana
Parishad/AGP in 2011 to join the BJP was the key petitioner in a landmark Public Interest
Ligitation/PIL case during the previous decade involving the ‘irregular Bangladeshis’. In
its problematic ruling (as briefly noted in Chapter 5), the Supreme Court (2005, 35) had
declared that Assam was experiencing protracted “external aggression and internal
disturbance” on account of the “large-scale illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals”.
Such unwanted migrations were perceived as a form of “aggression” against India and
uniformly threatening phenomenon (p. 35). The Asom Gana Parishad was formed by the
coalition of groups which spearheaded the ‘anti-foreigners’ movement in this province
from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s. Extended national and localized histories of
xenophobia centering on the unwanted, albeit nebulous, figure of the ‘irregular
Bangladeshi migrant’, and in the case of Assam, coalescing with narrower
understandings of the legitimate insider have informed and shaped these latest
developments. As Roy’s (2016) assessment notes, the fraught legacy of belonging and
associated politics in this province makes this important project a selective exercise of
identifying the ‘authentic’ Assamese-Indian citizens or Indian citizens who can be treated
as legitimate residents of Assam. The deepening of consensus on this pivotal issue
amongst various political and social quarters in India over time has paved the way for
the escalation of controls and implementation of such undertakings.

To be added to this database and deemed a citizen, Assam’s residents had to trace their
own or their ancestor’s presence in Assam on or before March 24, 1971 through two
databases, the 1951 NRC for Assam (created in a non-transparent manner out of the
Census data) and electoral rolls until 1971. For most residents falling in the latter
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category, they were required to identify their ancestors (father, grandfather’s name) in
these databases and provide linking official documents confirming this familial
relationship (Roy 2016). In the first draft completed at the end of last year, 19 out of 32.9
million residents were approved for the database. In the second and final draft version
released at the end of July of 2018, some 4 million persons, or 12 percent of its residents
were excluded (Saha 2018). Among those omitted are close relatives of India’s fifth
President, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, whose ancestor’s name did not appear in the legacy
data (Scroll.in 2018). Such excluded individuals are going to be allowed to make “claims”
and “objections” and this process was originally expected to commence on 30 August of
2018 and continue till late September or October. The final list of Assam’s Register of
Citizens is to be published at the end of this year.

The Standard Operating Procedure devised by the central government to accept and
adjudicate claims and objections of those excluded from the final draft list is being
currently considered by the Supreme Court (Rajagopal 2018). Rejected residents are to be
given a short window of opportunity to be involved in this process to finalize the list, and
after exhausting that option will need to approach the Foreigners’ Tribunals (quasiautonomous judicial tribunals operational only in this province) to determine their
citizenship status (Chakravarty 2018a). However, what continues to be unaddressed is
how these affected persons, especially those omitted due to weaknesses of documentary
evidence, will overcome this formidable barrier to participate with certainty in the
revision process. The robust procedural hurdles faced by marginal residents and its
accompanying risks have not been addressed at all by the Supreme and Guwahati High
courts. According to some reports, a separate, active process of detecting and detaining
‘illegal Bangladeshis’ by the Assam Border Police is slowly linking itself to the register’s
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creation despite the Supreme Court ruling out coercive action against those excluded
from the draft citizens’ lists (Donthi 2018; Mohan 2018a, 2018b). At least 1000 persons
branded as ‘irregular Bangladeshis’ are believed to be held in six detention centers carved
out of existing prisons in Assam. Assam’s government has recently received approval
and funding from the central government to create a standalone detention center with a
capacity of 3000 persons (Human Rights Watch 2018; Chakravarty 2018b).

A new report arising from an early 2018 fact-finding mission to selected detention centers
in Assam by the National Human Rights Commission’s Special Monitor for Minorities
confirmed that many of those being held there are in all probability Indian citizens
mistakenly labelled as ‘irregular Bangladeshis’ (NHRC 2018). This group is unlikely to
be accepted by Bangladesh and will endure protracted detention and legal limbo. In its
judgment for the PIL cases discussed briefly earlier, the Supreme Court (2014) had
directed the Government of India to establish a formal deportation treaty with
Bangladesh to expedite the expulsion of these unwanted migrants. Such a cooperative
endeavor is unworkable if the citizenship status of those branded as ‘illegal Bangladeshis’
is not accepted by India’s eastern neighbor. In its submission for this litigation, the
Government of India had acknowledged the persistent challenges in conclusively
establishing the nationality of apprehended migrants and its inhibiting effect on the
deportation process:
In the absence of a proper laid down procedure for deportation of illegal migrants
between the Government of India and Government of Bangladesh, it has become
difficult to carry out deportations. As such the deportation of foreigners is mainly
carried out through the ‘push back’ method (Supreme Court of India 2014, 28).
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A latest statement by the Ministry of Home Affairs to MPs acknowledges the absence of
“a specific treaty or agreement with the Government of Bangladesh regarding
repatriation of its citizens who have illegally entered India” (Rajya Sabha 2018b).

Difficult questions remain about the future of those who do not feature in the register and
are also subsequently rejected by the tribunals. After the first draft was completed at the
beginning of this year, Assam’s Chief Minister had affirmed that such persons shall hold
few rights in India. “People who are declared foreigners will be barred from all
Constitutional and fundamental rights” and will be only allowed to remain in India on
humanitarian grounds till the courts reach a decision regarding their expulsion, he had
maintained (Kalita 2018). BJP President Amit Shah recently declared that the NRC is the
“process to throw illegal migrants out”, laying emphasis on the expulsion of rejected
individuals (Indian Express 2018). A BJP legislator from Telangana has gone further,
openly calling for the use of violence against the unwanted migrants: “If these Rohingyas
and Bangladeshi illegal immigrants do not leave India respectfully, then they should be
shot and eliminated. Only then will our country be safe” (Hindustan Times 2018). It is the
limitations of existing spaces in India’s carceral system and available fiscal resources to
hold larger numbers of suspected migrants, that too for extended periods which has
prevented the exercise of mass incarceration and expulsion. Bangladesh has already
stated that the NRC is an ‘internal matter’ of India and it will not accept any of these
rejected residents unless India offers proof that they are its citizens and it is able to
independently verify such claims (bdnews24.com 2018; Maheshwari 2018). In 2016 and
2017, only 39 persons held in Assam’s detention centers were formally deported to
Bangladesh after conclusive verification of their nationality (Rajya Sabha 2018a).
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These persistent challenges notwithstanding, the strength of these latest mechanisms of
Aadhaar and the National Register of Citizens is that they enable the seamless control of
residents and non-residents across the entire national territorial spaces through the
regular categorization and reclassification of residents, their constant surveillance, and
the elimination of unwanted elements, even those previously included in such databases.
Rajya Sabha MPs were informed recently that the Unique Identification Authority of
India/UIDAI has deactivated or cancelled some 8.1 million Aadhaar cards due to
perceived inconsistencies in submitted documents and biometric details (Rajya Sabha
2017a). Through such enforcement practices, state authorities are and will continue to
actively un-assimilate groups that were absorbed and integrated into local communities
as Indians. The formal and informal assimilation of migrants and refugees in earlier
periods also brings into focus the difficult, unaddressed reality that at least a section of
those migrants have existed in India for many decades with their families. Their
precarious future and that of successive generations tied to such persons also requires
critical discussion, which has not materialized at all so far.

The National Citizens’ Register project shows that the grand bureaucratic exercise of
conclusively cataloging and sorting legitimate citizens from ‘illegal migrants’ and rightful
insiders from unwanted outsiders is incomplete. That these two vital sets of dualistic
categories do not overlap or converge neatly in national and localized imaginations,
particularly in India’s north-eastern region, presents a formidable challenge. Of course,
the very formation of postcolonial nation-states in the Indian subcontinent grounded in
dominant religious identities and the significant maneuvering by the Hindu right-wing
forces in recent decades have given it a particular slant, further distorting these
categories. Be that it may, the value of this mammoth undertaking cannot be
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underestimated. Upon conclusion, and as an exercise in the institutional demarcation of
citizens, it will resolve its undetermined boundaries, at least as far as the Indian state is
concerned. For indigent and vulnerable residents who are constantly at risk of being
falsely branded as the ‘IBIs’ or ‘illegal Bangladeshi immigrants’, their keen hope is that
once completed, it will finally uphold their status as lawful Indians and eliminate the
insecurity they constantly experience.

Driven strongly as it is by the insistent imperative to mark out, punish and exclude
‘irregular migrants’ and undesirable, unwanted residents in a context of rapidly
intensifying religious and xenophobic bias, the outcome is more likely to reject instead of
protect the rights of disadvantaged citizens. The procedural requirements itself are set up
such that they are deeply disadvantageous to the country’s weakest residents, forcing
them to labour excessively by spending extended periods to acquire such documents in
order to confirm their domicile status. Perceptive accounts of this vital undertaking for
Assam and its unfolding by journalists, rights groups and others who draw on ground
reports and interviews with affected persons, expose a vexed bureaucratic process driven
by biases, stacked against the marginal persons (Donthi 2018; Mander 2018; Pisharoty
2018; Mohan 2018a, 2018b; Halarnkar 2017). Common procedural errors by careless
officials, such as misspelled names in state-issued documents or legacy data and the
absence of relevant official’s counter-signatures have resulted in the omission of some
applicants (Reuters 2018). A significant segment of those left out from the final draft are
rural women married by the time they reached puberty as is generally the case who could
not provide linking data to their fathers’ names, only offering gram panchayat (villagelevel leadership) or circle officers’ certificates as proof of their Indian citizenship
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(Pisharoty 2018). These documents were considered as weak links because of a strong
suspicion that they could be forged, leading to their rejection. It is also not surprising that
many of those facing the imminent risk of permanent rejection from this important
database

and

long-term

consequences

arising

out

of

it

are

non-Assamese

individuals/groups, prominently those holding the Bengali and Muslim identity
(Mander 2018). These are the two groups whose ethnic attributes overlap closely with
that of the ‘irregular Bangladeshis’. As can be expected, a substantial number of those
excluded are indigent residents with the weakest capacity to acquire and submit such
official documents. However, just how these obstacles can be concretely overcome by
those who cannot present multiple documents to strengthen their claims to Indian-ness,
has not been addressed. As Chapter 5 discussed, the persistent slipperiness associated
with the fixing and confirmation of citizenship status itself has not yet been resolved.

It is also evident that enormous fear and suspicion about the contaminating presence of
‘illegitimate’ residents amongst rightful citizens are driving this exercise. Interior
immigration control is as vital in such a scenario as the fortification of the border zones
at the peripheries of the nation-state. In a twisted paradox, marginal tribal communities
in north-eastern states like Assam who can strongly claim autochthonous or indigenous
status in this region cannot also conclusively establish their lineage and citizenship
through the myriad documentary evidence required by authorities. Sympathetic local
officials may be able to ensure that such groups are accommodated by overlooking such
deficiencies. After all, they are seen to belong as rightful insiders in these localized
contexts and such discretionary powers have been conferred on state authorities. It must
be noted here that exceptions have been made for the “original inhabitants of Assam”,
who like many other marginal persons may not be able to acquire and offer such
234

documents for this exercise (Roy 2016). State officials are authorized to back up the
veracity of their claims. Such generous considerations are, however, far less likely to be
extended to Muslims and indigent residents with non-localized identities, who encounter
the identical procedural and identification-based challenges.

In liberal societies premised on moral and legal equality for all, Ngai (2014) has observed,
‘illegal migrants’ are “impossible subjects”, whose presence is a social reality yet a legal
impossibility. This unfeasibility, she adds, can be resolved in only one of two ways,
through legalization of status or deportation and permanent expulsion from the receiving
state. In India, both these approaches or solutions are unsustainable as far as ‘illegal
Bangladeshi migrants’ are concerned. Given the high-pitched, homogenous official and
public rhetoric vociferously opposed to their presence, no matter how long their tenure
in India, even extending for several decades, amnesty through formal inclusion is an
untenable solution. The generous acceptance of residents into the National Citizens’
Register and access to the Aadhaar cards is deemed to be discriminatory to the rightful
citizens. Of course, the greatest irony here is that the latter option, of removals or
deportations from national territories, is also not workable on a large scale and regular
basis. This is because the Indian state cannot provide conclusive documentary evidence
or proof to its neighbour that its unwanted residents are, in fact, ‘illegal Bangladeshi
migrants’ and the latter’s citizens. If the limitations of capricious citizenship, of concretely
confirming their citizenship status to the satisfaction of authorities, has bedeviled many
insignificant residents, especially those whose ethnic identities correspond with that of
the so-called ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’, chiefly Muslims and Bengalis, then the
Indian state itself has not escaped its problematic effects. The predominant use of the
coercive pushback method to forcibly expel unwanted migrants using the threat of
235

violence is yet another striking outcome of these vexed arrangements. Moyna’s
protracted detention was partly caused by the refusal of Bangladeshi border forces to
accept her as their citizen.

Ultimately though, it is the formation of a new precariat of the so-called illegitimate
‘illegal’ residents seen as not Indian and its broader ramifications that deserves the
greatest critical scrutiny moving forward. The fact that this new cohort of stateless
persons is being forged out of two existing marginal groups, of poor and Muslim
residents, and that at least some of these individuals may not be ‘illegal’ at all is its most
obvious feature. Different generations of migrants and non-migrants are, and will
continue to be, disqualified from various rights and freedoms and face many other risky
consequences. The obvious illiberality and unfairness of forming such a weak social and
legal unit, deprived of basic protections that are the hallmarks of a liberal democracy, and
yet continuing to exist tenuously inside Indian geographical territories, requires urgent
research attention and deeper social reflection.
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Appendix A
Primary Materials and Interviews
Primary materials
1. Official documents and government publications
Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha Questions and Answers, Parliament of India, 1995-2018
Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha debates, Parliament of India, 1995-2018
Annual Reports, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1998-2018
Press Releases, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of
India, 2013-2018
Crime in India, National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1998-2016
Prison Statistics of India, National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, 19982016
Gazette of India, Government of India, 2015-2018
Law Commission of India. 175th Report on the Foreigners (Amendment) Bill, 2000. New
Delhi: Law Commission of India.
Standing Committee on Finance. 2011. The National Identification Authority of India Bill,
2010: Forty Second Report. New Delhi: Lok Sabha, Parliament of India.
2. Immigration and Citizenship Laws and Rules
Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003
Citizenship Amendment Bill, 2004
Citizenship Act, 1955
Foreigners Act, 1946
Foreigners Amendment Bill, 2004
Passport Act, 1920
Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939
3. Newspapers, magazines and print/online media sources
Aaj (Hindi)
Amar Ujala (Hindi)
Asian Age
Business Standard
Caravan: A Journal of Politics and Culture
Counter Currents
Dainik Bhaskar (Hindi)
Dainik Jagran (Hindi)
Daily News & Analysis
Daily O
Deccan Herald
Economic Times
Free Press Journal
Frontline
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Hindu
Hindustan (Hindi)
Hindustan Times
Illustrated Weekly of India
Indian Express
Independent
India Today (Hindi and English editions)
Jansatta (Hindi)
Mid-Day
Nagaland Post
Nayi Duniya (Indore) (Hindi)
Ndtv News
National Herald (New Delhi)
Navbharat Times (Hindi)
Observer of Business and Politics
Outlook India
Patriot
Pioneer
Punjab Kesari (Hindi)
Radiance Views Weekly
Rashtriya Sahara (Hindi)
Scroll.in
Statesman
Telegraph (Calcutta/Kolkata)
Times of India (New Delhi and Mumbai editions)
Tribune
Two Circles.net
Week
Wire
4. Other primary materials
PUCL Bulletin
Delhi Police media releases
Organiser (Hindu right publication in English)
Panchjanya (Hindu right publication in Hindi)

5. Selected case-law
Calcutta High Court (Appellate Side). Mallick Kumar Saha @Mahibur Rahaman v. the State,
CRA No. 37 of 2009, March 5, 2013.
Calcutta High Court (Appellate Side). Bishu Khan @Mahiruddin Khan v. the State, CRM
No. 3883 of 2013, March 9, 2013.
Calcutta High Court (Appellate Side). Md. Fakir Ali @Faker Ali Shah v. Unknown, CRM
No. 6103 of 2013, April 26, 2013.
Calcutta High Court (Appellate Side). Purna Chandra Mondal and Another v. the State,
CRR No. 894 of 2012, August 1, 2012.
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Calcutta High Court (Appellate Side). Dukhu Mia v. the State, C.R.R. 2482 of 2012,
September 17, 2012.
Delhi District Court. State v. 1. Anwar Hussain@Nata, Sessions Case no. 104/2011, January
21, 2012.
Delhi High Court. Razia Begum and Ors. v. State and Ors. Writ Petition (Crl.) no.
677/2008, August 12, 2008.
Karnataka High Court. Smt. Moyna v. Union of India, Case no.: WP/26123/2013 (GMPolice), Bangalore, August 2, 2013.
Supreme Court of India. Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Others v. Union of India & Others,
Writ Petition (Civil) 562/2012, December 17, 2014.
Supreme Court of India. Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India & Anr., Writ Petition (Civil)
131 of 2000, July 12., 2005.

Interviews
Note: For the safety and security of my migrant and non-migrant participants and/or key
informants, their names have been changed or concealed in some instances. The locations in New
Delhi where interviews were conducted have likewise been left undisclosed.
Group interview with 4 migrants, location 1, March 1, 1998
Group interview with non-migrants, location 8, September 5, 1998
Group interview with non-migrants, location 5, June 5, 1998
Interview with Indian migrant employer, New Delhi, March 1, 1998
Interview with Indian migrant employer, New Delhi, April 9, 1998
Informal interview with local official, New Delhi, April 12, 1998
Interview with L. Hussain, May 6, 1998
Interview with Rehana, location 7, May 7, 1998.
Key informant 1 interview, March 7, 1998
Key informant 2 interview, March 5, 1998
Key informant 3 interview, March 12, 1998
Key informant 4 interview, March 19, 1998
Key informant 5 interview, April 12, 1998
Key informant 6 interview, April 14, 1998
Interview with Bina and Gudiya, April 15, 1998
Interview with Rekha and Muniya, June 10, 1998
Group interview, location 3, June 10, 1998
Group interview, location 4, April 12, 1998
Interview with Mushtaq, March 1, 1998
Interview with Noori, March 15, 1998
Interview with Aman, March 15, 1998
Interview with Majid, March 3, 1998
Interview with Kamaal and Asad, February 25, 1998
Interview with Jamila, May 20, 1998
Interview with Rahman, February 12, 1998
Interview with Mahmood, May 5, 1998
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Interview with Zakia and Adib, May 5, 1998
Interview with Rateeba, April 15, 1998,
Interview with Sakeena, September 11, 1998
Interview with S. Trivedy, July 1, 1998
Interview with S. Hameed, May 12, 1998
Interview with T. Bose, March 5, 1998 and April 2, 1998
Interview with B. Sarkar, February 1, 1998
Interview with T. Bose, February 22, 1998 and April 2, 1998
Interview with R. Venkatraman, February 22, 1998
Phone interview with A. Rajan, June 13, 2013
Phone interview with S. Das, August 9, 2013
Personal communication with Moyna’s lawyer 1, January 10, 2018
Phone interview with Moyna’s lawyer 2, January 30, 2018
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conditions and those established by CCC's Billing and Payment terms and conditions,
these terms and conditions shall prevail.
WILEY expressly reserves all rights not specifically granted in the combination of (i)
the license details provided by you and accepted in the course of this licensing
transaction, (ii) these terms and conditions and (iii) CCC's Billing and Payment terms
and conditions.
This Agreement will be void if the Type of Use, Format, Circulation, or Requestor
Type was misrepresented during the licensing process.
This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of
the State of New York, USA, without regards to such state's conflict of law rules. Any
legal action, suit or proceeding arising out of or relating to these Terms and Conditions
or the breach thereof shall be instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction in New
York County in the State of New York in the United States of America and each party
hereby consents and submits to the personal jurisdiction of such court, waives any
objection to venue in such court and consents to service of process by registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested, at the last known address of such party.
WILEY OPEN ACCESS TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Wiley Publishes Open Access Articles in fully Open Access Journals and in Subscription
journals offering Online Open. Although most of the fully Open Access journals publish
open access articles under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) License
only, the subscription journals and a few of the Open Access Journals offer a choice of
Creative Commons Licenses. The license type is clearly identified on the article.
The Creative Commons Attribution License
The Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY) allows users to copy, distribute and
transmit an article, adapt the article and make commercial use of the article. The CC-BY
license permits commercial and nonCreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License
The Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial (CC-BY-NC)License permits use,
distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited
and is not used for commercial purposes.(see below)

Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-NoDerivs License
The Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial-NoDerivs License (CC-BY-NC-ND)
permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited, is not used for commercial purposes and no modifications or adaptations are
made. (see below)
Use by commercial "for-profit" organizations
Use of Wiley Open Access articles for commercial, promotional, or marketing purposes
requires further explicit permission from Wiley and will be subject to a fee.
Further details can be found on Wiley Online Library
http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-410895.html
Other Terms and Conditions:
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